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Abstract 
My critical study argues that a majority of traditional ‘nature’ poetry has not formed a 
language able to confront the acute problems of our current environmental moment. I 
suggest that what is needed within poetry is a kind of ‘ecological’ writing, writing that 
is not only about ecological subjects, but is in itself ecological: open to the pattern of 
relations existent between the human and the nonhuman. 
 
In my critical study I look at Adorno’s theories about the nonidentity of the nonhuman 
— the difference that human thought has suppressed in its attempt to achieve a 
unified and coherent identity — and how this nonidentity might paradoxically be 
revealed by the human foregrounding their inability to access it fully. Adorno argues 
that such nonidentical difference may be crucial in unpicking identificatory thinking 
practices, challenging the rigidity of reified human thought. I examine, through close 
reading, how Stevens’ poetry enacts the kind of paradox Adorno describes, moving 
between the intense desire to understand nonhuman life, and the awareness that 
nonhuman difference can never fully appear within human consciousness or language. 
The thesis argues for radical nonhuman difference as something able to emerge from 
the processes of flexible and resistive poetic language; a form perfectly suited to 
gesturing towards, though never fully containing, nonhuman difference, agency and 
being. In my critical study poetry demonstrates its ability to become ecological; 
offering up new cognitive possibilities the challenge the supposed coherence and 
rigidity of human identity and thought. 
 
WITCH, the creative portion of this thesis, explores difference as it appears for ‘female’ 
and differently gendered persons. The poems in WITCH use the transformative 
potential of magic, witchcraft and the occult to question what a feminist poetic 
language might look like; gesturing towards gendered difference and oppression, 
without containing or commodifying it. This collection re-connects poetry to its origin 
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Difference and the Struggle of Language 
 
Thought ... is an act of negation, of resistance to that which is forced upon it. 
Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics. 
 
A woman is an ever fickle, changeable thing. 
Virgil, The Aeneid. 
 
Above all, magic seemed a form of … insubordination, and an instrument of 
grassroots resistance to power. 
Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch. 
 
It is the irrational/ That is worth living for. 
Dorothea Lasky, Thing. 
 
Difference is the concern, the area of exploration and the philosophical condition 
that both components of this thesis, creative and critical, consider. As a scholar and 
a poet, I am profoundly interested in the ways in which difference might appear in 
language, and how that difference might challenge the parameters of thought. At 
the heart of each half of my thesis is this question: how does one write difference 
in a way that recognises its existence, without at the same time obliterating it, 
covering it over with one’s own concepts and structures of thought, rendering it 
mute?  
 
It is within this thesis that I will fully answer this question. However, in this 
preface, I hope to make clear how my interest in bringing difference into language 
serves as the uniting thread that ties together the concerns of both my collection of 
poetry, and my critical essay. This preface is a foretaste; a set of images and forms 
that will find their fruition in the thinking of the work itself. As any writer will 
know, discussing one’s work, especially if it is creative, can be a genuinely painful 
struggle—searching to ‘explain’ what has already found its own very specific 
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shape within language. I will, however, confront the inevitable difficulties and 
failings of describing my thesis, in an attempt to register how the forms of my 
poetry were found, and the crucial relationship between that poetry and the more 
clearly delineated work of my critical writing. 
 
In my critical study the difference that I attempt to register is that of nonhuman 
‘nature’— a difference that has been relentlessly silenced by human concepts and 
structures; physical, linguistic and metaphorical. It is my suggestion that this 
suppression, and ignorance, of nonhuman difference may be at the root of much of 
our degradation and destruction of the nonhuman world.  I will suggest that we 
most often perceive ‘nature’ as either as a transformative comfort, or as a savage 
wilderness that we must suppress; and that in these simplifications and 
generalisations its actual, tangible difference and individuality is lost. I will 
consider how an ‘ecological writing’ might be able to challenge these 
simplifications, and explore how poetic language might develop its ability to 
attend to, and even serve, the relationship between the human and the nonhuman. 
 
The critical portion of my thesis will argue that we suppress and destroy 
nonhuman difference because its genuine, complicated difference, is what we do 
not, and cannot, own. This difference is what escapes from us in every encounter 
with ‘nature,’ thus challenging the illusion of our human mastery—the supporting 
ideological structure of our reified society. So we mute nonhuman difference, thus 
losing what, I will suggest, is the nonhuman’s greatest opportunity for the 
human—the chance to see something, experience something, not ourselves. This 
encounter with nonhuman difference offers a way to briefly break through the 
prison of stifling human subjectivity, a way to glimpse something beyond our own 
identificatory thinking.1 I will suggest that we must find ways of thinking with 
nonhuman difference; creating forms of thought and language that resist the 
pressure of controlling reified conceptions, rather than suppressing nonhuman 
                                                        
1 I do not wish to suggest that the attempt to escape human subjectivity is a new one, indeed the 
possibility of such an escape was the central concern of the Post-Kantian philosophers of the 
1790’s. What I do wish to suggest is that in considering the nonhuman, especially within poetic 
language, we may find new ways to attempt this escape that respond fruitfully to the particular 
struggles of our own environmental moment. 
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agency. Unless we create such forms we will be unable to glimpse beyond the 
prison of our human subjectivity, or witness any kind of genuine nonhuman 
agency or difference. Nonhuman difference is not for us, and does not speak to us, 
yet momentary knowledge of it can transform the ways in which we are able to 
understand reality; our failure to know nonhuman identity gesturing towards the 
incompleteness of our rigid human concepts. I will argue that it may be in the act 
of poetic language—language unmoored from the wholly rational, open to the 
liminal and fragile changeability of experience, that this difference might be able to 
become apparent.  
 
The critical part of my thesis will go on to argue that Theodor Adorno’s theories of 
nonidentity and negative dialectics; and Wallace Stevens’ ambiguous, flexible and 
resistive poetry; can demonstrate how attempts to glimpse nonhuman difference 
can transform what environmental and ecological writing might be and mean: 
creating forms of language which not only ‘cover’ ecological themes, but are 
themselves ecological. Poetry such as this would manage to register the 
impossibility of human cognition ever fully recognising nonhuman difference, 
whilst paradoxically bringing a crucial awareness of this difference into human 
knowledge. I will suggest that such a paradox provides the aesthetic energy 
necessary to create poetry able to grapple with, and respond to, our uniquely 
dangerous, important and complicated environmental moment. My work will 
show that a focus on the difference, agency and individuality of the nonhuman 
offers poetics a new set of linguistic acts and aesthetic challenges, ones which can 
question, and even potentially alter, rigid forms of human thinking. 
 
The difference that is the central focus of my poetry collection WITCH, is ‘different’ 
and yet profoundly related, from that of my critical study. WITCH will explore 
feminist language and forms of gendered difference, particularly that of those 
considered by society to be ‘female,’2 those who are nonbinary, or those who are 
                                                        
2 I will be referring to the ‘female’ within speech marks to make clear my understanding of 
‘femaleness’ as an identity or potential viewpoint that takes place within perceptions created by 
society’s structures, a way of looking at or designating a person’s apparent self, rather than as any 
inherent quality issuing from the appearance, biology, body, genes, character or behaviour of any 
individual. My interest in feminism and feminist poetics come from an interest in questioning and 
challenging patriarchal and misogynist actions towards, and structures of thought around, those 
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differently gendered. These forms include: sexuality and emotion; magic; bodily 
experience; the occult; pagan relationships with the nonhuman; mysticism and 
esoteric practice. The collection will explore the European Witch Trials, and 
women’s historical suppression, but it will also question the rigidity of gender and 
identity; using the strangeness of magic and the occult to form newly 
transformative forms of poetic language. My poetry will touch on the ways in 
which the historically degraded difference of 'female knowledge,' (elements of 
difference allocated to or associated with women, rather than ones inherently 
issuing from them) might be able to come into the open— radically interrogating 
what a challenging feminist poetic language might look like; and how magic, ritual 
speech, witchcraft and spell making’s alterity might give power to such language. 
My poems will seek to discover what can happen when such alterity takes hold of 
not only poetry’s content, but the very forms of its expression.  
 
It is in making use of the material of the occult and witchcraft that my language 
hopes to take on the paradoxical power of that which has been shut down and 
closed off: a new way of making meaning that sees no boundary between 
intellectual exploration and the exploration of visceral feeling and ritualistic 
knowledge. As part of the research for this collection (which also included much 
practice-based research and experimentation) I looked at many representations of 
witchcraft and witches throughout history; from folk stories and plays, to written 
accounts of European and American Witch Trials, lewd cartoons, paintings, 
etchings and religious pamphlets and tracts. All of these representations, bar the 
very recent, were ‘negative,’ seeking to either mock, demonise, silence or criticise 
those considered as, or imagined as, ‘witches’. However, being surrounded by 
these ‘negative’ texts and images, I could not help but be overwhelmed by their 
power. However critical these representations or accounts, they all gave those 
portrayed (almost all of whom were rendered as ‘female’) an agency, a humour, a 
strength, and an influence on events, that I had never seen in the representation of 
women, in works of the Western tradition at least, in any historical period before 
our own. This underlined to me, and made tangible, the obvious connection 
                                                        
considered ‘female,’ or differently gendered, rather than from any belief about the inherent 
qualities or sexual characteristics of infinitely varied human beings. 
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between the fear of witchcraft and the fear of ‘female’ and differently gendered 
power. It was thrilling to me to see such fearful power represented, even when 
couched in misogyny, distaste and cruelty. Thinking about this ‘female’ and 
differently gendered power, negative and shunned, yet spectacular and teeming 
with agency, gave me access to a new aesthetic energy—alternative power not 
only an abstract idea, but a visible form, one able to migrate into the body of poetic 
language. 
 
My work on the connection between feminist language and occult elements in my 
poetry has not appeared out of the ether, but has been fed by a huge number of 
inspiring ‘female’ and differently gendered poets and writers. These writer’s 
interests in sexuality, gender, feminism and magic, have shown me the possible 
routes for my collection to come into being. There are numerous writers and 
books that have been part of this, but I will focus on the most crucial, to situate 
WITCH effectively within its poetic and imaginative context.  
 
Italian writer and historian Silvia Federici’s controversial theoretical work Caliban 
and the Witch is without a doubt the non-fiction work that has been most 
influential on the writing of WITCH. In her book Federici links the European Witch 
Trials, the conquest and colonisation of ‘The New World,’ and the state’s need for 
obedient ‘female’ labour to support men’s employment within capitalism. For 
Federici the women often accused of witchcraft: those who worked as ‘healers,’ or 
as midwives, those who were widows, independent women, and those from 
different backgrounds to their communities, and so on, were a threat to the 
rigidified gender roles made absolutely necessary by a system of wage labour; a 
system in which a woman’s work as mother, housekeeper and wife for the 
employed man must be solidified into a universal ‘natural’ constant. Federici’s 
work has been queried for its historical accuracy, and she does make some claims 
that cannot be fully confirmed. For this reason, it is important to state that it is not 
the information Federici provides that influenced or supported the writing of my 
book. Rather Federici’s central argument: that the oppression of individuals 
through the Witch Trials was a systematic and total suppression of a particularly 
‘female’ and differently gendered power, knowledge and agency, has given me new 
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ways to think about, and most importantly imagine, the intersection between 
politics, witchcraft, magic and feminist change in my own work. It is Federici’s re-
politicisation of the European and American Witch Trials, events that have become 
familiar, tame, and even innocuous and entertaining within of popular culture (see 
the Halloween events that take place in Salem, Massachusetts every year), that 
alerted me to the sedimented feminist and political charge available within them. 
Federici made clear to me that these events are not only of interest for their 
historical information, but for the imaginative possibilities and knowledge that 
they offer to contemporary feminist thinking. 
 
As I have written the creative portion of this thesis I have drawn strength from a 
number of contemporary poets building on poetic histories including the 
experimental and innovative tradition, as well as confessional and lyric tradition of 
writers such as Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton. These contemporary poets use such 
varied poetic histories and opportunities to re-figure feminist poetics for our own 
moment. These writers include Anne Carson, Dorothea Lasky, Bhanu Kapil, Hoa 
Nguyen, Maggie Nelson, Nisha Ramayya, Ariana Reines, Jackie Wang and Sophie 
Collins; all poets who speak boldly and strangely of sexual desire, the potential of 
magic and/or the supernatural, and the violence of living. These poets are strongly 
intellectual and rational, and yet they are equally committed to irrationality, 
feeling and affective experience—transforming the possibilities of what a diverse 
‘female,’ nonbinary or differently gendered speaking might become. 
 
In particular, the work of American poets Dorothea Lasky and Ariana Reines has 
shaped this collection, because of the intense attention both have offered to the 
intersection between a potential feminist poetics and magic. Neither has focused 
on witchcraft specifically (as, indeed, none of the poets listed above have), but 
their poetry has interrogated how magic might be a way of shifting the parameters 
of language and thought; opening up new ways to explore gendered experience. 
Ariana Reines, in her book Mercury3, looks at mystical and runic symbols, as well 
as alchemy and ritual; to create a strange, vicious and unusual language that 
                                                        
3 Reines, Ariana. Mercury. Albany, NY: Fence Books, 2011. 
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questions differently gendered and ‘female’ existence, and what might be possible 
for women’s interaction with the natural world. Reines’ poems are violent, explicit, 
cruel, sometimes even shocking, but her work is never anything less than 
empowering. I mean this not in the banal sense of the word, but that of giving 
‘female’ and differently gendered persons a world in language in which their 
power, being and feeling is accessible and visible. 
 
Dorothea Lasky, across her various collections, including Black Life4, Awe5, 
Thunderbird6 and Rome7, investigates how magic (and astrology, the occult and the 
supernatural) can give voice to the messy, complicated and bodily experience of 
desire, gendered experience and spiritual knowledge. Lasky’s poetic tone is oddly, 
even confrontationally, simplistic, gentle and childlike. This tone has the effect of 
forcing the reader to come face to face with the earnestness of Lasky’s 
explorations, the genuine commitment she has to using poetics to reveal ‘debased’ 
knowledge. Lasky has shown me that poetry can engage in magical themes without 
apology or shyness. Rather than being embarrassed about subjects that a 
conventional or even patriarchal view might deem ‘silly,’ Lasky makes the most of 
her unusual thematic areas; using them to create wholly original, powerful poetry 
that considers what a feminist poetics might not only look like, but also feel like. 
Both Lasky and Reines have shown me ways forward in creating poetry that 
merges a fascination with the magical and the irrational, with a rational, searching 
intelligence: an integrated, radical poetics capable of confronting complicated 
questions of thought and experience. 
 
I should make very clear at this point, however, that my aim to make use of the 
alterity and power of witchcraft and the esoteric for liberatory poetic purposes, is 
not a simple one to execute. I had to ask myself, as a poet, how I could address the 
hugely complicated, varied, diverse and contradictory span of ‘female’ and 
differently gendered experience within my collection. How could I register, for 
example, the individuality of the women killed as witches for their difference; and 
                                                        
4 Lasky, Dorothea. Black Life. Seattle, WA: Wave Books, 2010. 
5 Lasky, Dorothea. Awe. Seattle, WA: Wave Books, 2007. 
6 Lasky, Dorothea. Thunderbird. Seattle, WA: Wave Books, 2012. 
7 Lasky, Dorothea. Rome: Poems. New York, NY: Liverlight Publishing Corp, 2016. 
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at the same time try and create a language that did not speak over, mute or 
provide false unity to the endless, diverse differences of gender identity, race, 
class, reproductive situation, age, health, location, religion, sexuality, body, space 
and wealth, for ‘female,’ non-binary, differently gendered people and others? 
 
In coming to terms with, and grappling with, this difficulty, the work of my critical 
study was absolutely crucial. There is a huge space between human and 
nonhuman difference, and yet both of their suppressions turns on the desire of 
reified society to merge all into obedient sameness, its refusal to accept dissonant 
ways of being that serve no clear master. To register multifaceted difference 
within my poetry, I faced the same challenges as the poets attempting to register 
nonhuman difference—the attempt to speak with, rather than speak for, what you 
are not entirely; the attempt to create forms of poetic thinking that resist control 
and dominance, that resist unity of meaning and exchange-value equivalence. 
 
My critical thesis, taking its direction from Theodor Adorno, showed me that in 
making the impossibility of reaching difference apparent, it could paradoxically 
appear into view—a shimmer of what is not known, registered if not fully 
observed. Learning from this, I attempted to weave this practice of silence, of not 
knowing, into my own poetry. This meant that instead of a more straightforward 
and historically accurate ‘dramatisation’ of the Witch Trials, or similar, my work 
became a much more unpredictable, various creation. Unsurprisingly, the 
difference of the nonhuman itself crept into my work: the central figure of the 
witch finding a connection with, and exploring, a nonhuman difference that echoes 
her own gendered and experiential alterity.  The language of my collection seeks to 
register and question the historical silence of ‘female’ and differently gendered 
individuals, not by re-creating realistic voices from the past, but by reproducing 
imperfect creative knowledge. The collection clearly shows up the gaps of what 
cannot be known within language; inviting the reader to shape their own 
individual poetic experience. 
 
The poems in WITCH are as strange, as unrealistic, as fantastical, as funny and as 
weird as the unknown must be. They use the unpredictable, resistive, aesthetically 
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fertile language of spells, of nonhuman interaction, of ritual. They are not ‘well 
made’ and satisfyingly complete, they are not formally perfect or linguistically safe, 
and they are not true in any straightforward, documentary sense. The poems 
embrace the potential of poetic cruelty and violence but turn it on itself: explosive, 
destruction becoming an outlet for affection between the women and differently 
gendered individuals and voices in these poems, who must blast their own 
existence into the continuum of history by force. It is important to me that these 
poems are confrontational and violent, so that they can honestly express the anger 
that was such a large part of their making. However, I would not want the anger 
expressed to suggest any desire to physically cause harm in the tangible world, or 
for that anger to eclipse the transcendent, humorous, and pleasurable freedom 
made possible by the forms of thinking that witchcraft and magic offer.  
 
The witch figure of my poems is not caught in a constant cycle of mourning. She 
does, and must, look backwards at the suffering of the past, but at the same time 
she looks forward into disparate potential futures. In these poems, the imaginative 
destruction of oppressive and patriarchal structures happens within the space of 
poetic experience—transformative violence taking action at the roots of thought.  
 
The poems of this collection cannot speak satisfactorily for even one woman or 
differently gendered person, from the past or the present moment, let alone all of 
them. No writer could have the breadth of experience within their lifespan to make 
such a thing achievable, but more importantly no one voice could possibly 
encompass the infinite variety of lived difference. For this reason, it is crucial to 
me that the transformative language of my poems is drawn, in part, from their 
inevitable failure to know and to understand. My poems fail, and would of course 
always fail, in their attempt to create a ‘wholly’ feminist language (feminism itself 
not being in any way a stable idea or form of thinking); one that is able to 
dismantle patriarchal structures of gender, and return the repressed agency of 
those buried and silenced by the past. Rather the poems of this collection reach out 
into the darkness, circling round suppressed experience, suffering, practice and 
knowledge, like bodies around a fire. The shadows that the flames cast do not 
‘reveal’ everything, but their dark shapes make apparent that something is there, 
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moving, unclear, extant. I cannot return suppressed difference to us, nor can I 
recreate it, but I hope that in my poetry it can be gestured towards, that the space 
can echo. 
 
The nonhuman’s meaning (if indeed it has one) sits far outside of normal measures 
of comprehensibility. Nonhuman meaning is so distant that perhaps it is only 
within poetic language, where linguistic imagination reaches furthest, that we may 
be able to hint at it. Nonhuman species and individuals seek to survive, but the 
meaning behind this survival, the event horizon of nonhuman experience, cannot 
be crossed. In the same way, occult experience may involve spells that encourage 
certain occurrences, or ward off negative ones, but the meaning, and indeed the 
activating power, behind these ritual actions and practices always remains unclear. 
Even the most clichéd representations of magic, mysticism and witchcraft contain 
some element of ‘mystery,’ some element of unknown knowledge, tantalisingly 
hidden from those outside the circle, and even from those within it. A lack of, or 
rejection of, clear, consumable and comprehensible meaning is what gives these 
areas a quality that struggles to accommodate identificatory structures.  
 
This ‘lack’ of meaning demonstrates why difference is not only an encouragement 
to respect and treat with compassion things and individuals not like ourselves; but 
also a way of bringing into thought forms of knowledge that challenge, by their 
very nature, identificatory thinking practices. My twin creative and critical 
approaches will seek to show that when space is made within poetry for us to 
observe language reaching for, and failing to capture, difference; such difference 
might emerge, briefly, into the light. My thesis seeks to show the resistive, 
transformative potential of this emergence—aesthetics as a space for thinking 
capable of change. It is to such thinking that the work you are about to read is 
dedicated: a work which I encourage you to read in your own order, carving a 





Radically Different: Thinking the Nonhuman in Wallace 




To live in the world but outside of existing conceptions of it. 
Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’. 
 
If thinking is to be true – if it is to be true today, in any case – it must also be a 
thinking against itself. 
Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics. 
 
 
This critical thesis is a work of intellectual and philosophical consideration, yet it is 
also work born from the questions of a creative, poetic practice. I am aware that at 
this contemporary moment we face, quite simply, a reckoning with the fact that 
nonhuman8 beings, habitats and things are profoundly affected, and profoundly 
damaged, by our actions. This is arguably the defining knowledge of our time, and 
it will shape the defining questions of our future. I wish to respond therefore, in 
the work of this thesis, to the unprecedented environmental changes taking place 
due to human action. It seems necessary for me, as a scholar and as a practioner, to 
find spaces in poetic language in which the political, moral, ethical, mental and 
emotional impacts of climate change and environmental destruction can be 
thought about. It was (and is) my belief that poetic language has unique qualities 
that make it suitable for considerations of this kind, a flexibility and a freedom that 
allows well-worn concepts, ideas and images to be questioned and unpicked.  
 
Poetry re-figures the boundaries of what language can speak or mean, and so is 
best placed to touch the edges of things outside of human comprehension: things 
within the ‘natural,’ nonhuman world. This flexible, lambent changeability holds 
the potential to explore, through language, how we have allowed nonhuman 
                                                        
8 This term will be explored, and its use defended, later on in this introduction. 
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destruction to take place, and why. The unfixed nature of poetic meaning; - words 
loosening themselves from their usual carapaces— might in turn allow the 
unfixed, alien and unpredictable reality of the nonhuman come forward a little 
way into human understanding. These were, and are, my hopes for poetic 
language. 
 
It was this passionate interest in finding a language for our contemporary 
environmental moment—a moment in which we are painfully aware of our 
impacts on the ‘natural’ world, that encouraged me to apply for a PhD in the first 
place. For me it seemed an opportunity to make space for such writing, whilst also 
critically studying the ‘nature poetry’ that would support my work. It became clear 
to me, however, in my own attempts to write ‘nature poetry,’ that something was 
wrong. This was not just a case of ‘writer’s block’, or a paucity of useful ideas. 
Rather it felt more like a philosophical and intellectual void—a lack of modes in 
which to respond to the ‘natural world,’ to think about landscape, the 
environment, climate change and destruction within aesthetics. It seemed that the 
‘obvious’ candidates, 21st century and 20th century mainstream ‘nature’ poets, had 
little to offer me, however many times I turned to them for guidance and 
inspiration. My attempts to write environmentally-focused poetry dried up. I had 
things to say, but did not know how to say them, and could find no obvious 
modern ‘nature’ writer who seemed to have accessed a mode that I could learn 
from in answering my own contemporary aesthetic questions9. So I had to ask 
myself: what kind of writing did I feel was missing, and what would this kind of 
writing look like? Why did I find the closely held ambitions of my creative work 
stymied by the poetry that I looked to for guidance? 
 
Considering the state of environmental emergency in which we find ourselves, it 
seems naive, even unethical, to write comfortingly lyrical meditations on nature, 
ones that elide the shadow of danger that hangs over every element of the ‘natural’ 
world. At the same time, straightforward polemic seems not only often to be bad 
                                                        




poetry, but to be less effective as polemic than articles or political speeches, in 
which facts can be explained and possible practical solutions laid out.  
  
How then can poetry serve what I wish to claim as its powerful environmental 
potential? How can poetry explore the thin line between domestic human 
experience and wilderness, and broach the strangeness of the more than human 
world, whilst also serving, rather than harming, these elements? By harm I do not 
mean tangible physical harm, but rather a continuation of the very thinking 
practices that have fed into much environmental destruction and oppression—
that the human is more important than the nonhuman, that ‘nature’ is an 
entertaining, comforting whole that is there to serve us, either physically; as 
resources, or emotionally; as balm and pleasure. In such ways of thinking, ‘nature’ 
has no agency of its own, but serves only as an adjunct to us, utterly 
comprehensible, consumable and silent. Unfortunately, there is no simple answer 
to the question of how one can create art that does not become part of these 
damaging practices; art that can even be part of a resistance against such ways of 
thinking and being. It thus became apparent to me that any artistic or intellectual 
practice that wished to challenge the usual ways of considering the ‘natural’ world 
would have to face up to, rather than the smooth over, the complications of this 
task.  
 
As I will illustrate in Chapter One, I had become impatient with work that elided 
the agency of the nonhuman, and which elided humanity’s role in its control and 
oppression. It seemed essential therefore to find a way of writing that managed to 
both respect the agency and difference of the nonhuman, and simultaneously own 
up to and draw attention to the human actions and thoughts that constantly 
suppress, distance and silence that nonhuman being or object. Such writing would 
include human subjectivity, always, as part of the aesthetic equation—looking, and 
being aware of the mode of looking at the same time. This would make it easier to 
avoid the trap of sentimentalising ‘nature’ as something easily accessible; 
something timeless and pure, untouched by human impact. Instead it might be 
possible to draw into the frame not only the nonhuman itself, but the swirl of 




The poetry I was looking for - writing that might manage to achieve a balance 
between genuine consideration of the nonhuman, alongside a potent awareness of 
damaging human conceptual structures - I came to think of as ‘ecological poetry.’ 
The Merriam -Webster Dictionary explains the meaning of ecology thus: ‘1: branch 
of science concerned with the interrelationship of organisms and their 
environments 2:  the totality or pattern of relations between organisms and their 
environment.’10 It is the second part of this definition that allowed me to start 
imagining the kind of nonhuman poetics that I feel is both lacking, and necessary, 
in our contemporary moment. That is: ‘the totality or pattern of relations between 
organisms and their environments.’ Certainly no poetics can contain the totality of 
anything, but it might be possible, in poetry, to represent not only a nonhuman 
object, environment or organism, but the pattern of relations that shape how we as 
humans see that nonhuman. It might also be possible to represent how these 
patterns impact upon our behaviour towards, and relationship with, that 
nonhuman. It became apparent to me that a poetics that sought to look at the 
‘interrelationship’ and ‘pattern of relations’ between human and nonhuman, rather 
than seeking to somehow represent or consider the nonhuman in ‘isolation’ 
(something I will argue is impossible to achieve anyway), would be able to better 
serve the nonhuman: reflecting the actual political, ethical and intellectual 
boundaries within which any representation of the nonhuman is held. In reflecting 
the boundaries that limit and suppress the nonhuman within language, it might be 
possible to question these boundaries, even change them.  
 
Despite being able hypothesise the type of ecological poetics I might hope to 
practice, I was as yet no closer to creating or supporting such work directly. I could 
not imagine what this work might look or feel like, and could not seek to create it 
in a vacuum of my own making. For this reason, my thesis turned away from my 
own practice to search for writers and thinkers outside of the environmental 
mainstream—writers who could point towards ways of thinking and creating that 
might have something to offer the project of ecological poetics.  
                                                        





The writers that I became drawn to were not necessarily those who might be 
considered avowedly environmental. Though this thesis draws on contemporary 
eco-criticism — especially the work of American theorists Timothy Morton and 
Jane Bennett — its central critical focus is the work of the Frankfurt School 
philosopher Theodor Adorno, a critic profoundly influenced by Marxism and by 
the upheavals of fascism and war that took place in Europe during his lifetime.  
 
Though Adorno is not ‘traditionally’ considered to be a voice for 
environmentalism, it is his philosophy, and its emphasis on new ways of thinking 
about the difference of the nonhuman, that has allowed me to carve a path towards 
understanding what an ecological poetry might be and mean; refreshing the terms 
of the mainstream ‘environmental’ discourse within aesthetics. Brian O’Connor 
describes the dialectical focus of Adorno’s philosophy in a way that reveals its 
huge import to the questions of my thesis: 
 
Adorno uses the term ‘dialectical’ as the illuminating experience of 
contradiction. Hence the name he was to give to his philosophy, negative 
dialectics. In dialectical thinking the object is allowed to speak against the 
finality of our conceptualizations. It operates, then, with a sense of 
obligation to the object: the obligation to deal with the object on its own 
terms. Adorno actually speaks of this disposition as ‘Schuld’ which means 
both ‘guilt’ and ‘debt.’ It is a consciousness of what our concepts fail to say 
about the object and it is the obligation that the knowledge of that failure 
places on us to think ever more about the object in its particularity.11 
 
In Adorno’s dialectics the object, nonhuman thing, or being, is ‘allowed to speak 
against the finality of our conceptualizations.’ Such speaking, whereby the 
nonhuman finds a way to appear in its individuality and agency within human 
thinking, will be at the centre of my consideration of an ecological poetics. In 
Adorno’s theory it becomes possible to imagine a kind of thinking in which 
                                                        
11 Brian O'Connor, Adorno (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p.20. 
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concepts turn on themselves and confront their own failure, a failure that 
illuminates the very object that these concepts have failed to capture. It is in 
Adorno that I have a found words for the potential of language—a way of 
considering how we can think about nonhuman difference that is both hopeful and 
relentlessly critical. Adorno’s work provides a revelation of the cracks in thinking, 
seeking to make those cracks wider rather than smooth them over. For Adorno 
guilt and failure are the starting point for thinking about and writing about the 
nonhuman object— rather than a soothing lyrical comfort, or a falsely encouraging 
and dominating eco-polemic. Adorno’s work brings the ‘nonidentical,’ into focus, a 
term that is at the heart of how I will be framing my understanding of the position 
of the nonhuman within poetry. Lambert Zuidervaart, writing for The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, explains this term and its importance for Adorno’s 
philosophy, through a brief comparison with Hegel’s idealism: 
 
The concept of the nonidentical … marks the difference between Adorno's 
materialism and Hegel's idealism. Although he shares Hegel's emphasis on 
a speculative identity between thought and being, between subject and 
object, and between reason and reality, Adorno denies that this identity has 
been achieved in a positive fashion. For the most part this identity has 
occurred negatively instead. That is to say, human thought, in achieving 
identity and unity, has imposed these upon objects, suppressing or ignoring 
their differences and diversity. Such imposition is driven by a societal 
formation whose exchange principle demands the equivalence (exchange 
value) of what is inherently nonequivalent (use value). Whereas Hegel's 
speculative identity amounts to an identity between identity and 
nonidentity, Adorno's amounts to a nonidentity between identity and 
nonidentity. That is why Adorno calls for a “negative dialectic” and why he 
rejects the affirmative character of Hegel's dialectic.12 
 
The existence of the ‘nonidentical:’ the ‘differences and diversity’ of nonhuman 
beings and objects obscured by being made ‘equivalent’ by exchange-value driven 
                                                        




society, is what ecological poetry would hope to gesture towards. Adorno locates 
part of the damage of capitalist society not only in tangible action, but in the action 
of thought—the ‘nonidentical’ individual element of objects, and in the case of this 
thesis, specifically nonhumans, hidden and suppressed by a conceptual system 
that overlays their reality with human principles. It will be my argument that this 
understanding of nonidentity might make it possible for us to re-orient poetic 
language to reveal the outline of hidden difference: - not a full comprehension, but 
a distant glimpse that would illuminate the failure of humanity’s totalising 
concepts. In this difference resides the unique and alien agency of the nonhuman, 
an agency that I will argue we must be able to register if we wish to challenge 
destructive attitudes, and actions, towards the nonhuman world within poetics. 
 
It is not only, however, Adorno’s theories of the object that drew me so intensely to 
his work in attempting to answer the questions of my creative practice, and of this 
critical study. Adorno holds a uniquely powerful appeal for me as a poet— a 
philosopher and critic who engages fully with aesthetics as a site of potent 
intellectual change. Adorno does not seek to ‘use’ art in his theory as the material 
for social change; rather it is art’s resistance to a specific and reified ‘use’ that 
makes it so central to his thought, and to the argument of my thesis. It is within the 
aesthetic mimesis of artworks that the ‘uselessness’ of art might serve as a space 
made briefly free of the strictures of reified thought. Brian O’Connor, in his book 
Adorno, suggests that: 
 
Aesthetic mimesis is (for Adorno) … a diagnostic concept. It serves as a 
reference point in Adorno’s theory for non-reified human behaviour. It 
assumes a particular form in aesthetic activity, but even in that form it 
points towards something that is absent from the everyday experience of 
life within the social totality. Aesthetic experience possesses, he claims, ‘the 
mimetic vestige, the plenipotentiary of an undamaged life in the midst of 
mutilated life’ (AT 117), providing us with a glimpse of our mimetic 
potential. It is in this respect ‘the unimpaired corrective of reified 
consciousness’ (AT 339). In the experience of aesthetic mimesis – imitative 
creativity – there is ‘the happiness of producing the world once over’ (AT 
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339), that has almost entirely been eliminated by the reifying rationality of 
the social totality.13 
 
O’Connor suggests that mimesis’ ‘imitative process’ is: 
 
… suggestive of Adorno’s account of non-identical experience, which 
involves subjects adjusting … ‘to a moment which they themselves are not’ 
(ND 138).14 
 
Mimesis is a term with widely varying interpretations and significations within 
critical theory, but its importance for Adorno comes from its rare ability to insert 
irrationality into a society of total rationality— the nonidentical elements that 
reified thought seeks to bury, but which may be able to be revealed within 
artworks. As Adorno argues: 
 
Art is a refuge for mimetic comportment. In art the subject exposes itself … 
to its other, separated from it and yet not entirely separated … That art, 
something mimetic, is possible in the midst of rationality, and that it 
employs its means, is a response to the faulty irrationality of the rational 
world as an over-administered world. For the aim of all rationality—the 
quintessence of the means for dominating nature—would have to be 
something other than means, hence something not rational. Capitalist 
society hides and disavows precisely this irrationality, and in contrast to 
this, art represents truth in a double sense: It maintains the image of its 
aim, which has been obscured by rationality, and it convicts the status quo 
of its irrationality and absurdity … Art completes knowledge with that that 
is excluded from knowledge and thereby once again impairs its character as 
knowledge, its univocity … Art cannot fulfil its concept.15 
 
                                                        
13 Brian O'Connor, Adorno (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p.150. 
14 Brian O'Connor, Adorno (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p.153. 
15 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p.73-74. 
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Within the mimesis Adorno describes, the viewer or reader comes across an 
experience of the other: the nonidentity and irrationality supressed by reified 
thought. In this experience they may momentarily loose themselves from the 
complete control of human subjectivity— ‘a moment which they themselves are 
not.’16 It is such a moment that allows ‘our mimetic potential’ to come forward, a 
glimpse of ‘undamaged life in the midst of mutilated life.’ This matters profoundly 
to my thesis, because it suggests that art’s failure to ‘fulfil its concept’ might make 
possible a space in which the profound difference of nonidentity can be met: a site 
in which the observer of an artwork might glimpse something beyond reified 
identificatory thinking, and witness nonhuman individuality. This way of seeing 
the relationship between observer and artwork allows us to understand why it 
might be within aesthetics, and, as I will argue, particularly poetry, that nonhuman 
independence might emerge, challenging controlling human conceptions. I will 
argue that the mimetic ‘irrationality’ that Adorno describes might be best served 
by the liminal potential of poetic language: poetry’s flexible and non-linear 
capabilities allowing for a meaning able to stretch rationality to its limits, the 
irrational pushing up against rational within capacious poetic form. 
 
In examining Adorno’s ideas in this thesis I have chosen to focus my attention on 
Aesthetic Theory17 and Negative Dialectics18, as well as considering the text of 
Adorno’s 1962 lecture ‘Commitment.’19 Though I have spent time working across 
Adorno’s canon of thought, it is within Aesthetic Theory and Negative Dialectics 
that the critical ideas that I have outlined have their fullest expression. In bringing 
these two centres of Adorno’s thought together, I will be able to explore the impact 
of Adorno’s theories on the action of thinking, and on the potential of aesthetics. 
These areas will not serve to give me a ‘mode’ of criticism, or a set of wholly 
inflexible critical rules to follow, in my consideration of poetry’s ability to connect 
to nonhuman difference. Rather, Adorno’s work will serve as inspiration and 
guide, part of an intellectual conversation in which Adorno’s theories assist in 
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steering me towards what might be made achievable in human-nonhuman 
relations, within the flexible space of poetic language. 
 
My interest in exploring the potential for poetry to become a space in which 
nonhuman difference can be registered, has found its critical force through 
Adorno’s work. However, this thesis would have been impossible to undertake if I 
had not been able to find a poet whom I felt had already created some form of 
ecological poetics, work that allowed me to think into what a contemporary 
ecological poetics might be. It is for this reason that I found myself called back to 
the work of the American modernist poet Wallace Stevens. Stevens is not an 
overtly ‘nature’ orientated poet in the mould of Wendell Berry, for example, (a 
writer I will consider in my first chapter). Yet it is in Stevens’ work that I found 
language capable of making nonhuman difference available to the reader, language 
that simultaneously explores and critiques its own limits, whilst pointing towards 
the nonhuman nonidentity that it can never fully cognise. Stevens work is 
intimately and obsessively concerned with difference, and the ability, or failure, of 
language to capture that difference. His poetics captures human subjectivity 
reaching towards the nonidentical, an impossible reaching that, through its failure, 
paradoxically produces an awareness of the existence of nonhuman objects, 
beyond human conceptions. 
 
Despite these qualities, within conventional literary criticism Stevens remains an 
unlikely ecological figure. This is partly due to the reported nature of Stevens the 
man, not a person in whom a movement for ecological equality and balance might 
seek its champion. Adam Kirsch, writing in The Atlantic, says of Stevens: 
 
He never left North America. He was casually racist and anti-Semitic. A 
Hoover Republican, he distrusted labor unions. He drank too much at 
parties, to overcome his natural shyness, and later had to apologize for his 
boorishness. In the depths of the Depression, he made $20,000 a year, the 
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equivalent of $350,000 today. Each detail feels more interest-repelling than 
the last.20 
 
It is important to quote these abhorrent, queasy making qualities of Stevens to 
make it clear that this thesis is in no way a defence of Stevens the man. It is, and 
can only be, an exploration of Stevens the poet, of the words on the page and the 
book in my hands—a claiming of poetic heritage and inspiration by a person 
whom Stevens himself, according to biographical reports, would intensely dislike. 
This examination does not excuse Stevens the man, but it does, for the purposes of 
this thesis, put him aside.  
 
It is not only Stevens the individual, however, who does not appear to fit any 
predictably ecological mould. It is also Stevens the poet who has been considered 
an unlikely candidate for works of nonhuman interest. Scott Knickerbocker, in his 
book Ecopoetics, references one of Stevens most famous critics, Helen Vendler, in 
his suggestion that: 
 
According to most of Wallace Stevens’s prominent critics, the poet is 
anything but ecologically orientated … For Vendler … the “true” Stevens … 
is unmoved by the material particularities of the natural world: “The lively 
things of this world—human, animal, vegetable—do not touch him as they 
did Keats or Wordsworth …” Vendler goes even further to claim that … 
Stevens is actually repulsed by the material fecundity of nature … To 
abbreviate an old argument: for Vendler and others, Stevens’s 
“imagination” takes precedence over “reality.”21 
 
Knickerbocker goes on to argue that: 
 
                                                        
20 Kirsch, Adam. "The Patron Saint of Inner Lives." The Atlantic. Accessed September 06, 2016. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-patron-saint-of-inner-
lives/471468/. 
21 Scott Knickerbocker, Ecopoetics: The Language of Nature, the Nature of Language (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), p.19. 
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The dominant view … is that Stevens privileges the imagination and 
everything that accompanies it—art, artifice, language—over reality, 
traditionally conceived as physical nature, or that, even more strongly, 
imagination creates reality. In this view Stevens is dedicated to … “putting 
the fictional before the real” (Rosu xi). This view clearly serves 
contemporary social constructionism and the poststructuralist account of 
the rupture between language and the world to which it refers. While no 
one would claim the opposite of this view of Stevens … a closer look at his 
statements on poetry as well as his poetry itself reveal that for Stevens, 
reality is not swallowed up by the imagination. To him these terms are not 
simply opposed to each other; nor do they collapse completely into each 
other. Instead, the imagination and reality require each other … “[The 
imagination] has the strength of reality or none at all” (Necessary Angel 
6,7) … “[The nature of poetry] is an interdependence of the imagination and 
reality as equals” (Necessary Angel 24, 27).22 
 
Stevens’ explorations of the power of the creative imagination have contributed to 
the view that Stevens ‘privileges the imagination’ over reality. From the traditional 
standpoint of ecocriticism, a poet whose prime focus is the imagination can never 
be an aesthetic voice for the reality of nonhuman ‘nature.’ However, as 
Knickerbocker argues, for Stevens ‘the imagination and reality require each 
other.’23 What becomes apparent in Stevens’ poetics is that one cannot simply 
brush away imagination, artifice and thought to reach authentic, tangible 
nonhuman difference and individuality. Human beings are irrevocably caught up 
in the intense subjectivity of their own imaginative conceptions of the world, 
conceptions that inflect any experience they might wish to have of nonhuman 
reality. It is in bringing the imagination to the fore, rather than ignoring it, that 
Stevens manages to interrogate the cognitive controls that human beings place 
around nonhuman existence.  
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Stevens interrogates poetic language, its metaphors and its unstable concepts, to 
briefly create clearings in which nonhuman difference can appear through a 
recognition of the concepts placed around it. It is Stevens’ exploration of the 
constant interplay between imagination and reality that allows the reader the 
briefest glimpse of nonhuman reality beyond our conceptions. This most 
‘fantastical,’ humorous and imaginative of poets is thus best placed to enact an 
ecological poetics. As Knickerbocker argues: 
 
… the effect Stevens … has as a proto-ecological modernist is to put into 
question what composes the real as well as to help us see the wild 
unpredictability of language. Stevens never proposes a specific way we 
should treat nature, but his poetics shows us the intertwined relationship 
of language and the imagination with physical reality in its most 
fundamental form. No matter how much we pare down or restrict language 
to get at brute nature, “something resides,” yet that residuum of language 
and sound is itself wild and beyond our ability completely to control it, like 
nature.24 
 
Stevens’ poetry provides unique challenges and possibilities for the reader. 
Stevens uses language less to create a holistic set of narratives, and more to render 
linguistic spaces in which the reader’s mind might challenge its own conceptions. 
In these spaces the reader might recognise the dialectical qualities of their own 
thinking, reaching beyond totalising subjectivity; and thus, perhaps, furthering the 
possibility that they might recognise nonhuman difference.  
 
Stevens’ poetry also encourages an active, creative reading process, one that 
resonates deeply with me as a creative practioner. Stevens makes it possible to 
imagine a poetry that is not propagandist, didactic or ‘convincing,’ and yet one in 
which the potential for intellectual change exists within the open spaces of 
linguistic action. Such poetry does not tell the reader what to think, but makes a 
wider spectrum of potential thought available to the reader—a space to think in, 
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University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), p.36. 
30 
 
rather than a list of things to think. Bart Eeckhout, quoting Daniel R Schwarz, in his 
book Wallace Stevens and the Limits of Reading and Writing, argues that:  
 
“More than any major figure, … Stevens restructured our concept of what it 
means to read” … Stevens’s own texts … compel the reader to develop a 
more than usual degree of self-consciousness about the act of reading. 
Stevens’s metapoetry demands and engenders its own type of metareader. 
It actively prompts or begs us to study the question of its appropriability 
and possibilities for contextualisation. And lest this question appear too 
cerebral, we might recall that such prompting or begging is of more than 
theoretical importance: it engages us in many senses, including that of 
doubling the poet’s self-styled task—the task, that is, of recording the mind 
in the act of finding what will suffice.25 
 
In drawing our attention to ‘the act of reading,’ that we engage in with each poem, 
Stevens also makes us slowly aware of the acts of reading that structure our every 
experience of the outside, ‘objective,’ world. Each act of understanding is one of 
reading and interpretation, shaped by the concepts and knowledge that is always 
already pre-formed in our minds. In drawing out a multiplicity of possible 
meanings and contexts, Stevens’ flexible language points us towards the 
multiplicity of meaning and agency that lies beyond our wholly human 
subjectivity. Within Stevens the act of reading becomes one in which self-
consciousness of thought drives knowledge—an understanding of the nonhuman 
world, gleaned from an awareness of the multiple failures of static human 
conceptions to cognise that world. As John N. Serio argues in The Cambridge 
Companion to Wallace Stevens: 
 
 Stevens pointedly declares that everything we believe is a fiction, that 
reality is an invention of the mind … This stance does not turn Stevens into 
a solipsist, nor does it imply a denial of reality, which Stevens explicitly 
affirms as the “ding an sich” (23), or the “Thing Itself” (451). But it is to 
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grant that all we can know of the outer world is our interpretation of it and 
that the construction of this interpretation is a poetic act. As Stevens 
observes in “Adagia,” “Things seen are things as seen” (902).26 
 
It is in becoming aware of our ‘interpretation,’ of the world, that we begin to 
imagine a seeing that would go beyond it. To gesture in any way to the actual 
world of nonhuman difference, we must realise that any experience of it is 
fashioned by the ‘interpretation’ which we inevitably place upon it. As Serio 
suggests, totally removing this interpretation or conceptual screen is impossible. 
However, in Stevens poetry, this screen is witnessed, tested and stretched through 
language, pulled far beyond its usual unthinking position. In this stretching, tiny 
splits may appear, an awareness of what is built through a knowledge of what we 
are unable to witness. Stevens’ ‘fiction,’ does not negate the reality of the 
nonhuman world. Rather it is in prioritising this fictionionalising, through the 
processes of poetry, that what is behind the fiction might make a shadowy 
appearance— a blurred outline on a photographic negative showing that 
something was there, though we may not be able to fully recognise what that 
something is. As Serio suggests: 
 
In the (poetic) process, what is evoked, tellingly, if only momentarily, is a 
credible belief in a fiction that discloses reality.27 
 
The poems of Stevens that I have chosen to consider in this thesis cover a wide 
scope of his poetic career, from early work to some of his late poems.28 This is 
because my method in selecting these poems was driven by questions of poetic 
creation, the potential of these works to emerge as sites of ecological poetics. I do 
not attempt to make an argument about the importance of different sections of 
Stevens’ oeuvre, or to give an overview of his poetic development and historical 
context. Many fine books have already undertaken these tasks successfully, and I 
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feel no need to add to them. Rather, as I have said, the instances of Stevens’ work 
that I have selected are the ones in which the potentiality of using poetic language 
to excavate nonhuman agency and difference is most apparent.  The close readings 
of his poems that I provide in no way seek to become the ‘definitive’ or final 
readings of these works. Instead my readings of these poems open up 
potentialities of meaning in which a reader might be able to challenge or question 
their usual relations with, and concepts of, nonhuman difference and individuality. 
Stevens’ language is, for a reader, an open-ended, liminal experience in which 
poetics reaches for the difference that it cannot contain. As Stevens himself argues: 
‘A poem need not have a meaning, and like most things in nature often does not 
have.’29 My methodology does not attempt to fix a consumable and final ‘meaning,’ 
upon the poems I consider, but to recognise them as sites of cognitive potential in 
which nonhuman difference might come to be glimpsed. These poems are spaces 
of thinking, not finished ‘products’ with a correct interpretation.  
 
My readings are as creative as my poetic writing—imaginative acts in which the 
mind witnesses itself in its own attempts to go beyond itself, reading that has the 
provisionality and possibility of the writing process. Such reading is a central part 
of my own creative writing, my own efforts to find forms of cognition which might 
allow an ecological poetics to bloom into life. It is for this reason that, despite an 
intimate familiarity with the texts, I do not extensively draw upon Stevens’ prose 
writings on poetics in this thesis. Stevens’ prose works, including The Necessary 
Angel,30 and sections such as ‘Adagia’ from Opus Posthumous,31 are beautiful and 
informative works of thought that reveal much about Stevens’ own process, his 
wide interactions with philosophy and literature, and the act of poetry itself. 
However, it is not my aim in this thesis to explore how Stevens’ prose work relates 
to his poetry, or to try and use Stevens’ own statements to ‘explain’ the meanings 
and intentions of his poems. In excluding Stevens’ reflections on his own poetic 
experience, I am able to more closely map my own readings of the poems as they 
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are influenced by Adorno’s theories and contemporary eco-critics. To try and 
match these readings up point for point with Stevens’ own complex and 
contradictory philosophy would be dishonest, and un-illuminating. The readings of 
this thesis respond to the ecological potential of the poems themselves, not 
ignoring Stevens philosophy, but also not foregrounding it. In seeking to provide 
fresh and original scholarship I turn away from the traditional texts of academic 
Stevens analysis— exploring a new set of works more able to help me understand 
my creative relation to Stevens’ poetry, in a time of contemporary ecological crisis. 
 
Throughout this thesis I will be providing glosses of relevant critical terms, but 
there is one term that is central to my thesis and which merits particular 
explanation and understanding. That word is ‘nonhuman,’ a word that I use 
instead of the more commonly used word, ‘nature’. To understand why I rarely use 
the word ‘nature,’ in this thesis, and why, when I do, I use quotation marks, I must 
briefly turn to the contemporary American eco-critic Timothy Morton, and his 
book Ecology Without Nature.32 It is in researching Morton’s book for this thesis 
that I found voice for the reasons that I felt uncomfortable with the word ‘nature,’ 
and persuasive arguments that convinced me that its use would be unable to serve 
the aims of this project. Morton argues that: 
 
‘We discover how nature always slips out of reach in the very act of 
grasping it … Even as it establishes a middle ground “in between” terms 
such as subject and object, or inside and outside, nature without fail 
excludes certain terms, thus reproducing the difference between inside and 
outside in other ways. Just when it brings us into proximity with the 
nonhuman “other,” nature re-establishes a comfortable distance between 
“us” and “them.” With ecological friends like these, who needs enemies?’33 
 
For Morton, ‘nature’ flattens the essential differences between varying objects and 
subjects that are ‘natural’ into an undifferentiated sameness, and distances the 
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Harvard University Press, 2007). 
33 Morton, Timothy. Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), p.19. 
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human being from the ‘other’ of ‘nature.’ In doing so, ‘nature’ becomes an 
undifferentiated mass whose individual sites of agency are hidden—a mass that is 
distant from the uniqueness of human beings, whose implication in, and intimacy 
with ‘nature’ is entirely lost. ‘Nature’ describes so much that it describes almost 
nothing at all, neither a factual term, nor an obvious metaphor, binding together all 
that is not human into an oppositional position with that which is human. It 
sanctions a divide and a separation that is not a recognition of difference, but 
rather an easy evasion of our connection to the alien reality of the ‘natural’ world. 
The word ‘nonhuman’ on the other hand, though far from perfect, is a word that 
manages to drain away some of the philosophical and intellectual baggage 
contained in ‘nature.’ The ‘nonhuman,’ obviously enough, means quite clearly that 
which is not human, and nothing else. It can refer to living beings, and to rocks and 
mountains and air. The word in no way excludes the possibility that both the 
nonhuman and the human are as ‘natural’ as each other, nor the possibility of a 
web of intimacy between nonhuman beings and objects and humans. As Morton 
argues: 
 
Life-forms are constantly coming and going, mutating and becoming 
extinct. Biospheres and eco-systems are subject to arising and cessation. 
Living beings do not form a solid prehistorical, or nonhistorical ground 
upon which human history plays. But nature is often wheeled out to 
adjudicate between what is fleeting and what is substantial and permanent. 
Nature smoothes over uneven history, making its struggles and suffering 
illegible.34 
 
The ‘nonhuman,’ does unfortunately rely on the ‘human,’ to make its meaning, and 
yet its attempt at simple designation may leave space in signification for the 
‘arising and cessation,’ Morton describes; the complex and constant change that 
occurs within nonhuman action. ‘Nature’ patches over ‘uneven history,’ a trans-
historical, everlasting concept that makes its ‘struggles and suffering illegible;’ a 
romanticised sameness that renders the tectonic plates under the earth and a 
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family of wasps part of one comfy, and comfortably distant, substance. All ‘nature’ 
must, at root, be the same, whereas nonhuman beings and objects may only share 
the fact that they are not human: sites of intense difference that are not the same 
as us, and may not be at all the same as each other.  
 
As this thesis will argue, language can never hope to do full justice to the unique 
individuality and agency of the nonhuman. It can only grasp after its truth, failing 
in its attempts for full understanding. This thesis will however also argue that the 
language that makes up this search matters, that linguistic choices have the power 
to release difference into human comprehension, and to own up to human 
conceptual control. My choice of words in this thesis are important for the 
possibilities they make available within thinking, the space they carve for 
traditional human conceptions of the nonhuman to be stretched and challenged. 
Morton argues that: 
 
The idea of nature is all too real, and it has an all too real effect upon all too 
real beliefs, practices, and decisions in the all too real world. True, I claim 
that there is no such “thing” as nature, if by nature we mean something that 
is single, independent and lasting. But deluded ideas and ideological 
fixations do exist. “Nature” is a focal point that compels us to assume 
certain attitudes. Ideology resides in the attitude we assume toward the 
fascinating object. By dissolving the object, we render the ideological 
fixation inoperative. At least, that is the plan.’35 
 
Like Morton, my ‘plan’ for the critical portion of my thesis seeks to undermine 
‘ideological fixations,’ finding room for nonhuman nonidentity to appear through 
and beyond human ideas of it. Using ‘nonhuman,’ instead of ‘nature,’ is no 
guarantee of success, as every word is freighted with history and ideology. In 
removing the familiar term of ‘nature,’ however, I hope that the more unfamiliar 
‘nonhuman,’ will inculcate a potential self-consciousness in my reader about what 
they understand as nonhuman beings and objects. This potential self-
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consciousness may help to bring about an awareness of difference: the seething 
variety of things that cannot be comfortably held under the capacious term of 
‘nature,’ but which strive to emerge in their individuality through language. It is 
this difference that my thesis will seek to explore, responding to the alien quality 
of nonhuman difference, and the alien quality of language itself. My work will 
attempt to make an intellectual space in which it might be possible to imagine an 
ecological poetry that could do justice to ecological existence; to a contemporary 
moment in which recognising difference might give us profoundly relevant ways of 







Where Has All The ‘Nature’ Poetry Gone?  
 
As I have explored in my introduction, the environmental questions of our times 
can equally be thought of as linguistic questions—therefore there is a need for 
poetry, the art form in which language confronts itself most deeply, to engender 
new ways of describing and enacting human relationships with the nonhuman 
world. Yet, despite this, the majority of modern36 poetry that seems to support the 
‘natural’ world, also seems to reproduce the ways of thinking that are at the heart 
of environmental suppression, as I will demonstrate in this chapter. Thus this 
thesis must as: where can contemporary poets look in order to shape a poetics that 
refrains from colonizing and oppressing the nonhuman; one that responds to the 
pressure of the environmental crisis whilst revealing the agency and difference of 
the natural world?  
 
It is not just the obvious horror that drives these questions: the loss of nonhuman 
life, the destruction of habitats and landscapes, the dangers of pollution, global 
warming, deforestation and water poverty. It is also a horror that comes from the 
poetic and philosophical understanding that thought-worlds are produced by life-
worlds: that the capabilities of our thought partly depend on the material 
environments that impact upon it. In this understanding, the nonhuman is not only 
fodder for metaphor and imagination, it is a catalyst and a forebear of the creative 
act—its own unique difference and individuality stretching and shaping the 
intellectual and imaginative potential of the human mind.  
 
From this perspective, the loss of nonhuman beings or environments is a lessening 
of the capabilities we may have as thinking animals, ones able to break through 
subjectivity and become witnesses of essential and enchanting difference. To not 
turn in on ourselves— a painfully lonely and intellectually incestuous species 
playing inside the prison of our own subjectivity— we will need to allow for a 
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recognition of nonhuman difference, agency and freedom, in both physical and 
linguistic spaces. 
 
It was my frustration at a lack of non-oppressive ‘nature’ poetry from which to 
grow my practice that led me, as I have explained in my introduction, to this thesis, 
and towards seeking potential ways out of the poetic bind that I describe. To 
understand these potentialities, however, it is at first crucial to understand the 
problem which I am trying to solve. That is: what are the issues at work in much 
modern ‘nature’ poetry that get in the way of meaningful poetic interactions with 
the nonhuman?  
 
It is my argument that modern (by which I mean mid to late 20th century, and 21st 
century) Anglophone ‘nature’ poetry has a habit of falling into two general camps: 
what I will call the ‘committed’ and the ‘pastoral’. These camps have dominated the 
character of ‘nature’ poetry for nearly a hundred years, and, as I will suggest, may 
be contributing to contemporary poetry’s inability to face up to the environmental 
challenges we now face.  Most mainstream environmental poems (with inevitable 
exceptions)37 either seek to convey a strongly political message in relation to 
‘nature’, one committed to changing people’s attitudes and actions towards the 
nonhuman; or they attempt to provide a lyric and immediate rendering of the 
experience of the nonhuman for the reader.38 As I will prove in this chapter, both 
of these dominant poetic strategies falter in their lack of recognition of the 
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contingency and agency of nonhuman individuals and things; and so can only be 
dead ends in the search for an ecologically engaged poetics.39 
 
To understand and reveal the problems with the activist environmental writing of 
‘committed’ poetry, I will first look at Gary Snyder’s poem ‘Mother Earth, Her 
Whales’.40 Alongside this poem I will consider the text of Theodor Adorno’s 1962 
lecture Commitment,41 a piece of work that powerfully demonstrates the failures of 
art that commits itself to a didactic message.  
 
Snyder’s poem is a polemic against a capitalistic system that abuses nonhuman 
beings and things, as well as the human beings who live in ‘natural’ environments:  
 
The grasses are working in the sun. Turn it green. 
Turn it sweet. That we may eat. 
Grow our meat. 
  
Brazil says "sovereign use of Natural Resources" 
Thirty thousand kinds of unknown plants. 
The living actual people of the jungle 
                        sold and tortured … 
 
Ah China, where are the tigers, the wild boars, 
                    the monkeys, 
                        like the snows of yesteryear 
                                                        
39 The poets I will be placing particular emphasis on in this chapter, Gary Snyder (as an example of 
‘committed’ poetry, and Wendell Berry, (as an example of ‘pastoral’ poetry), are both American, 
and are both part of the same generation: Snyder born in 1930, and Berry in 1934. As such, though 
they are very different writers stylistically, these poets both share a narrow bracket—white, 
American men of nearly the same age. I point this out to make clear that I do not and could not 
consider these two men exemplars of all poetic perspectives, but that I do consider them two 
broadly representative poles of mainstream environmental poetry, poets that have hugely 
influenced the writing of their and our current moment. As the careers of these two dominant 
‘nature’ poets come to a close (both are now in their late 80’s) it seems the perfect moment to re-
assess their work, and consider where environmental poetry might go from here as we tackle ever 
more challenging ecological situations.  
40 Snyder, Gary. Turtle Island. (New York: New Directions), 1974. 




Gone in a mist, a flash, and the dry hard ground 
Is parking space for fifty thousand trucks.42 
 
Snyder’s general poetic argument: that oppressive human systems destroy and 
manipulate environments and beings, and that they should be resisted, is in itself 
one that, to my mind, seems ‘correct’. I too would like to see governments and 
societies treat the nonhuman with care. So why is it that I find the poem not only 
ineffective as art, but also ineffective, even counter-productive, in its liberatory 
aims for the nonhuman? Adorno argues in Commitment that: 
 
Works of art which by their existence take the side of the victims of a 
rationality that subjugates nature are even in their protest constitutively 
implicated in the process of rationalization itself. Were they to try to 
disown it, they would become both esthetically and socially powerless: 
mere clay.43 
 
Adorno is suggesting that if an artwork tries to polemically take the side of victims 
of a rational, capitalist society, putting itself in the same category as the victims by 
unhitching itself from that society, then it falls into the rationalizing trap of that 
society. This is because, in putting forward a polemical argument, the artwork 
takes on the empiricist nature of capitalist society. Adorno suggests that: 
 
Once the life of the mind renounces the duty and liberty of its own pure 
objectification, it has abdicated. Thereafter, works of art merely assimilate 
themselves sedulously to the brute existence against which they protest, in 
forms so ephemeral (the very charge made vice versa by committed against 
autonomous works) that from their first day they belong to the seminars in 
which they inevitably end.44 
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We can see this assimilation at work in Snyder’s poem, which aims to liberate the 
nonhuman from human oppression, and yet ends up repeating, in its aim for 
political effectiveness, the tropes at the heart of this oppression. In the seventh 
stanza of the poem, the speaker asks, ‘Is man most precious of all things?’ and with 
an assumed affirmative answers his own question: ‘-then let us love him, and his 
brothers, all those,/Fading living beings.’45 Putting aside the glaring gender 
imbalance of these lines, the poem has itself made the very argument that fuels so 
much environmental exploitation: that man ‘is the most precious of all things,’ and 
so can take what s/he needs from the ‘natural’ world, even if it has dire ecological 
consequences.  
 
Snyder knows that most of his readers will place human beings at the top of the 
chain of being over animals, plants and objects, yet instead of challenging this 
view, questioning whether a scale of importance distracts from the individual, 
unexchangable value of each being, he reiterates human specialness. Snyder is of 
course trying to use the ‘specialness’ of humanity as a tool to plead for the 
specialness of other creatures. He hopes that his readers will see these beings as 
‘brothers,’ part of their world, almost as important as them, and thus worth saving. 
And yet, in so doing, Snyder’s poem cannot help making the arguments that his 
poem is designed to negate. His need to convince his readers politically has not 
only subsumed his aims, it has shattered them. These lines leave the reader’s 
perspective on the nonhuman unchallenged, nowhere confronting the possibility 
that the nonhuman may have a right to exist not because it is connected to or 
pleasing to humans, but simply because it is. 
 
We see this negation of nonhuman agency and independence again in one of the 
poem’s most overtly polemical stanzas: 
 
Solidarity: The people. 
Standing Tree People! 
Flying Bird People! 
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Swimming Sea People! 
Four-legged, two legged, people!46 
 
This stanza calls for ‘solidarity’ between human and nonhuman, but the laudable 
political aim is in trouble immediately. Firstly, this solidarity can only be one way, 
framed as it is in human language inaccessible for any nonhuman being. More 
importantly, though the aim of describing various nonhumans as kinds of people 
can only be to equalize their importance and value in the minds of the reader, it 
achieves the opposite. ‘The people’ are at the top of the stanza— the real human 
‘people’ who need no extra designation, the original and ideal version of human-
ness. The animals then described as ‘Flying Bird People,’ and so on, are not only 
literally lower down in this poetic schema of value, they are only being given value 
at all as a kinds of humans, not as their own, always-different selves. Snyder hopes 
to engender affection in his readers for nonhumans by convincing us that they are 
really just other (lesser) kinds of humans, ones with feathers or gills. But this is an 
oppressive act that elides the individual reality and difference of those plants and 
animals mentioned. Rather than confronting his reader with the challenge of 
loving or valuing the absolute, and inaccessible, difference of those with whom 
they share a world, he perpetrates the same intellectual mistake that leads to the 
nonhuman oppression he deplores. 
 
In Commitment, Adorno analyses what he sees as the problems at work in the 20th 
century German playwright Bertolt Brecht’s ‘committed’ writing:  
 
‘Even Brecht’s best work was infected by the deceptions of his commitment. 
Its language shows how far the underlying poetic subject and its message 
have come apart. In an attempt to overcome the gap, Brecht affected the 
diction of the oppressed. But the doctrine he advocated needs the language 
of the intellectual. The homeliness and simplicity of his tone is thus a 
fiction. It betrays itself both by signs of exaggeration and by stylized 
regression to archaic or provincial forms of expression. It can often be 
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importunate, and ears which have not let themselves be deprived of their 
native sensitivity cannot help hearing that they are talked into something. It 
is a usurpation and almost contempt for victims to speak like this, as if the 
author were one of them.’47 
 
In Brecht’s desire to speak up for the oppressed, he ends up speaking for them, 
trying to merge real political subjects with the political work itself. In doing so, the 
victim’s own agency and reality is usurped by the author trying to be ‘one of them’. 
This explication of Brecht’s concerns clarifies another problem at the heart of 
Snyder’s polemical environmental poetics. Snyder rails against those who attempt 
to speak for the nonhuman world: 
 
How can the head-heavy power-hungry politic scientist 




         non-farmer      jet-set             bureaucrats  
Speak for the green of the leaf? Speak for the soil?48 
 
Snyder draws a separation between those in power and the nonhuman world they 
‘speak for,’ whilst simultaneously oppressing. Yet Snyder’s entire aim in this poem 
is to speak for (to speak up for) the nonhuman ‘natural’ world. His motivations are 
understandable, but by speaking for nonhuman beings he elides their difference, 
obscuring the individuality of their suffering and experience.  
 
Snyder criticises the ‘bureaucrats’ who speak for the nonhuman, but he does not 
consider the inherent problems of any human speaking, that is using human 
language and linguistic forms, to express the reality of non-linguistic beings. Nor 
does he consider that the valid factors that make the nonhuman appealing to 
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him—beauty, diversity, wildness, strength and so on—may mean nothing at all to 
nonhuman beings and things themselves. The ‘green of the leaf,’ may be a human 
source of affection for the plant world, but may mean nothing to the plant itself, or 
be understood completely differently in the plant’s life processes. At the heart of 
Snyder’s love for the nonhuman is a wholly hermetic lifeworld of experience and 
or/existence, one that is violated when it is presented as communicable. This is not 
to suggest that human beings cannot work for nonhuman protection and 
liberation. But it does, however, reveal a huge problem at the heart of Snyder’s 
poem. By presenting his poem’s narrator, and by extension himself, as the ‘rightful’ 
speaker for the nonhuman — without any reflection on the fractures of meaning in 
any human communication of nonhuman reality — nonhuman agency is lost. The 
controlling voices of the bureaucrats are replaced by a much more well-meaning, 
but equally misleading, poetic speaker. Snyder does not explore the gaps between 
representation and reality, between his desire to protect the nonhuman and its 
inaccessible reality. By ignoring these gaps, Snyder negates any liberatory 
potential for the nonhuman in his eagerness to make his poetry effective as 
politics. 
 
Adorno’s lecture expresses another central problem with committed artworks: the 
possibility that, in representing a victim’s suffering, that suffering is corrupted 
through a process of aestheticization: 
 
…by turning suffering into images, despite all their hard implacability, they 
wound our shame before the victims. For these are used to create 
something, works of art, that are thrown to the consumption of a world 
which destroyed them. The so-called artistic representation of the sheer 
physical pain of people beaten to the ground by rifle butts contains, 
however remotely, the power to elicit enjoyment out of it. The moral of this 
art, not to forget for a single instant, slithers into the abyss of its opposite. 
The esthetic principle of stylization, and even the solemn prayer of the 
45 
 
chorus, make an unthinkable fate appear to have had some meaning; it is 
transfigured, something of its horror is removed.49 
 
By using the horror of suffering as an aesthetic tool for making a political point, the 
suffering becomes ‘meaningful’: - it gains a paradoxical kind of value as the 
material for future change. In doing this, its agonising futility is concealed, and we 
may even draw some kind of aesthetic pleasure from its role as part of an artwork; 
forcing suffering to become sublimated for a higher political purpose. This also 
contains the potential ‘to elicit enjoyment’ from suffering within the society that 
caused the suffering in the first place. Snyder’s poem, unaware, operates within 
the corrupted aestheticization Adorno describes. It does this by painting a richly 
evocative picture of environmental pain, in the hope that this will make its polemic 
more effective: 
 
The robots argue how to parcel out our Mother Earth 
To last a little longer 
                   like vultures flapping 
Belching, gurgling, 
                near a dying Doe. 
 
“In yonder field a slain knight lies- 
We’ll fly to him and peck his eyes 
                    with a down 
       derry derry derry down down.”50 
 
This stanza draws a pleasurable, perhaps even mildly erotic, contrast between the 
ugly, disgusting vultures ‘belching’ and ‘flapping’ and the vulnerable, female, dying 
doe deer. These lines suggest that the ‘natural’ world is beautiful, delicate and 
pure, unlike the horrible and foul ‘robot’ vultures of human governments. In 
‘supporting’ the aims of the poem, the reader finds themselves pleasurably on the 
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pure and morally correct side of ‘natural’ world and its attractive doe. The reader’s 
agreement with Snyder’s argument is rewarded by inclusion within its beauty and 
goodness, further underlined by the stanza’s connection of the doe to a ‘knight’—
someone noble, chaste and pure, slain in righteous battle.  
 
In simplifying nonhuman struggles in this way, Snyder betrays the very victims of 
human oppression he wants to protect. It is particularly telling that he imagines 
his hated bureaucratic humans as nonhuman ‘vultures.’ This metaphorical 
aestheticization suggests that nonhumans who appear ugly, unpleasant and foul 
need not apply to his liberatory program. It little matters that vultures have a 
crucial place in the ecosystem, making use of rotten dead animals and returning 
them to the life cycle— they are aesthetically unappealing, and so are not offered 
sympathy in the poem. Whether Snyder has any genuine dislike of vultures is 
irrelevant: in painting them this way, Snyder elides the actual and complicated 
reality of the nonhuman world he is trying to save. The suffering and oppression of 
the whole network of nonhuman beings is reduced to the sad, tragically satisfying 
and sentimental fate of a dying doe. This is designed to give pleasure and self-
satisfaction to the reader, and so turn nonhuman suffering into a tool for political 
change. This conversion, however, neglects those he is hoping to save by ignoring 
their individuality, favouring those pleasant to human tastes rather than 
supporting all. The cliché of the disgusting vulture fails to make language confront 
its own well-worn images, at the same time that it fails to acknowledge the variety 
and contingency of the nonhuman. The poem turns nonhuman suffering into a 
comfortably familiar linguistic artifact, one that is offered back to the human 
society that created it. Thus Snyder’s political aim ‘slithers into the abyss of its 
opposite’51. 
 
As proven by my explorations of ‘committed’ art so far, the attempted merger of 
aesthetics into politics leads to a situation in which the aims of both fall into 
difficulty. It is my argument that not only does polemical political content fail the 
responsibilities of artworks, but that the nature of artworks cannot help but cancel 
                                                        




them out as political tools. To understand this, I look to Adorno’s examination of 
Brecht’s play Mother Courage. In this section of his lecture, Adorno demonstrates 
the problem of the inevitable political simplification needed when a specific cause 
is transformed into aesthetic experience: 
 
The picture-book technique which Brecht needs to spell out his thesis 
prevents him from proving it. A sociopolitical analysis, of the sort Marx and 
Engels sketched in their criticism of Lassalle’s play Franz von Sickingen, 
would show that Brecht’s simplistic equation of the Thirty Years’ War with 
a modern war excludes precisely what is crucial for the behavior and fate of 
Mother Courage in Grimmelshausen’s original drama. Because the society 
of the Thirty Years’ War was not the functional capitalist society of modern 
times, we cannot even poetically stipulate a closed functional system in 
which the lives and deaths of private individuals directly reveal economic 
laws … His attempt to reconstruct the reality of society thus led first to a 
false social model and then to dramatic implausibility. Bad politics becomes 
bad art and vice versa.52 
 
In Brecht’s use of the Thirty Years’ War as a symbol for the troubles of his own 
historical period, the political reality of both times is distorted, as is the play’s 
artistic integrity. This is because ‘If we take Brecht at his word and make politics 
the criterion by which to judge his committed theatre, by the same token it proves 
untrue.’53 Brecht’s play asks to be treated as politics, and so when it acts as art — 
imaginative, metaphorical, straying away from clear factual arguments — it 
simultaneously fails as both. The precision that is expected of political analysis can 
never be offered by an artwork. Yet, in putting forward the nature of the work as 
wholly political, this expectation is set up, only to be disappointed. The negation of 
the political within the artistic also takes place in Snyder’s work, where the desire 
for a factual underpinning to his argument poses problems for the effectiveness of 
his poem as art.  
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Snyder uses specific real world examples in his poem to underline the importance 
of his ecological arguments, and to draw attention to what has been lost in the 
‘natural’ world through human expansion and activity: 
 
Pére David’s Deer, the Elaphure, 
Lived in the tule marshes of the Yellow River 
Two thousand years ago- and lost its home to rice- 
The forests of Lo-yang were logged and all the silt & 
Sand flowed down, and gone, by 1200 AD54 
 
The aim of this stanza is to use specific detail — ‘Pere David’s Deer,’ ‘The forests of 
Lo-yang’ — to bring home to the reader that even in the distant past of ‘1200 AD,’ 
environmental destruction was robbing nonhuman creatures of their homes and 
lives. It thus hopes to awaken the reader to the scale of the suffering that has taken 
place, and encourage them to take an active interest in averting more of the same. 
However, in providing us with specifically factual information to back up a political 
argument, Snyder encourages us to read the poem in an empirical and analytic 
manner—yet such a reading falters on the lack of information provided. Was the 
rice that took over the ‘tule marshes’ planted for crude profit, or was it planted by 
people in desperate poverty who needed to eat? If the latter, would Snyder still 
deplore their actions, if man is the ‘most precious of all things’?  
 
If Snyder is arguing that nonhuman environments should never be destroyed, even 
if it means improving, or saving, the lives of human beings, then that would appear 
to be a contradictory political stance to the one he adopts earlier in the poem, one 
for which the reader may well desire an explanation. Either way, we are left in 
confusion, wondering over the exact circumstances and evidence Snyder invokes, 
but without the means to clarify the particular political terms of the poem. Of 
course Snyder’s simplifications are not simple political evasion—the aim of the 
poems, and poems like it, is to forge like-minded communities, and encourage that 
                                                        
54 Snyder, Gary. Turtle Island. (New York: New Directions, 1974), p.49, Lines 27-31. 
49 
 
community to take environmental action. Such community building is rooted in 
Snyder’s 20th century historical moment, and comes from a positive desire to band 
together to create change. However it is my argument that action built on such 
evasions and simplifications inevitably cover over the necessary complications of 
nonhuman difference, eliding nonhuman individuality at the same time that they 
work towards its alleged freedom. 
 
Further to this, Snyder says nothing about the political geographical differences 
between ‘1200 AD,’ in Asia and the modern day actions of a Western society. Were 
the reasons for environmental destruction the same then as now, despite one 
being imperial and feudalist, and one being capitalist? By bringing them together 
without comment in this way, the reader is left to assume that these two societies 
are the same, providing ‘bad politics’ that does nothing to reveal the varying 
societal drivers behind ecological collapse, or the complicated relations between 
past and present attitudes to the ‘natural’ world. This fudging of the political 
within the aesthetic reveals that ‘committed’ artworks are actually always 
speaking to those who already agree with them. This is why they can provide 
factual arguments that falter under scrutiny: because they expect the emotional 
power of their message to sweep aside such concerns in an assessment of the 
work. This is supported by Adorno’s statement that: 
 
The notion of a “message” in art, even when politically radical, already 
contains an accommodation to the world: the stance of the lecturer 
conceals a clandestine entente with the listeners, who could only be truly 
rescued from illusions by refusal of it.55 
 
The message of ‘committed’ art such as Snyder’s poem covertly assumes a 
sympathetic listener, accommodating itself to the ego and sentimentality of a 
reader who is already on its side. At no point does Snyder’s ‘committed’ poem 
challenge the structures of thought that lead to nonhuman oppression. The poem 
argues for change, but does not enact that change within its formulation as an 
                                                        




artwork. Adorno suggests that, ‘It is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives, 
but to resist by its form alone the course of the world, which permanently puts a 
pistol to men’s heads.’56 Rather than demonstrating generalised political 
alternatives in a way that a pamphlet or documentary might, art may be able, in its 
very aesthetic form, to resist the oppressive structures of an ideologically 
saturated world. Adorno describes artworks that operate in this way as 
‘Autonomous works of art’: 
 
Autonomous works of art…firmly negate empirical reality, destroy the 
destroyer, that which merely exists and by merely existing endlessly 
reiterates guilt. It is none other than Sartre who has seen the connection 
between the autonomy of a work and an intention which is not conferred 
upon it but is its own gesture towards reality. “The work of art,” he has 
written, “does not have an end; there we agree with Kant. But the reason is 
that it is an end. The Kantian formula does not account for the appeal which 
resounds at the basis of each painting, each statue, each book” … The 
uncalculating autonomy of works which avoid popularization and 
adaptation to the market involuntarily becomes an attack on them.’57 
 
‘Autonomous works of art,’ reject exchange-value in their avoidance of a clear 
‘message,’ one that, however noble, could turn them into another ‘useful’ object, 
vulnerable to, and available for, capitalist exchange. ‘Autonomous’ artworks lack 
an easily consumable intention and cannot help but ‘negate empirical reality,’ as 
their very existence ‘becomes an attack’ upon dominant modes of existence in 
which they can play no part. It is to the potentials of such work that I will turn in 
my second chapter. Before reaching that point however, I will elucidate the other 
general area of ‘nature’ poetry that, I will argue, fails in both its treatment of the 
nonhuman and the achievement of its own artistic aims. That is ‘pastoral’ poetry. 
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‘Pastoral’58 poetry focuses on an immediate experience of the natural world, 
blurring as much as possible the divide between the observing and recording 
human poet, and the nonhuman beings described. I will explore this ‘pastoral’ 
environmental poetry through the work of American farmer and writer Wendell 
Berry. To elucidate some of my concerns about poetry such as Berry’s, I will also 
look at the critical work of Timothy Morton, a contemporary environmental 
philosopher and critic, focusing on his text Ecology Without Nature.59 Morton’s 
book challenges the very concept of a separate, reified ‘nature’ within human 
culture, and argues that this concept is a block to real change within 
environmental relations. More specifically however he provides a critique of what 
he calls ‘ecomimesis’: nature writing (including ‘pastoral’ poetry) that aims for 
total immediacy. It is Morton’s critique of this type of writing, drawn in part from 
his own readings of Adorno, that will elucidate my explication of the 
contradictions and problems of ‘pastoral’ writing. 
 
Berry’s poems provide lyrical meditations on ‘nature’ and place, often evoking the 
solace he finds in experiencing the nonhuman world. We see this solace clearly in 
‘The peace of wild things’: 
 
When despair grows in me 
and I wake in the middle of the night … 
in fear of what my life and my children’s lives may be, 
I go and lie down where the wood drake  
rests in his beauty on the water, and the great heron feeds. 
 
I come into the peace of wild things 
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Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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who do not tax their lives with forethought  
of grief. 
I come into the presence of still water.60 
 
Berry’s writing in these lines seems in no way aesthetically self-aware. Rather, it is 
concerned with providing a beautiful account of immediate experience. The simple 
movement of ‘I go and lie down’ carries the reader with the narrator as they come 
‘into the peace of wild things’— the peace made to appear as easily accessible as 
the entrance to the pond or forest. The experience feels automatic, inevitable, a 
direct communication or transfusion of peace from the nonhuman to the poetic 
subject, and therefore to the reader. There is no registering of the potential gaps 
between nonhuman, poetic narrator, poetic author, and reader. All signs that this 
poem — and its quasi-mystical, peaceful atmosphere — are artistic constructs 
have been muted. The immediacy of the transmission of peaceful capabilities: ‘I 
come into the presence of still water,’ is utterly smooth. Morton describes this kind 
of ‘ecomimiesis,’ as ‘rendering’: 
 
Rendering attempts to simulate reality itself: to tear to pieces the aesthetic 
screen that separates the perceiving subject from the object. The idea is 
that we obtain an immediate world, a directly perceived reality beyond our 
understanding. When ecomimesis renders an environment, it is implicitly 
saying: “This environment is real; do not think that there is an aesthetic 
framework here.” All signals that we are in a constructed realm have been 
minimised.61 
 
The rendering that Morton describes could, on first look, be perceived merely as 
an aesthetic choice, a way of writing that allows the author to focus on what he is 
describing, rather than spending attention on the frame of description itself. 
However, Morton argues that: 
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Nature writing relieves us of the obligation to encounter non-identity, 
sometimes called “nature,” the “more-than-human,” the “nonhuman.” Like a 
daytime chat show its mode is one of avoidance rather than escapism. The 
aesthetic, artful, contrived quality of writing is downplayed. Nature writing 
seems to be a sheer rendering of the real, just as “reality TV” appears to be 
real (and we all know very well that it is not).62 
 
For Morton, the smooth and confident communication of nonhuman ‘reality’ by 
way of a ‘sheer rendering’, disallows the nonidentity and difference of the 
nonhuman. By downplaying the constructed nature of humanly-made artworks, 
‘rendering’ performs what seems to be a full reveal of the ‘reality’ of the 
nonhuman, without ever questioning whether such a reveal is possible for a 
human subject. This avoids a consideration of the difference that the nonhuman 
may possess beyond the accessibility of a human understanding, thus suppressing 
its independence and freedom.  
 
Berry’s work clearly emerges out of love, affection, and even respect for the 
‘natural’ world. However, in providing a pastoral rendering of immediate 
experience, this ‘natural’ world, and its nonhuman beings, are suppressed. Berry 
describes the ‘wood drake’ as he ‘rests in his beauty on the water.’ Already with 
this line the ‘immediacy’ and ‘reality’ of Berry’s version of environmental 
experience is called into question. The wood drake is very unlikely indeed to have 
any sense of the concept of beauty. Yet in saying that he ‘rests in his beauty,’ (my 
italics) Berry turns the concept of beauty into something belonging to the drake 
himself. The porous nature of Berry’s natural world, one that so easily 
communicates its ‘peace’ to the human subject, is not all it seems. Rather than 
being given a reliable account of nonhuman experience, we are given human 
concepts, and whatever the drake may be, or feel, vanishes. Any kind of nonhuman 
truth is occluded through the blurring of a human conception into an apparent 
nonhuman reality.  
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The issue of immediacy is also apparent in the description of coming into, ‘the 
peace of wild things/who do not tax their lives with forethought/of grief.’ The fact 
that the narrator finds the presence of wild things relaxing or peaceful is in no way 
problematic. What is problematic, however, is that these lines suggest a direct 
entrance of the human into nonhuman experience. The narrator claims a 
knowledge of nonhumans ‘who do not tax their life with forethought,’ a peace that 
he has access to. Yet the narrator cannot possibly know whether wild things have a 
‘forethought of grief’, whether some do and some don’t, or none do at all. In fact, 
could it be said that they don’t ‘tax’ themselves with grief, if they do not have a 
concept of grief at all? Or death? Or tax? Of course we cannot answer these 
questions, but in presenting his work as if we can, Berry turns the ambient peace 
of a landscape— the quiet, the aesthetic beauty — into a claim for a direct line to 
the truth of the nonhuman. In doing so, nonhuman reality is not only obscured, it is 
contained and repackaged as a comforting ‘truth’ for the human subjects that 
cause its oppression. The challenge of nonidentity, of laying down by the water 
next to appealing but hermetic difference, is never explored. Rather the 
nonhuman’s actuality is circled with human constructs, and thus hidden. As 
Morton suggests, ‘To borrow an argument from Theodor Adorno…the thinking 
process is in essence the encounter with non-identity. If not, it is just the 
manipulation of preformed pieces on a readymade board.’63 In Berry’s poem all the 
reader is given is a swirl of pre-existing human fantasies, fantasies which stand in 
for a real interaction between the human mind and the existence of a nonidentical 
nonhuman being.  
 
In the final stanza of Berry’s poem the narrator states that: ‘For a time/I rest in the 
grace of the world, and am free.’64 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary explains the 
meaning of ‘grace’ as: ‘unmerited divine assistance given humans for their 
regeneration or sanctification.’65 The nonhuman world has provided a grace to 
humans that is ‘unmerited,’ an access to freedom that seems to need no human 
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effort. Yet surely the ‘peace’ offered by this nonhuman world is an idea created by 
its very hermetic difference. The closed off presence of the nonhuman turns into a 
mirror for the human subject, reflecting their emotional need for a gentle, innocent 
nature. The challenging difference of the nonhuman is converted into a wall of 
comforting silence, upon which human desires can be projected. The nonhuman’s 
difference becomes ‘useful,’ a tool of (non-divine) assistance in which humans can 
convince themselves that they are briefly free of human worries, whilst remaining 
utterly submerged in their own subjectivity. The nonhuman cannot be what it is, 
but becomes again an adjunct to human needs and fantasies.  
 
Such a rendering of nonhuman reality also conveniently overlooks the ways in 
which human actions have made the entire ‘world’ of the nonhuman profoundly 
un-peaceful and disturbed. Whether it is clearly apparent in Berry’s landscape or 
not, all of nonhuman life is impacted by humanity’s erosion of natural 
environments, its agriculture, its creation of global warming and on and on. Berry’s 
pond or river may already be affected by toxic pollution or increasing 
temperatures, but, even if it isn’t (which is unlikely), the potential for these 
impacts is inevitable. Morton argues that: 
 
Nature writing tries to be “immediate”—to do without the processes of 
language and the artful construction of illusions. It wants to maintain the 
impression of directness. But this can only be a supreme illusion, ironically, 
in a world in which one can find Coke cans in Antarctica. The immediacy 
that nature writing values is itself as reified as a Coke can.’66 
 
The immediacy of the ‘natural world,’ its untouched peacefulness, is always-
already covered by the fingerprints of human action. This is not to in any way 
negate the difference of the nonhuman, whose ultimate reality remains hermetic 
to the human subject, but to suggest that it is nevertheless caught up in processes 
which humanity itself has caused. The ‘peace of wild things,’ (if it ever existed at 
all), has been profoundly tampered with by humanity, in both overt and subtle 
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ways. Whether it is global warming, or early humans encouraging the growth of 
certain medicinal plants, an untouched and ‘pure’ environment is a reified fantasy; 
one that fatally distracts from the intimacy with difference that exists in the human 
relation to the nonhuman world. There can after all be no harking back to the 
peace of ‘original nature,’ without already having a clear conception of human 
culture—it is an awareness of that culture that gives us any notion of ‘nature’ in 
the first place, ‘nature’ only able to exist as one half of that lingustic contrast.67 
Without that cultured other, ‘nature’ simply falls away into generalised ‘being.’ The 
purity of a seperate ‘nature’ that Berry admires so much, is a purity that springs 
wholly from his own intensely human way of thinking and percieving. 
 
One of the central tendencies of contemporary pastoral poetry, alongside 
immediacy, is its definition of certain places, almost always rural, as centres which 
can exist outside of capitalism’s rapacious ideology. In describing such places, 
pastoral poetry seems to offer the hope of an alternative reality, one free from the 
ideological shackles of exchange-value that lead to the degradation and abuse of 
human and nonhuman alike. I will, however, suggest that, in positing certain places 
as environmentally ‘good’ in contrast to other ‘bad places’, pastoral poetry 
reproduces the same consumerist, colonising systems it hopes to reject; as well as 
obscuring the actual power relations of human and nonhuman interactions. In 
Berry’s poem, ‘In This World’, the narrator evokes his serene rural locality, and 
contrasts it to the violence of the wider world: 
 
The sun sets. 
Ahead of nightfall the birds sing. 
 
I have climbed up to water the horses 
and now sit and rest, high on the hillside, 
letting the day gather and pass. 
Below me 
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cattle graze … 
 
slow and preoccupied as stars. 
In this world 
men are making plans, wearing themselves out, 
spending their lives, in order to kill each other.68 
 
In these lines, the reader is invited to be gently surprised that ‘In this world,’ there 
can exist both places that have a calm, measured and wholesome way of life, and 
places in which men spend their lives ‘in order to kill each other’. The assumption 
is that, despite sharing a ‘world’, the narrator’s rural idyll is as far away as possible 
from the (surely) urban space of brutality and danger. This is expressed by the 
lines ‘The sun sets/Ahead of nightfall the birds sing’ — images so simple that they 
seem edenic, timeless. Berry’s narrator is caught up in the eternal rhythms of the 
earth, rather than the hustle and speed of the violent townscape — a human being 
whose life is closer that of to the nonhuman ‘horses,’ and ‘cows’ that share his 
locale, than to the cruel humans far away from him. However, in representing 
place in this manner, Berry’s poetry ignores any connection there may be between 
his innocently portrayed ‘natural’ world, and the capitalistic, modern world that he 
rejects. Rejection of this kind is described by Morton as ‘beautiful soul syndrome,’ 
which he explains thus: 
 
It is all very well to carp at the desires of others while not owning up to the 
determinacy of one’s own desire. This is a political as well as an intellectual 
position, one to which ecological thinking is itself prone. After Hegel I call it 
beautiful soul syndrome… The “beautiful soul” washes his or her hands of 
the corrupt world, refusing to admit how in this very abstemiousness and 
distaste he or she participates in the creation of that world.69 
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Berry’s beautiful and restful rural place only takes on its meaning because of the 
contrasts that make such a meaning possible. It is a knowledge of busy and 
sometimes dangerous other places that makes the narrator’s place exist—a mirage 
of its opposite, a landscape shaped as the echo of all that Berry hopes to reject 
within the modern world. Berry’s location is intimately connected to the places he 
rejects, and in-fact needs those places to be ‘bad’, for his to gain its status as ‘good’. 
As well as this, by creating a sense of place within his poetry that is seemingly 
untouched by the ‘corrupt’ world Morton describes, Berry removes himself from 
the site in which change could take place. By treating the rest of the world as a 
distasteful space of violence, the dangers that threaten ‘nature’ and the rural are 
not averted, they are ignored; whilst the narrator and reader can bask smugly in 
the higher moral quality of their chosen location. In doing this the poem partially 
recreates the world it rejects, strengthening its sense of inevitability as the urban 
ying to Berry’s rural yang; and doing absolutely nothing to shift its paradigms. This 
treatment of place not only helps to prop up the existing systems of the wider 
world; it also obscures the ideological violence that is happening in the seemingly 
pure location that Berry evokes. Morton argues that: 
 
Ideological determination depends not just upon the content and form of an 
artwork or rhetorical device, but also on the subject position that it 
establishes. The artwork hails us, establishing a certain range of attitudes.70 
 
The content and form of Berry’s poem lull the reader into a place of quiet peace: 
 
cattle graze out across the wide fields of the bottomlands 
slow and preoccupied as stars71 
 
The sibilance of ‘slow’ and ‘stars’ and the imagistic space of ‘out across,’ and ‘wide 
fields,’ cannot help but communicate a mixture of gentleness and freedom for both 
the nonhumans grazing and the human observing them. However, if we look 
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closer, we see that these poetic aspects cover up the position of a subject re-
producing the oppressive tropes we would expect Berry’s writing to reject. This 
occurs because the hierarchy of the narrating subject over the nonhuman object 
allows the reality of what takes place to remain hidden. The cattle of the poem 
serve as a symbol of an utterly natural and peaceful way of life. Yet if the cattle 
were living a ‘natural’ life, outside of human protection, then they would be 
inevitably caught up in the violence of the predator-prey relationship. As well as 
this, they would not be separated by gender, as they are on farmland, leading to 
violence in the struggle for mates, as well as the potentially visceral spectacle of 
procreation. Even in their peacefully constructed state as farm animals, they, or 
their calves, will eventually serve as meat for the human subject that idealises 
them as figures of non-violence. The peace in which they seem to live, and which 
they embody for the poem, is an utterly reified human fantasy. 
 
The problem with Berry’s poetic construction, for my argument, is not that it is 
‘unrealistic.’ It is that, in obscuring the utter control of the human subject over the 
nonhuman being, both within the physical landscape, and in the aesthetic system 
of the poem, the nonhuman’s agency and individuality is occupied and suppressed. 
It seems as if the nonhuman roams freely through the life of the poem, as it does 
through the fields, when actually it is being bent to serve the ideological pleasure 
of the subject, taking part in the creation of a comfortingly eco-friendly sense of 
self. By creating an unrealistically peaceful, and fully comprehensible, version of 
nonhuman existence, Berry turns actual nonhuman life into a reified and 
consumable product. Not one peep of actual nonhuman suffering, difference, or 
mystery appears in Berry’s poem. His seemingly ‘naturalistic’ lyric turns the 
nonhuman into an aesthetically petrified, and conveniently communicable, version 
of its actual and complicated self. Morton suggests that: 
 
Literature about the environment takes on various roles within 
consumerism. One function is to soothe the pains and stresses of industrial 
society, as national parks assuage our weekday world … ecological writing 
(including criticism) fills a gap in normative forms of consumerism. It does 
not fall out of consumerism altogether. It provides a “new and improved” 
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version of it—however little those invested in such literature and criticism 
may like it.72  
 
In creating a soothing version of farm life, Berry turns a complicated actuality into 
a pleasant poetic product. Despite his genuine aim to reject the ideology of 
capitalist and consumerist competition and violence, Berry provides the ‘new and 
improved’ consumerism Morton describes. In this new consumerism, the product 
on offer is, paradoxically, the very pleasure that comes from feeling oneself free, 
morally or physically, of consumerism and capitalism. This paradox feeds the 
enjoyment of Berry’s narrator, and his readers. Enjoyment is bought through a 
hierarchical control over the meaning of nonhuman existence, an image of 
freedom that is philosophically and literally its opposite. Whether killed for meat, 
or enjoyed in a poem, the agency or individuality of the nonhuman is nowhere to 
be found. This eco-consumerism does nothing to challenge the unbalanced 
subject/object relations that are in part responsible for the oppressive violence of 
capitalism. Rather these relations are symbolically rejected at the same time that 
they are aesthetically performed. 
 
This sort of subjective masquerade, one that provides a version of the nonhuman 
that is merely human wish fulfilment, does nothing to solve the problems of 
representing the nonhuman in a way that is non-oppressive. It also does nothing to 
suggest how a poet might be able to access nonhuman difference and 
communicate it, or if such communication is even desirable within aesthetics. 
Morton suggests that: 
 
To truly love nature would be to love what is nonidentical with us … 
Instead of trying endlessly to get rid of the subject-object dualism…to love 
the thingness, not in a Heideggerian sense, but actually the mute, objectified 
quality of the object, its radical non-identity. Nature is not a mirror of our 
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mind. Ecological criticism should admit to the unnaturalness both of the 
object and of the subject: ecological desire is not chaste.73  
 
What if part of the problem of Berry’s pastoral poetry is not only that it covers up 
unequal power relations in its communication of nonhuman reality, but that the 
desire to communicate this reality is itself problematic? Morton is arguing for a 
kind of ecopoetics that does not seek to better communicate the nonhuman to its 
readers, but one that rather admits to the inherent strangeness and hermetic 
difference of the nonhuman, but is prepared to think about it and love it anyway. 
Admitting such a love-at-a-distance would ‘denature’ the idealised ‘naturalness’ of 
the nonhuman, but would also, as Morton argues, do the same for the subject. A 
subject aware of its failure to fully comprehend the nonhuman is one that would 
be unable to set itself up as an idealised paragon of rural wholeness ‘at one’ with 
the natural world. Even if the human subject was practically involved with the 
nonhuman, it would be an involvement, an intimacy, with a world of nonidentity, 
of strangeness. Poetry from such a subject position would lose the comforting 
pastoral unity of Berry’s cultivated landscapes, as well as the self-deluding 
positivity of Gary Snyder’s committed eco-solidarity. It would have to describe its 
interest in, its passion for, a nonhuman world of which it has no full grasp, 
revealing the aporias of its own understanding. In doing so, however, it might be 
able to achieve what Morton calls ‘a radical openness to other beings, without 
goal;’74 an openness that could make space for the agency of the nonhuman to 
become apparent. My second chapter will argue that this kind of poetry can 
overcome the problems I have explored in the work of Wendell Berry and Gary 
Snyder; offering us, as contemporary writers, potential ways forward in creating 
an environmentally engaged, ecological poetics. 
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Making The Mute Eloquent. 
 
In my first chapter I considered some of the problems which I perceive to exist in 
the two central strands of modern ‘nature’ poetry: the ‘committed’ and the 
‘pastoral.’ I argued that these forms of poetry, exemplified by the writers Wendell 
Berry and Gary Snyder, suppress the agency and difference of the nonhuman. 
Language of this kind reflects human subjectivity back to itself, rather than 
exploring or revealing the individuality of nonhuman existence. As demonstrated 
in that chapter, it seems clear to me that poetry which claims a full understanding 
of nonhuman reality fails the nonhuman beings it considers; and ignores the 
potential of poetic language to open up new ways of thinking for human subjects.  
 
In this chapter I will be close reading four of the American poet Wallace Stevens’ 
works. Stevens is a writer whose poetics, I believe, comes close to a non-
oppressive engagement with the nonhuman. I will be holding Stevens’ poems up as 
examples of language that can engage with, and make fruitful rather than barren, 
the challenges faced by poets attempting to interact with the nonhuman in their 
work. I will use readings of Stevens’ individual poems to argue that the issues of 
my first chapter, the usurping of nonhuman agency, and the transformation of 
nonhuman experience into consumable human products; do not have to be 
inevitable in creating a poetics of the nonhuman. I will argue that these problems 
can be resolved in a form of writing that does not call for change, but rather 
produces a space of potential change within the movements of its own aesthetic 
structures. In this space the mind of the poetic reader has the opportunity to 
challenge its own subjectivity, and the chance to glimpse the radical individuality 
and difference of the nonhuman. These unusual opportunities certainly cannot 
guarantee a shift in either the reader’s perspective or their actions, but it can 
prompt new kinds of thinking, ones accessed through the generative instability of 
poetic language. Such poetic thinking, in which totalising subjectivity is pierced by 
nonhuman difference, is what makes it possible to imagine changed forms of 
interaction with the nonhuman.  
63 
 
My argument is that it is in poetry that the structures and traditions of language 
can be unstitched, and that through this challenge to language, a challenge to the 
very character of thinking can be mounted—language facing itself within an 
experience of radical reading. It will be my suggestion that Stevens’ writing allows 
us to experience such reading, to imagine a poetry that recognises and reveals the 
existence of nonhuman agency; whilst always owning up to the domineering 
potentialities of its own language. 
 
Stevens’ poetry demonstrates that the best place to begin in making changes to 
human-nonhuman relationships may be within language itself. The intensity of 
poetry’s use of language, and its ability to change the ways in which that language 
is experienced and signified, makes it, to my mind, the form in which these 
intellectual and perceptual transformations can be most readily achieved. In 
Stevens’ case this is initiated through a dismantling of the subject positions that 
lead to controlling perspectives on, and actions towards, the nonhuman. That is 
not in any way to say that Stevens’ poems serve as concrete tools for activism, nor 
that they should. My argument is rather that a shift in perception must be achieved 
at the deepest level if we have any hope of amending human action towards the 
nonhuman world; and that looking to the work of these poems can contribute to 
that shift.  
 
In Chapter One I touched on Adorno’s conception of what he calls ‘autonomous 
works of art.’ Adorno asserts that, ‘The uncalculating autonomy of works which 
avoid popularization and adaptation to the market involuntarily becomes an 
attack on them.’75 It is my suggestion that just such an autonomy can be found in 
Stevens; specifically, the refusal of his poems to provide a straightforward 
ecological message or palatable version of ‘nature’ in their consideration of the 
nonhuman. This autonomy allows Stevens’ poems to transcend the repetitive 
subjectivity of Berry, Snyder and their ilk, creating a transformative aesthetic 
experience for the reader. The slipperiness of Stevens’ poems when faced with 
questions of genre or intent allows them to resist ‘adaption to the market’76— to 
                                                        




resist the very forces of identificatory thinking that are at the root of nonhuman 
oppression. The space of unknowing that we enter into within the poems operates 
very differently from the exchange-value driven system with which we are 
familiar. This suspension of exchange-value, for an experience whose value is hard 
to quantify or delineate, creates the ideal situation for a questioning of human 
subjectivity. To experience the autonomy of one of Stevens’ poems is to glimpse 
what might be possible beyond reified conceptions, an autonomy that also mirrors 
that of the nonhuman, just beyond reach. Stevens’ poems do not give us a position 
that can be summed up and reproduced. Rather they create spaces in which we 
can briefly experience something that is not our own subjectivity; where 
uncertainty and openness replace the ideology and certainty we observed in the 
poetry of my first chapter.  
 
It could be argued that Stevens’ poems are not ‘ecological’ poems at all— certainly 
they have no discernibly polemical content, nor do they lament any lost species, or 
celebrate, in a straightforward and lyrical manner, the ‘natural’ world. Instead, 
Stevens’ poems interrogate the subject positions of their human narrators, and 
that of the creating artist themselves. The poems question how any perspective or 
aesthetic act can hope to speak of an existence beyond its own. The poems mine 
the gap between the human desire to connect with the nonhuman, and the 
hermetic individuality of the nonhuman itself. In doing this, I will argue, Stevens 
replaces poems about ‘natural’ or ecological topics, with poems that are in 
themselves ecological: aesthetic spaces in which the interrelationships and 
differences of nonhuman and human organisms and environments can emerge. 
Within these spaces the human subject reveals its limitedness, owning up to the 
chasm between its experience and the experience of the nonhuman which it hopes 
to comprehend.  
 
Revealing the space between human understanding and nonhuman reality 
produces a poetic structure that is radical in its rethinking of the nonhuman within 
aesthetics. Instead of attempting to use poetry as a magnifying glass for the 
nonhuman, picking out its detail in the hope of comprehending it, Stevens’ poems 
instead turn the glass onto the poetic human subject. In doing this — looking at the 
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crippling failures of the subject’s attempt to understand the nonhuman — an 
awareness of nonhuman autonomy is able to briefly appear, through the 
knowledge of its absence. Thus the telos of Stevens’ poetic movement becomes 
reaching out, yet failing to fully grasp, the nonhuman. In so doing Stevens reveals 
both the domination of the nonhuman by human culture and concepts, and the 
irretrievable distance, strangeness and nonidentity of the nonhuman’s individual 
reality. It is this movement that I will focus on in my attempt to show how Stevens’ 
poetry challenges human subjectivity, and is able to glimpse nonhuman agency.  
 
To understand why a poetry of this kind is important, and how it operates, I return 
again to the ideas of Theodor Adorno. I will be exploring the full repercussions of 
Adorno’s aesthetic philosophy on my argument in my third chapter, however in 
this chapter the specific focus will be on Adorno’s idea of the nonidentical. 
Nonidentity is explained by the contemporary philosopher Lambert Zuidervaart in 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:  
 
Adorno claims that modern philosophy has privileged thought and its 
concepts. As a result, philosophy has not done justice to that in the object 
which does not fit under concepts -- the unique side of everything "by 
virtue of which things are identical neither to the kinds they embody nor to 
other instances of those kinds." (Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.54.) Such 
"identity thinking" ignores or suppresses "the non-identical." It thereby 
takes part in the domination of nature.77 
 
The nonhuman is, as evidenced by this statement, always nonidentical, in that the 
nonhuman’s individuality of existence cannot be fully contained by human 
concepts. Adorno, in Aesthetic Theory, argues that these human concepts oppress 
the nonhuman by claiming that they can fully comprehend and communicate its 
specific reality. These concepts cover over the nonhuman’s nonidentity, muting its 
agency and replacing it with an image forged entirely by human subjectivity. This 
muting is part of the exploitation of the nonhuman, turning it into a resource for 
                                                        




human use or experience, its own being-in-itself suppressed. Adorno also argues 
that this silencing of the nonhuman cannot merely be thought away, as it is an 
inherent part of the identificatory thinking brought about by reified society, and 
thus is part of human subjectivity itself. It may however be possible, he argues, for 
art to touch on the reality of the nonhuman by making ‘the mute eloquent;’ 
exposing ‘itself to failure through the insurmountable contradiction between the 
idea of making the mute eloquent, which demands a desperate effort, and the idea 
of what this effort would amount to, the idea of what cannot in any way be 
willed.’78  
 
It is my contention that Stevens’ poems manage to make the mute eloquent 
through the ‘insurmountable contradiction’ that Adorno suggests. Stevens’ poems, 
in their simultaneous forward-backwards motion toward the nonhuman, manage 
to craft a gap in language in which we can briefly glimpse the reality of the 
nonhuman object outside of our subjectivity—a reality made ‘mute’ to us by the 
structures of our subjectivity, unable to locate the nonhuman’s individual being 
within a totalising mental system. For me it is this motion, rather than the feigned 
immediacy of ‘pastoral’ poetry, or the political messages of ‘committed’ poetry, 
that comes closest to a truly non-dominating interaction with the nonhuman 
world. Stevens manages to gesture with his language towards the individuality of 
the nonhuman without controlling, processing, or finally comprehending it. Such 
language is ‘ecological’ in the sense that it contains the ‘pattern of relations’ that 
make up how we perceive the nonhuman. It reveals the hidden structures of our 
understanding, stretching towards the nonhuman but never quite reaching it. In 
doing so ‘ecological’ language manages to paradoxically glimpse nonhuman reality 
from within this network of relations, providing illumination for what cannot be 
found. 
 
It is Stevens’ poetic search for an understanding of objective, nonhuman reality in 
his poems, which allows it to be made clear how far a reified human perspective 
will always be from such an understanding. However, as I will demonstrate, 
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enacting the frustration of this desire within poetry can itself be ‘like a new 
knowledge of reality;’ allowing the reader to catch a shimmer of nonhuman being-
in-itself on the very edge of their perception. 
 
To understand how the nonidentical can appear, through the attempt, and 
eventual failure, of language to comprehend it, we must attend to the ways in 
which Stevens dramatizes and reveals these failures within his poetry. The first 
poem I will consider in this regard is ‘The Man on the Dump’. In the first stanza of 
this poem the dump is described as a place ‘full/Of images,’79 where material from 
every corner of the world seems to turn up, ‘So the sun,/And so the moon, both 
come, and the janitor’s poems/Of every day, the wrapper on the can of pears,/The 
cat in the paper bag, the corset…the tiger chest, for tea.’80 The detailed variety of 
this list, its jumbled specificity, achieves a kind of paradoxical generalisation. This 
is achieved because the spheres the list touches upon — things cosmic — the sun 
and moon, things human — the corset, and things nonhuman — the cat and the 
pears, are so wide as to be able to symbolise everything, and yet are made up of 
such odd images that they retain the sensual impression of individual instances of 
objective existence. In setting up the dump’s ‘janitor’s poems,’81 as made from the 
discarded sweepings of the material world, as environments of generalised 
specificity, Stevens is bringing reality itself into our consideration: - hinting 
towards a multitude of vibrant individual objects which are impossible for him to 
summarise or express fully. This lack of summary is crucial because, rather than 
aiming to represent reality effectively through the dump, Stevens instead makes us 
aware of how difficult it is for human concepts to access the complicated 
difference of the objective world. Stevens makes evident the impossibility of 
forming images that can successfully capture nonhuman, non-subjective reality in 
full.  
 
The difficulty of accessing reality through language is then expanded on in detail in 
the next section of the poem:  
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The freshness of night has been fresh a long time, 
The freshness of morning, the blowing of day, one says 
That it puffs as Cornelius Nepos reads, it puffs 
More than, less than or it puffs like this or that.82 
 
The ‘freshness’ of a breath of wind or a morning has been expressed so much that 
the experience of ‘freshness’ in language is no longer fresh, weighted as it is by the 
known history of other’s past experience and metaphors of experience. This is 
made clear by the mention of ‘Cornelius Nepos,’ a Roman biographer of ‘great 
lives’, who acts as a reminder of the monolith of recorded human life that stands 
between us and a truly ‘fresh,’ wholly new experience of reality. So, from the 
evidence of these first stanzas, it seems as if the reality of the world is cut off from 
poetic communication, as the language and metaphors which we attempt to use to 
dig it out are worn and warped from overuse, no longer reliable carriers of direct 
meaning. 
 
However, later in the poem, Stevens seems to pose a challenge to the arguments of 
his own first stanza. He does this by attempting a powerful description of 
nonhuman particularity on the dump: ‘Now, in the time of spring (azaleas, 
trilliums,/Myrtle, viburnums, daffodils, blue phlox)’83 This incredibly specific list of 
names appears to liberate the flowers from the generalisations of human concepts, 
those which force objects into pre-conceived ideas, rather than taking their 
understanding from the objects themselves. Unlike the lumped together ‘flowers’ 
of the previous stanza, these flowers have individual and separate titles which 
have more to do with their scientific actuality than any kind of humanly imposed 
metaphor or vision of beauty. The practicality and facticity of these names, and the 
jumble of conflicting sounds that they force on the inner ear, seem to allow the 
flowers to be themselves, nonidentical to the human, their difference from 
anything but themselves foregrounded. In this Stevens appears to have found a 
way to de-poeticise his poetry, managing to describe flowers without any ‘flowery’ 
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language; thus separating ‘spring’ from its usual generalised and romanticised 
character and restoring to language some of the nonhuman specificity of objective 
reality. 
 
Yet the stanza continues: ‘Between that disgust and this, between the things/That 
are on the dump (azaleas and so on) /And those that will be (azaleas and so on).’84 
From an explication of seemingly specific instances of reality, Stevens swerves 
back to the generalisation of ‘and so on,’ in lines that are both visually and aurally 
balanced with each other, examples of sameness rather than difference. By doing 
this Stevens reveals that even the scientific sounding, botanical names of his 
earlier line contain and embody a kind of hidden generalisation. This is because 
the names are human sum ups of subjectively decided species, such as ‘azaleas,’ 
and not expressions of the individual reality of each flower. These concepts exist to 
order and make consumable the specific difference of the nonhuman. They 
masquerade as full disclosures of nonhuman reality by placing concepts around 
the object which speak as if they were the object itself. The ‘disgust’ that is cited in 
the lines is a disgust at the failure of the poem’s language to live up to, or access, 
nonhuman reality, however hard it tries to draw close to the specificity of the 
nonhuman object. The poetry’s attempt to hone in on objective reality has failed, 
and we as readers have witnessed its failure. 
 
However, despite this disgust, the speaker of the poem asserts that ‘One feels the 
purifying change. One rejects/The trash.’85 What change can have emerged from 
this utter poetic failure? ‘One’ rejects the trash, but, as Stevens has set up in his 
first stanza that everything is trash, everything is on the dump, then it is 
everything that is being rejected. All the old images and conceptions are being 
recognised as faulty in their ability to connect to and access nonhuman reality. The 
failure is not of the individual poem, but of all poems, all language. Unlike the 
flawed consciousness of ‘committed’ or ‘pastoral’ poems, convinced that their 
particular organisation of words will succeed in drawing the nonhuman from its 
hiding place, this poem accepts the complete inability of all language to reveal 
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nonhuman reality. This total rejection is ‘purifying’ and liberating, because, in 
recognising the impossibility of touching the nonidentical fully through language, 
the nonidentical seems to speak through the gap. This is achieved not through a 
‘change’ of language, the always-already failed attempt to replace one set of 
metaphors with a more effective alternative, but through a ‘change’ in what 
language is attempting to do. By creating a poem that explicitly reveals its failure 
to access the nonidentical, the reader of the poem cannot help but become aware 
of the distance between language and the thing it tries to describe. In witnessing 
this gap, they witness the space in which the nonhuman should be, and so become 
negatively aware of its objective reality. This is not to say that this gap provides us 
with full knowledge of the nonidentical. Instead, being aware of this gap makes us 
unavoidably aware of its shrouded but vital existence, distant as we may be from 
capturing or cognising its meaning. Like a chalk outline around a no longer present 
corpse, it is our witnessing of what is not there which tells us what was or should 
be. This is a knowledge of absence, rather than of detailed reality. This poetic 
knowledge out of emptiness is deftly demonstrated by the extra space left in the 
transition between the relevant stanza and the one that follows it: 
 
One feels the purifying change. One rejects    
The trash.  
 
               That’s the moment when the moon creeps up    
To the bubbling of bassoons. That’s the time 
One looks at the elephant-colorings of tires.86  
 
Creating these unusual line formations, which appear in no other stanza, gives a 
visual way for Stevens to show the nonidentical gap, a space on the page that 
contains nothing, and yet which, surrounded by words, is visible. Reality rushes 
into view as what is not there, the nonidentity that we experience powerfully in 
poetry because we are paradoxically aware that we cannot fully experience it. This 
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paradox is the central one of the poem, and of Stevens’ nonhuman poetics, a 
closeness to difference that can only be bred through distance.  
 
The nonidentical is not, however, put forward in Stevens’ poetics as static entity, 
waiting to be revealed through poetry. In the paradox of seeing-through-not-
seeing in his poetry, we become aware of the agency of the nonhuman, an agency 
usually covered up by the suppressive nature of identificatory thinking.  This can 
be understood by turning to the poem ‘On the Road Home’. The poem begins, ‘It 
was when I said,/“There is no such thing as the truth,”/That the grapes seemed 
fatter. The fox ran out of his hole.’87 It is at the very moment that the speaker gives 
up on comprehending the truth of reality, gives up on the very existence of truth 
for the human subject, that reality forcefully asserts itself. The nonhuman 
suddenly comes into view, the grapes seeming ‘fatter,’ taking up more room, and 
the fox running ‘out of his hole,’ choosing to leave a secret space and briefly flash 
up in the open. The irony of the speaker’s ‘no such thing’ alongside these rich 
bursts of nonhuman activity communicates not that any comprehension of true 
reality has taken place, after all the grapes seem fatter, but that reality continues to 
flourish and change beyond our conception of it. It is when the speaker accepts 
that the only truth available is that we cannot access truth that, ‘the silence was 
largest/…the night was roundest,/The fragrance of the autumn warmest,/Closest 
and strongest.’88 It seems odd that the sound of possible human-nonhuman 
knowledge should be silence, and that this silence should go along with a deeply 
sensual experience of an autumn night. But this silence is not a shutting out, rather 
it is a marker of the fact that the narrator has had a genuine glimpse of nonhuman 
difference. It is the nonhuman’s very silence that discloses its agency, its ability to 
retreat invisibly into the void without us. This disclosure of agency through silence 
requires a different kind of listening from the human subject, one attentive to gaps, 
to the emptiness that reveals the absence of the nonidentical, and thus its hidden 
sensual reality. This kind of listening does not hear nothing, it hears ‘silence,’ a lack 
of sound full of the inaccessible but potent reality of nonhuman life. Unable to 
follow or comprehend, but able to attend to this lack, the human becomes aware of 
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the nonhuman, nonidentical agency that resists its concepts. In recognising 
nonhuman agency Stevens’ poems also recognise that we do not need to believe in 
the nonhuman for the nonhuman to exist. The nonhuman does not need our 
conceptions to come into being, shaking us off at the very moment that we think 
we have got hold of its reality.  It is this poetic rejection of epistemological idealism 
that offers the hope that the nonidentical gap may not simply be another way to 
trap the nonhuman within our concepts, another version of human control masked 
as an allowance of independence. 
 
To understand the poetic impact of recognising the agency of the nonhuman 
beyond our conceptions, we now return to the third stanza of ‘The Man on the 
Dump’. As soon as the speaker ‘rejects/The trash’89 of human metaphor:  
 
That’s the moment when the moon creeps up 
To the bubbling of bassoons. That’s the time 
One looks at the elephant-colorings of tires. 
Everything is shed; and the moon comes up as the moon 
(All its images are in the dump) and you see 
As a man (not like an image of a man), 
You see the moon rise in the empty sky.90 
 
Having rejected the trash, and recognised the limitations of human conceptions, it 
is paradoxically then possible to see the moon ‘come up as the moon,’ as all its 
images ‘are in the dump.’ The moon’s metaphors and ideas are discarded, in an 
‘empty sky’ free of attempts to make sense of and control it. In the same way it can 
be seen ‘As a man,’ that is, not like some image or concept of what a man (or 
indeed woman) might be, but as a separate, individual human being; aware of the 
limits of comprehension, and yet made momentarily free by this knowledge.  
A connected kind of release takes place in ‘On the Road Home’, when the separate 
agency of the nonhuman is recognised: ‘the tree, at night, began to 
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change,/Smoking through green and smoking blue.’91 The tree begins to appear 
less as the solid and reliable thing we might imagine it, and more like a gas: 
‘smoking through’ our concepts of it, our images of ‘green’ and ‘blue,’ as, moving 
like smoke, it cannot be pinned down or held onto. The speaker of the poem’s 
rejection of total human knowledge allows the tree itself to evade human 
conceptions of its individual reality. Or, rather, the tree’s specific nonidentity was 
always evading human conceptions, but now this liberated evasion is visible to the 
speaker, and readers, of the poem. Of course, however, as we see in ‘The Man on 
the Dump’, not ‘Everything is shed,’ in Stevens’ poetics. This is evidenced by the 
line ‘the elephant-colorings of tires,’92 in the poem, a metaphor which attempts to 
use the reality of one nonhuman thing to describe another: getting closer to it 
through imagery, whilst simultaneously pulling away from its unique reality. This 
metaphor demonstrates the inability of language to fully comprehend or make 
explicit the nonidentical. What is ‘shed,’ is the idea that such a comprehension 
could be achieved, the surreal quality of the image drawing attention to its very 
imprecision, and so, again, accessing a kind of knowledge of reality within 
negation, a knowledge that appears in its distance from us. 
 
To demonstrate this reality through negation it is, however, not enough to simply 
state the existence of the nonhuman’s agency and nonidentity, and leave the 
reader to become enlightened by their failure to comprehend it. What is absolutely 
crucial in these poems is the movement towards, and then the failure to capture, 
the reality of the nonhuman. It is this ceaseless backwards and forwards motion of 
language that can forge a fertile poetic paradox out of failure. It does this by 
allowing us to witness the nonidentical gap emerging from within a crosshatch of 
poetic movement, a gap that would otherwise remain invisible. Poetic language is 
able to create, and hold in balance, a paradox that transforms linguistic failure into 
an engine for nonhuman witness— language that lays itself bare, allowing 
nonhuman revelation to emerge through cracks made by what it cannot do.  
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In an earlier paragraph I explored the lines in ‘On the Road Home’, which focuses 
on a tree, ‘Smoking through green and smoking blue,’93 the tree’s evasion of human 
conceptions becoming visible to the poem’s speakers. However, directly after this 
revelation of nonhuman agency come the lines, ‘We were two figures in a 
wood./We said we stood alone.’94 Immediately we move from one individual tree 
to a ‘wood,’ a generalised group of trees under their familiar moniker. The 
speakers have returned to their human conceptions, and so are ‘alone,’ surrounded 
by the nonhuman and yet not truly with it, not able to register its separate and 
complete agency and difference. So these lines, in their motion towards and then 
away from the nonidentical, necessarily contain both the freedom offered within 
language, and its remainder. The ‘Smoking through,’ of the tree cannot be a 
permanent state of awareness for the speakers, or readers, of the poem. It can only 
flash up as a glimpse of the nonidentical’s existence, briefly illuminating the 
overwhelming subjectivity of human beings’ identificatory thinking. 
 
The motion between reality and subjectivity is also apparent, as we have seen, in 
‘The Man on the Dump’. However, in the final stanza of the poem Stevens moves 
into a piercing self-commentary on his own poetic strategy. The stanza painfully 
questions whether even Stevens’ poetry is guilty of offering delusionary revelation, 
a new way of circulating the same old suppression of the nonidentical nonhuman. 
This stanza digs into the very form of poetics that the potential reader has been 
hoping might liberate them from total identificatory thinking. The stanza begins:  
 
One sits and beats an old tin can lard pail. 
One beats and beats for that which one believes. 
That’s what one wants to get near. Could it after all 
Be merely oneself, as superior as the ear  
to a crow’s voice? Did the nightingale torture the ear, 
Pack the heart and scratch the mind? And does the ear 
solace itself in peevish birds? Is it peace, 
Is it a philosopher’s honeymoon, one finds 
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On the dump?95 
 
In these lines Stevens questions whether the rejection of human conceptions can 
offer any actual glimpse of the nonidentical’s existence, or whether the subject is 
simply glimpsing itself, cloaked in the borrowed strangeness of the nonhuman. 
The beating of the ‘old tin can’ in the poem seems to be sound, rhythm, poetry— 
and the belief is the belief in reality, that it is really out there, outside the self: 
‘that’s what one wants to get near.’ However, the fear is that even these small, 
unseen yet seen glimpses of reality are ‘merely oneself.’ If this is the case then the 
nightingale’s song becomes ‘torture’ because through its beauty, its appeal, it has 
tricked the mind into thinking it has truly experienced something outside of itself. 
The deluded mind then finds ‘solace’ in ‘peevish’ birds, the perversely obstinate 
nonhuman that gives nothing away. This is the ‘philosopher’s honeymoon:’ poetry 
as a pretence that reality can be seen in any way through language, in truth only a 
distraction from a total failure to escape subjectivity. This is the deluded poetry 
which hears ‘the blatter of grackles,’ and says ‘Invisible priest,’ immediately 
turning nonhuman nonidentity into the symbol or equivalent of a completely 
human idea, in this case religion. Such poetry pulls ‘the day to pieces’ by crying 
‘stanza my stone’: - thinking that it can forge its lines directly from the earth. This 
assumed direct connection between human and nonhuman, in its dominating 
arrogance, pulls the day apart, pulls apart any chance that reality might have had 
to come through to the human. This is Stevens’ version of poetic despair: poetry 
not as a way to gesture towards nonidentical reality, but as another form of false 
consciousness, another way of pretending to let the nonhuman be, whilst 
converting it utterly into subjective human experience.  
 
Yet, in the final line, seeming to have taken apart the earlier stanzas’ offered 
possibility of circling around the gap of nonidentity, and thus recognising its 
existence, the poem finishes: ‘Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the.’96 
It is only through language that, however imperfectly, we came to know of ‘the’ 
truth at all. ‘The the’ was what gave us the very idea of truth when we came to try 
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and understand it, language the only available vehicle to think around what the 
nonhuman might be or mean. For this reason, painful and impossible as it is, it is 
through language that we must look for truth, for reality. This may mean turning 
language against itself, recognising its failures to access the nonidentical, and 
through this, gaining knowledge of the existence of what we cannot know. But 
Stevens’ shows that we need language to reach, and fail, and reach, as this poem 
itself does, after nonidentity and the nonhuman, never pretending to grasp and 
control it. We must accept that nonhuman nonidentity can never fully appear to us, 
never be fully cognised, rising up only as an absence which we can witness but not 
decode.  In doing this, language may offer a fractured mirage of the object-in-itself, 
the distant but crucial knowledge of an existence outside subjectivity. Steven’s 
demonstrates why it is in language that we must attempt to re-think our 
relationship with the nonhuman, poetry as the essential aesthetic workshop in 
which new strategies for interactions between the human and nonhuman are 
forged. 
 
The third poem I will address in this chapter, ‘Not Ideas about the Thing but the 
Thing Itself’, also creates a movement between language’s attempt to capture the 
always receding nonidentical, and its failure to do so. However, like the ‘The Man 
On the Dump’, this poem is also concerned that poetic movement may not be 
enough, and that the seeming glimpses of nonidentical difference that appear are 
really the human talking to him or herself. The poem dramatizes the back and 
forth of the speaker’s mind, as he tries to prove to himself that there really is an 
objective outside world beyond his own stifling subjectivity. In doing this the 
poem shows us the experience of constant questioning necessary to undertake this 
form of poetics, a form that rejects the cast iron rigidity of the subjective self found 
in ‘committed’ and ‘pastoral’ poetry—subjectivities unable to criticise their own 
perspectives, and so doomed to repeat their own concerns to themselves, unable 
to glimpse the nonhuman sphere. Stevens’ poetics, in contrast, reaches for the 
nonidentical whilst always being aware of its own inability to fully grasp it. It is 
this fractured, self-questioning experience of failure that offers the only hope of 
moving beyond the strictures of reified human conceptions within language. 
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In the first stanza of ‘Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself’, the speaker of 
the poem hears ‘a scrawny cry from outside’ which ‘Seemed like a sound in his 
mind.’97 The cry, coming at the ‘earliest end of winter, /In March,’98 is outside, part 
of a moment of nonhuman change and seasonal transition, of a distinctly 
nonhuman agency. Yet the cry seems to the speaker like ‘a sound in his mind.’99 
Despite the promise of the poem’s title, any sound from outside will always be 
received and shaped by the inner mind, it cannot pass pure, untouched by human 
conception. The next lines however attempt to reaffirm the genuine existence of a 
space outside of subjectivity: ‘He knew that he heard it,/A bird’s cry, at daylight or 
before, In the early March wind.’100 This line offers a list of environmental specifics 
that demonstrate the speaker’s need to believe, to ‘know,’ that what he heard was 
genuinely something outside himself. A nonhuman sound has been registered, at a 
specific time, in the specific context of the ‘early March wind,’ these details aiding 
the speaker in imagining a world that is not himself.  
 
This need or desire to prove the existence of objective reality is developed by the 
next stanza: ‘The sun…No longer a battered panache above snow…/It would have 
been outside,’101 which repeats the insistence of the speaker that their experience 
was not a subjective imagining, that there really is an outside taking place. The line 
also registers a change in the nonhuman sun, its ‘battered panache,’ shifting to the 
utterly bare description of ‘It would have been outside.’  The damaged 
flamboyance of ‘battered panache’— a flamboyance we must assume is draped 
around the sun by human metaphor — recedes as an awareness of the reality of 
the outside develops. In stating only that it is ‘outside’, the description is less rich, 
and yet we get a clearer sense of the reality of the sun beyond our metaphors, a 
nonhuman entity apart from our ideas, simply outside.  
 
The poem continues to build the structural pressure of this ‘outside’ in its attempt 
to reveal the possibility of objective reality: ‘It was not from the vast 
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ventriloquism/Of sleep’s faded papier-mâché…/The sun was coming from 
outside.’102 The sun and the bird’s cry are not ventriloquized, they are not the 
voice of the subject masquerading as the voice of nonhuman difference. Nor are 
they part of ‘sleep’s faded papier-mâché’, the soft, malleable detritus of dreams 
which, occurring in sleep, are the mind talking to it itself, and have nothing to do 
with accessing an external reality. The line also repeats the belief that the sun is 
‘outside,’ the word gaining in weight as it is repeated, pressing through the 
inherently crafted nature of poetic language with the distantly luminous promise 
of something beyond human craft and thought.  
 
At the end of the poem Stevens moves the focus more closely in on the bird’s cry 
itself, and the impact its nonhuman expression has on the human speaker’s ability 
to recognise and believe in an external reality— ‘That scrawny cry—it was/A 
chorister whose c preceded the choir.’103 The cry is not imagined as a full choir, but 
as a single chorister who’s ‘c’ sets the note for the other singers. In these ingenious 
lines we ‘hear’ both the single note and the choir that must follow, our minds 
unable to help filling in the next step in the chain of sound from chorister to choir. 
Yet of course the only note we can clearly imagine or ‘hear’ in our minds, as it is 
the note has been given to us, is that single ‘c,’ and not the following unknown song 
of the choir. In leaving this unfilled gap Stevens shows how the bird’s cry reveals 
the complexity and richness of the nonhuman’s nonidentical world, without 
revealing it. The unheard choir rises in the reader’s mind, but without sound, a 
space that points to itself, to a knowledge that we gain and simultaneously cannot 
have. The speaker has got as close as one can to the reality of the nonhuman world, 
through the imaginative glow of its retreating absence. The cry is ‘part of the 
colossal sun … Still far away,’104 still free from the control of human knowledge, 
powerful and revelatory as the experience of it has been.  
 
The poem’s final line is, ‘It was like/A new knowledge of reality.’105 The experience 
that has been brought about by the cry is like a new knowledge of reality, rather 
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than an actually new, complete knowledge of reality, because that would be 
impossible within the mind’s conceptions. This being ‘like’ is crucial, because, in its 
awareness of the failure of language, of our incomplete understanding of the 
nonhuman, the knowledge is achieved that there is an outside of the human mind 
and human subjectivity; even if that outside is opaque and distant. The wonder of 
this outside pierces the speaker of ‘Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself’ 
with difference, with the violent realisation that there is an inaccessible world of 
nonhuman nonidentity. This realisation forges the hope of something beyond 
reified human conceptions. It is this hope that animates and ignites the effects of 
each of the poems discussed in this chapter. 
 
The final poem that I will be examining is ‘The Snow Man’, which shares a 
questioning of human subjectivity and its limits with the poems explored so far. 
‘The Snow Man’ demonstrates the near impossibility of understanding the 
nonhuman world without what we observe being coloured by human concepts:  
 
One must have a mind of winter …  
 
not to think 
Of any misery in the sound of the wind106 
 
The reader of these lines is inevitably unable to help merging their imaginative 
version of a winter wind with the ‘misery’ described as its sound. The aesthetic 
imaginary of a cold wind cannot appear without an attendant descriptor of 
‘misery,’ or bleakness being assumed, showing how difficult it is to separate a 
nonhuman instance from our conception of it. The reader is made aware of the 
potential of ‘not’ thinking this way, of having a ‘mind of winter’ able to parse the 
nonhuman. Yet the human connection of ‘misery’ and a January wind is too tightly 
bound to be easily undone. This despite the fact that the sad ‘sound’ of the wind is 
actually the movement of ‘a few leaves’107:  
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Which is the sound of the land 
Full of the same wind 
That is blowing in the same bare place108 
 
The sounds that emerge from the wind passing over the leaves and the land, come 
from a nonhuman existence that has nothing to do with any of our ideas of 
emotion or atmosphere. The land is ‘bare’ of concepts, of anything but itself, and 
yet we cannot experience it that way; trapped in a form of thinking in which our 
human understanding struggles to achieve an objective view of the nonhuman. 
This attention towards the layers separating human understanding and nonhuman 
reality is underlined by the repeated imagery of snow built up over nonhuman 
objects: 
 
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow; 
 
And have been cold a long time 
To behold the junipers shagged with ice, 
The spruces rough in the distant glitter 
Of the January sun; …109 
 
To ‘regard’ the ‘boughs’ and the ‘junipers’ in their entirety would mean somehow 
seeing beneath the crusts of snow and ice layered on top of them. Stevens’ imagery 
simultaneously shows us nonhuman entities, and hides them beneath wintry 
coverings. This imagery demonstrates, within the body of the poem, the 
experiential paradox of viewing a nonhuman object whose being-in-itself you 
cannot access— our understanding as smothered by our own conceptions as the 
pines by snow. The final stanza of the poem seems to confirm that the human mind 
is always unable to draw itself out of identificatory, reified thinking in order to see 
the individual agency of the nonhuman: 
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For the listener, who listens in the snow, 
And, nothing himself, beholds 
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.110 
 
The ‘listener’ of the poem is able to ‘see’ everything in the scene in front of them — 
‘Nothing that is not there,’ but what is there is not available to him — ‘the nothing 
that is.’111 On first consideration this appears to be a negative assessment: the 
‘listener’ can see ‘nothing,’ a set of nonhuman objects that appear in the physical 
world, but are utterly closed off from human consideration. The nonhuman’s 
existence is essentially invisible in any search for understanding or meaning, the 
listener frozen out from insight.  
 
However, if we attend to the details of these lines, we see that Stevens’ poem is 
more open and complex than this apparent judgement seems to suggest. The half 
rhymes of ‘boughs/snow,’ ‘time/ice,’ ‘think/wind,’ ‘snow/beholds,’112 provide an 
aesthetic experience that is both connected and distant—the mind of the reader 
matching up the sounds at the same time that they experience the rhythmic 
remainder; simultaneous closeness and jarring separation. A rhyme scheme of this 
nature intimates that there may be forms of connection possible in aesthetic 
experience that is not wholly forthcoming. The import of this can be understood by 
looking again at the final stanza. The stanza considers someone who ‘beholds,’ and 
yet this person is described as ‘the listener, who listens in the snow.’113 There is a 
disjunct here between stated sense perceptions: a listener who looks. This 
suggests that though it may be impossible to entirely see past human concepts to 
observe the nonhuman, there is another form of perception available. This 
perception would be attentive to the sound of nonhuman silence, looking for the 
nonhuman through its physical apparitions whilst simultaneously listening to its 
lack of arrival into human comprehension. We can only ‘hear’ the ‘sound of the 
wind’ by listening to its imprint in the vibrations of ‘leaves’ and ‘land’ being 
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shaken.114 In the same way, this form of perception would seek to gain 
understanding from the vibrations, traces and echoes of the nonhuman, rather 
than the impossible to reach nonhuman object itself. It would listen to a land rich 
with the silence of nonhuman, existent but closed. This kind of poetic perception is 
offered to us in Stevens’ poem— one able to catch sight of nonhuman reality 
through the reverberation of its absence.  
 
The listener described by the poem is ‘nothing himself,’115 an extremely cryptic 
line that is both paradoxical and uncertain. On the one hand the human listener is 
‘nothing’ in the negative sense; he is a closed off entity to which no nonhuman has 
access, both invisible to the truth of the other. On the other hand, the listener being 
‘nothing,’ means that he is described in the same terms as ‘the nothing that is,’116 
the hermetic but existent realm of the nonhuman. As the poem’s half rhymes 
brought together instances of language and ideas whilst pushing them apart, this 
shared description provides a connected space in which the human and the 
nonhuman are equalized. Both are ‘nothing,’ and so both can claim a joint place 
within the open expanse of the negative: closed, but bristling with intimate 
potential. 
 
Stevens’ line ‘Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is,’117 is the final one of 
the poem. The ambiguity of this line brings the reader into an uncertain space, one 
where the usual rules of exchange-value—the value of each thing located in what it 
can be exchanged for, are suspended. The ‘nothing’ is the hermetic nonhuman to 
which the human has no access, excluding it from becoming a fixed and 
comprehensible unit for consumption. Yet this is a nothing ‘that is.’ It exists in the 
very same world that a human being exists in, part of the ‘nothing that is not 
there,’ a physical fact that manages to deflect all enquiries into its being and 
existence. The nonhuman’s closed off absence points to the existence of what 
cannot be known, and so, paradoxically, makes that existence briefly apparent.  
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The intense paradox of this nonhuman apparition, fully there and yet fully absent, 
briefly undoes the rules of reified understanding. Existing side by side with the 
human, intimate in its sharing of our world, it remains wholly distant from a form 
that could make it accessible to us and our identificatory thinking. In bringing 
awareness to this relational paradox, Stevens creates an autonomous realm within 
his poem—a place in which it is possible to briefly ‘think outside’ of identificatory 
thinking. The poem has no consumable (and thus exchangeable) ‘message’ that can 
be easily summed up, nor does it provide a comforting narrative of suggested ways 
to improve human beings’ treatment of the environment. This lack of message 
resists ‘adaption to the market,’118 not through a specific political stance, but 
through the poem’s refusal of fungibility, its refusal to be anything other than its 
own unique and singular entity.  
 
Stevens’ poem is a ‘bare place’ in which some of the strictures of human concepts 
can be suspended, leaving the reader in an interaction with an unknown 
nonhuman thing—an interaction that, in its very lack of a rigid purpose or aim, 
allows for a glimpse of the freedom available beyond all-encompassing 
subjectivity. It is in this being-in-itself that we might find ways to think towards 
the nonhuman’s own fiercely independent agency and difference, allowing beings 
and objects that belong entirely to themselves the space to exist. Like all of the 
poems discussed in this chapter, The Snow Man does not call for change, but rather 
creates an ecological space in which change might take place in the body of 
language itself, at the root of how we think into the world. 
 
                                                        





The Capacity Of Thought. 
 
At the heart of this project is a re-thinking of the ways in which we might call on 
poetry to be ecological, (that is, provide ways towards sustainable, equitable 
relations between human and nonhuman beings) both in the structures of texts 
themselves, and in the ways that we read and criticise those texts. In Chapter One I 
addressed some of the problems I felt hampered mainstream environmental 
poetry’s relationship with the nonhuman, and in Chapter Two I looked at how 
Adorno’s idea of the nonidentical might reveal the ecological potential of Wallace 
Stevens’ poetry. In this chapter I will build on the work of Chapter Two, arguing 
that it is in Adorno’s work that we find theories able to reveal how ecological 
poetry might alter thinking practices: producing a dialectic within language that 
makes the structural rigidity of thought apparent, whilst using this rigidity to point 
to the existent world beyond these stirctures.  
 
In this chapter I will particularly be focusing on Adorno’s essay, ‘Society,’ and his 
longer work Negative Dialectics. I will also continue to explore the ecological 
potential of Wallace Stevens’ poetry, making use of Adorno’s influence to excavate 
the challenge to traditional modes of thinking about the nonhuman provided by 
Stevens’ work. Rather than simply placing Steven’s work ‘under the lens’ of 
Adorno, I will seek to represent a fruitful conversation between the two, revealing 
the critical understandings birthed by this interaction. Through this conversation I 
will aim to reveal not only how Stevens’ poetry attempts to undo reified thinking 
about the nonhuman, but why this undoing could be crucial in transforming our 
attitudes and actions towards the nonhuman world. 
 
One thing that is particularly interesting about Adorno’s philosophy is its sheer 
difference from most of mainstream environmental aesthetic criticism, often 
termed ‘eco-criticism.’ Adorno’s work is not only different in its attitude to its 
material, but in the very fact that its areas of consideration are not constricted by 
any overt generic affiliation. Such affiliations can be profoundly generative in the 
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opportunities they provide for making connections between scholars’ work, but 
can also pre-form the expectation of what critical work should attend to, and even 
what answers or conclusions it should provide. Adorno’s freedom from this 
disciplinary specificity allowed him to produce work that challenges some of our 
assumptions about the nonhuman, and which can take on and consider elements 
from any relevant field of thought. 
 
Ecocriticism is a varied field, and so cannot be in any way repudiated as a 
hegemonic academic system, but there are elements in its ways of thinking and 
reading that often recur, perhaps due to the disciplinary expectations cited above, 
that are revealing to consider in contrast to Adorno’s aesthetic and cognitive ideas. 
In a series of short essays titled Defining Ecocritical Theory and Practice,119 
produced in 1994 for the US branch of The Association of Literature and the 
Environment, a selection of critics working in ecocriticism set out their ideas about 
what this field does, and the meanings it holds.  
 
In his essay for this series, ‘What is Ecocriticism?’ Harry Crockett explains that 
‘Ecocriticism elucidates relationships between human and non-human nature.’ 
Apart from his non-questioning use of the word ‘nature,’  this appears to be a 
reasonable account of the aims of ecocriticism. However, Crockett goes on to argue 
that: 
 
We want to have an impact beyond the academy about those matters in the 
world most dear to us. Ultimately, we will be failures in our own eyes if our 
labors don't help green our society.120 
 
Despite Crockett’s passionate assertion, the terms of the supposed ‘failure’ that he 
mentions are not made clear. Crockett also suggests that, ‘We reject the prevailing 
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critical assumption that reality is socially constructed.’121 Crockett does not go on 
to elucidate the ways in which he hopes that criticism will have an impact in 
helping ‘green,’ our society. Nor does he provide further details about how he is so 
sure that reality is not ‘socially constructed.’ These statements reflect two 
important issues that arise in a number of mainstream eco-critical readings. These 
are: the desire to use environmental literature to bring about concrete political 
and social change, and the belief that reality, especially nonhuman reality, is 
uncomplicatedly ‘out there,’ if we would only look for it. These two elements are 
connected in that they seem to focus more on action, pushing out into the ‘real’ 
world, than on a consideration of thinking practices, and how those practices effect 
the world of the nonhuman. Crockett seems sure that it is possible to change 
things through ecocriticism, but how this will be done is not explained. There is no 
mention of how ecocriticism might not only draw attention to environmental 
problems, but also challenge the systems of thought that are in part responsible 
for those very problems. 
 
In an essay from the same series, also titled ‘What is Ecocriticism?’ Cheryll 
Glotfelty describes her version of eco-critical thought: 
 
Ecocritics and theorists ask questions like the following: How is nature 
represented in this sonnet? What role does the physical setting play in the 
plot of this novel? Are the values expressed in this play consistent with 
ecological wisdom?122 
 
These questions focus less on social change, and more on how the nonhuman is 
represented within literature, also a valuable area of study. What is similar in both 
essays however is the idea of ‘nature’ as something ‘there,’ a part of the tangible 
world that is easily accessible, and easily considered. Glotfelty’s essay does seem to 
take into account to some degree the linguistic and cultural construction of 
‘nature’ in literature, and yet leaves concepts such as ‘Ecological wisdom,’ and 
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‘nature’ unexplored in themselves; not questioning how these formations 
themselves may act as a bar to genuine consideration of nonhuman existence. 
 
I have no wish to negate the importance of these critics’ aims, and they are writing 
an earlier stage in the evolution of ecocriticm that writers such as Timothy Morton 
and Jane Bennett, whose work I will also consider. I do however want to suggest 
that many assumptions and structures of thought that the human brings to the 
consideration of the nonhuman, are skipped over in these seemingly clear and 
concise versions of eco-critical aesthetics—aesthetics whose influence is still 
powerfully felt in much mainstream ecocriticism. These critics laudably aim to 
think about how the nonhuman is represented, but there is no mention at all of the 
kinds of thinking that made this representation possible, or the assumptions that 
exist in the act of human beings representing the nonhuman in the first place. 
Similarly, the aim to ‘green’ society, to create a critical response to aesthetics that 
reaches directly out into the political world, seems to jump over the internal 
intellectual and conceptual changes within criticism that might be crucial before 
direct change is possible. This is not in any way to repudiate the need for action. It 
is rather to re-orientate our attention: to put thinking and writing practices at the 
forefront of what needs to be examined if human-nonhuman relations have a hope 
of being altered. In this chapter I will seek to step back from attempts to use texts 
as tools for political, physical action. Instead I will consider what happens when 
we approach texts as spaces where the action of thinking might be challenged; 
where the roots of nonhuman oppression might reveal themselves, and so, become 
vulnerable.  
 
In contrast to the assumptions of the eco-critics already mentioned, Adorno’s ideas 
seek to challenge the concepts, ideologies and structures of thinking that we bring 
to bear on the nonhuman and the world in general. For Adorno, unless these 
structures can be resisted, no genuine work of nonhuman liberation can take 
place, either within art itself, or in the use of that art for social change. Adorno’s 
work suggests as much of a desire to change human-nonhuman relationships as 
the critics mentioned above, but his ways of bringing this about involve not only a 
consideration of the nonhuman and its appearance in aesthetics, but a 
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consideration of what happens, and can happen, in the very acts of thought that 
shape human interactions with nonhuman objects. This consideration 
differentiates Adorno from much mainstream criticism about the nonhuman, and, I 
will argue, provides a unique philosophical and critical perspective with which to 
consider the ecological potential of aesthetics. 
 
In the previous chapters I have touched on Adorno’s thinking in relation to 
‘autonomous art’: art that does not make a political statement, or sum up and 
explain a communicable message. Such art is revolutionary in its very ‘being-in-
itself,’ its resistance to becoming an exchangeable commodity. It is in exploring 
autonomous art and its language that I as a poet have been able to see a way 
forward in forging an ecological writing, one that does not suppress the singularity 
of the nonhuman. In critically examining Wallace Stevens’ autonomous art, I am 
able not only to locate some of the causes of nonhuman oppression in the 
structures of reified thought, but also to consider ways in which it might be 
possible to challenge those structures within poetry. This chapter attempts to 
create a new way to think about the possibilities of poetics through an engagement 
with Adorno’s critical strategies; forging the hope that ecological change may take 
place, in some part, in the work of language itself. 
 
In his essay ‘Society,’ contained within in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno argues that: 
 
What is social in art is its immanent movement against society, not its 
manifest opinions. Its historical gesture repels empirical reality, of which 
artworks are nevertheless part in that they are things. Insofar as a social 
function can be predicted for artworks, it is their functionlessness. Through 
their difference from a bewitched reality, they embody negatively a 
position in which what is would find its rightful place, its own. Their 
enchantment is disenchantment. Their social essence requires a double 
reflection on their being-for-themselves and on their relations to society.123 
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For Adorno, any concrete ‘opinions’ that an artwork might express matter much 
less than its ‘functionlessness’ a quality which ‘repels empirical reality,’ through its 
difference from that reality. In its intense being-in-itself, its existence outside of 
the ‘useful’ practical space of empirical society, autonomous art offers the 
possibility of something beyond reified capitalist ideology. Adorno believes that to 
understand such art we must understand that its ‘being-in-itself’ converges with 
its ‘relation to society’: a socially radical act that takes place through a rejection of 
any functional action. It is this paradox, radical potential drawn from uselessness, 
from which autonomous art draws its power, repelling the strictures of total 
exchange-value.  
 
Adorno suggests that: 
 
Art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position 
only as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique to 
itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as 
“socially useful,” it criticizes society by merely existing, for which puritans 
of all stripes condemn it. There is nothing pure, nothing structured strictly 
according to its own immanent law, that does not implicitly criticize the 
debasement of a situation evolving in the direction of a total exchange 
society in which everything is heteronomously defined. Art’s asociality is 
the determinate negation of a determinate society.124 
 
What is revolutionary in this is that it suggests that ‘asociality,’ a lack of message 
and action within art, is the only way in which it is able to become ‘social’—this 
because, in a society completely defined by exchange-value, what is ‘socially useful’ 
can only be the complete rejection of society’s control within art’s very structure. 
Rather than criticizing, in a clear way, a society which controls not only life but 
modes of thought, art is able to be, in itself, an alternative mode of thinking; an 
autonomy that cannot help but challenge determinate ideology. This alternative 
does not easily solve the problems of society, but it does offer the promise that 
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there may be other ways of being, a chink in the armour of a totalising ideological 
system. For Adorno: 
 
The iridescence that emanates from artworks, which today taboo all 
affirmation, is the appearance of the affirmative ineffabile, the emergence of 
the nonexisiting as if it did exist. Its claim to existence flickers out in 
aesthetic semblance; yet what does not exist, by appearing, is promised. 
The constellation of the existing and nonexisiting is the utopic figure of art. 
Although it is compelled toward absolute negativity, it is precisely by virtue 
of this negativity that it is not absolutely negative.125 
 
To understand how this ‘iridescence’ appears in poetry, and the ways in which it 
can help us to re-think the making of a space for nonhuman difference, is one of 
the key aims of this chapter. Adorno does not give specific examples of individual 
works that embody his autonomous ideal. However, it is my argument that in 
Wallace Stevens’s work we can see how art is able to produce ‘the emergence of 
the nonexisiting as if it did exist;’ demonstrating the potential of this emergence to 
re-structure human-nonhuman relations within aesthetics. I will first explore the 
‘constellation of the existing and nonexisiting’ in Stevens’ short poem 
‘Disillusionment of 10 o’clock’, seeking to show how this constellation makes it 
possible to ‘shake’ the ‘I’ of subjectivity’s thinking, pushing back against the 
empirical world’s totalising control, the locked conceptual space that suffocates 
and degrades nonhuman agency.  
 
In ‘Disillusionment of Ten O’Clock’, which is short enough to reproduce in its 
entirety, Stevens paints an apparently whimsical picture of a dreamlike world: 
 
The houses are haunted 
By white night-gowns. 
None are green, 
Or purple with green rings, 
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Or green with yellow rings, 
Or yellow with blue rings. 
None of them are strange, 
With socks of lace 
And beaded ceintures. 
People are not going 
To dream of baboons and periwinkles. 
Only, here and there, an old sailor, 
Drunk and asleep in his boots, 
Catches tigers 
In red weather.126 
 
This poem puts across no strongly worded riposte to its society’s structure or 
ideology, and yet it provides an immanent movement against society in the very 
structure of its imagery; in the creation of a fantasy world that pushes back against 
the empiricism of reified reality.  
 
The poem takes place at 10 o’clock, the time in which people traditionally go to 
bed or get ready for bed, a time between waking and sleeping. This liminality 
allows what is to brush up against what could be. In this ambiguous space Stevens 
describes houses that are ‘haunted/By white night-gowns.’127 This first line 
already pushes the poem into a questioning of the boundaries between what is 
existent and what is not. Unlike the imagined night-gowns that come after them, 
the white night-gowns are ‘real’, they are mundane physical objects, and yet the 
‘houses’ are ‘haunted’ by them. These supposedly existent objects are acting, or are 
being perceived to act, in the manner of non-existent supernatural entities, ghosts 
and ghouls. In this first image the existent is emerging as if it did not exist, 
undermining the claim to total reality that prevailing empiricism holds. The 
surrealistic quality of these ‘real,’ yet paranormal, night-gowns is then added to a 
description of what is not real, but imagined: 
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None are green, 
Or purple with green rings, 
Or green with yellow rings, 
Or yellow with blue rings.128 
 
These imagined night-gowns are drawn into the ‘constellation of existing and 
nonexisiting,’ equally as strange as ‘what is.’ The brightness of the colours in their 
encircling ‘rings,’ merge for the reader through the rhythmic circling of the poem’s 
language, throwing together potentialities of colour and movement. Rather than 
the night-gowns existing as specifically dyed objects, they swirl into a constellation 
of what is and what might be, their rings as unsettlingly unexpected as the white 
night-gowns’ hauntings. This imagistic movement, blurring the boundaries 
between imaginative possibility and tangible reality, is continued by Stevens’ lines: 
 
None of them are strange, 
With socks of lace 
And beaded ceintures.129 
 
Lace is most often something intricately patterned in swirls and flourishes, and 
‘beaded ceintures,’ which are belts or girdles, twist and wrap round the waist—a 
deepening of the circling and swirling movements of the poem. These effects drive 
the configurations of the non-existent nightgowns into the reader’s mind: these 
splendid night-gowns may not be real, yet their shapes, striped and twirling, 
impress themselves structurally upon the reader. They are not there, and yet they 
are being made present to us—a poetic dialectic of absence and presence. Stevens 
claims that ‘None of them are strange,’ whilst their strangeness is exploding 
visually in our imagination, producing an ‘emergence of the nonexisiting as if it did 
exist.’ Stevens is providing a negation of empirical control through the immanent 
aesthetic effects of the poem itself. These effects are furthered by the lines: 
 
People are not going 
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To dream of baboons and periwinkles130 
 
The bizarre juxtaposition of these lines belies the claim that people ‘are not going 
to dream,’ of these things, because of course the reader of the poem is part of an 
act of imagination, a kind of waking dream, in which these very things become 
cognitively possible. The poetic satisfaction and strange beauty of this aural and 
imagistic juxtaposition, criticizes a world in which these things do not occur more 
strongly than an outright denunciation would. We want to be able to dream of 
these things, not to return to the cold emptiness of the white night-gowns, ghostly 
in their separation from any hint of warm bodies that might wear them.  
 
These lines also establish a tension between an empirical world and a more 
imaginative one through the multiple possibilities invoked through the use of the 
word ‘periwinkle’.  Not only is this an appealingly unusual world, but it contains 
three distinct potential nonhuman meanings. ‘Periwinkle’ means a shade of 
blue/purple, a flower, and a type of sea snail.131 This word draws attention to the 
endless difference and individuality of the nonhuman, because one word cannot 
effectively contain its differences. The single word is not enough for us to know 
what is being represented, reminding us that no words or concepts can ever fully 
contain nonhuman reality. Potentialities of meaning flicker in these lines, pointing 
to the huge range of realities that are unable to exist within the closed net of 
reified society. ‘People are not going/To dream,’ of these nonexistent realities, but 
within the poem, they become available to us as readers, their objective agency 
reaching out of the poem into consciousness. In ‘Society’ Adorno argues that: 
 
The shock aroused by important works is not employed to trigger personal, 
otherwise repressed emotions. Rather, this shock is the moment in which 
recipients forget themselves and disappear into the work; it is the moment 
of being shaken. The recipients lose their footing; the possibility of truth, 
embodied in the aesthetic image, becomes tangible. This immediacy, in the 
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fullest sense, of relation to artworks is a function of mediation, of 
penetrating and encompassing experience; it takes shape in the fraction of 
an instant, and for this the whole of consciousness is required, not isolated 
stimuli and responses. The experience of art as that of truth or untruth is 
more than subjective experience: It is the irruption of objectivity into 
subjective consciousness. The experience is mediated through subjectivity 
precisely at the point where the subjective reaction is most intense … Non-
judging, artworks point—as with their finger—to their content without its 
thereby becoming discursive.132 
 
To come into contact with the hermetic reality of the nonhuman is to experience 
the ‘irruption of objectivity into subjective consciousness.’ The shock of this 
experience for the reader is the shock of momentarily losing one’s totalising 
subjectivity, which sees everything entirely through its own concepts. The 
‘immediacy’ of the experience briefly shakes consciousness, allowing the full 
potential of autonomous art to emerge— not ‘discursive’ argument, but the ability 
to point towards new ways of thinking outside of empirical ideology. In this way 
Stevens’ poem, thoroughly without consumable ‘message,’ challenges the reader’s 
subjectivity by allowing objectivity to emerge briefly through his poem’s 
imaginative language. The very flexibility of language is what makes this challenge 
possible— the experience of the ‘irruption of objectivity’ can take place for the 
reader because of the ways in which the meanings of words can crumble and give 
way within themselves. For example, ‘Periwinkle’ can, as we have seen, mean sea-
snail, purple and then flower, or it can mean all of these, or more, at the same time. 
This inherent movability in language’s signification offers a potently liminal space 
in which differing meanings and modes of being can become apparent. In language, 
and especially within poetic language, the possibility of the not-real and the real 
can co-exist, giving the reader a way into a thinking that sees beyond the rigid 
structures of empirical concepts. Language is the source of concepts, and yet, 
dialectically, offers respite from their control. 
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In its last stanza the poem’s ‘immanent movement against society’ develops its 
most explicit expression: 
 
Only, here and there, an old sailor, 
Drunk and asleep in his boots, 
Catches tigers 
In red weather.133 
 
In this small section of the poem we further witness the possibility of forging an 
aesthetic dialectic that allows the not-real to make its presence known amongst 
the real. In this dialectic the creative power of poetry reveals a potential in the 
existent structures of the empirical—not negating the empirical entirely, but using 
those structures to point beyond to what cannot yet exist within its own 
construction. Imaginative poetry cannot wholly do without the empirical, relying 
as it does on its organizational and rational powers, and the logic it imparts to 
language. It can however bring about a dialectic in which the empirical challenges 
itself, enabling realities beyond itself to bloom into cognitive life. Adorno describes 
the result of this action as:  
 
The iridescence that emanates from artworks…the appearance of the 
affirmative ineffabile, the emergence of the nonexisiting as if it did exist.134 
 
In this poem the ‘iridescence’ comes from the possibility of seeing beyond the 
reified world, towards the existent, but hidden, individual nonidentity of the 
nonhuman. The ‘old sailor,’ is able, in dreaming, to catch ‘tigers/In red weather.’ 
Perhaps due to his profession, inevitably suggesting extensive travel and 
movement through nonhuman environments, the ‘sailor’ is able to access a way of 
thinking and imagining very different to the owners of ‘white night-gowns.’ In his 
dreams he ‘catches’ tigers— but this does not suggest the usual control and 
commodification of the nonhuman by the human that we might expect. This 
catching takes place in ‘red weather,’ the very colour of the environment produced 
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by the tiger’s red-orange colouring. It is the tiger’s space entirely, one that the 
‘sailor’ is able to briefly enter into. What he ‘catches’ is, obviously, not the body of a 
real tiger, but the potential of imagining the tiger’s nonhuman reality. Separated 
from the ‘normality’ of empirical external reality by two states that change mental 
processes—drunkenness and sleep, the ‘sailor’ is able to imagine the emergence of 
nonhuman reality ‘as if it did exist;’ as if it’s full agency and individuality were able 
to come forth. In entering into the space of these lines, the reader also briefly 
experiences nonhuman agency ‘as if it did exist.’ The reader’s subjectivity is 
challenged by the poem’s structural reversal of values: the nonhuman able to 
define what is, rather than the human. Adorno describes the importance of this 
challenge to subjectivity when he suggests that: 
 
For a few moments the I becomes aware, in real terms, of the possibility of 
letting self-preservation fall away, though it does not actually succeed in 
realizing this possibility. It is not the aesthetic shudder that is semblance 
but rather its attitude to objectivity: In its immediacy the shudder feels the 
potential as if it were actual. The I is seized by the unmetaphorical, 
semblance-shattering consciousness: that it itself is not ultimate, but 
semblance. For the subject, this transforms art into what it is in-itself, the 
historical voice of repressed nature, ultimately critical of the principal of 
the I, that internal agent of repression. The subjective experience directed 
against the I is an element of the objective truth of art.135 
 
As subjectivity is challenged within the poem, the ‘I’ becomes briefly aware that ‘it 
itself is not ultimate.’ This is a moment of thought that ‘transforms art,’ revealing 
‘the historical voice of repressed nature,’ that is always and everywhere 
suppressed by the control of human conceptual systems. Nothing outside of the 
reader’s mind has been clearly changed, and yet something utterly crucial for a 
transformation of human-nonhuman relations has taken place: the negation 
(though transient) of the all-encompassing ‘I.’ In negating this ‘I,’ total subjectivity 
is suspended, bringing about an awareness of nonhuman agency; that the human is 
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not everything, but shares a world with very real others. It is not possible to draw 
from this poetic experience physical manifestations of changed action in real time. 
I would argue however, that for ecological change to take place we first need to 
change the structures of thought that oppress the nonhuman. In Stevens’ poem we 
see how poetics can begin this change at the level of language.  
 
The immanent aesthetic structure of Stevens’ poem, especially the use of imagistic 
effects, brings the objective, ‘nonexistent’ nonhuman into the realm of the existing. 
This is made clear in the poem’s use of colour. Up until the final line, the poem has 
listed every colour that makes up the visible light spectrum: ‘white’ and also the 
traditional visible rainbow of ‘yellow, green, blue,’ and ‘purple.’136 Though the 
reader may not be consciously aware of it, the colour red is missing, and so the 
final line, ‘red weather,’137 offers imagistic completion. The line fills in a gap for the 
reader, a poetic fulfilment crafted out of imagined elements. In this poetic effect 
what does not exist is able to act as if it did, integrating into the action of the 
reader’s mental experience. In this way Steven’s poem, without any explicit 
critique, (beyond a dislike of boring aesthetic choices) is able to push back against 
what is able to exist in the empirical world of human subjectivity. Stevens’ act of 
imagination immanently challenges ‘a total exchange society in which everything 
is heteronomously defined.’138 It does this by ‘crystallizing in itself as something 
unique to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as 
“socially useful.”139 The poem forces that which does not exist to flash up inside its 
immanent reality as if it did, and so ‘criticizes society by merely existing.’140 This 
poetic effect is a challenge to empirical thought structures because it allows a 
dialectic to not only be considered, but to be experienced in language. The 
dialectical interaction of the not-real and the real within the poem offers mental 
pathways in which thought’s own potential is revealed to itself—that the very 
limits of thought’s structures and concepts can provide breaking points that reveal 
the potent absence of the nonhuman. 
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Stevens’ poem has no concretely ‘useful’ purpose, but instead offers a singular 
experience of potentially renewed thinking for its reader. The negation of a 
consumable ‘use value’ negates the structures of empirical ‘usefulness’ to, 
paradoxically, become ‘useful,’ or, more exactly, to become fruitful. The immanent 
dialectical vortex of the poem shakes the ‘I’ and thus makes thinking beyond 
empiricism, beyond subjectivity, imaginable. This thinking therefore makes the 
reality of the nonhuman imaginable, something that can be momentarily glimpsed, 
despite not being fully apprehended. Understanding that the potential of poetry 
may lie in what it does not do: — its ‘uselessness,’ its unique separation from 
everything beyond its own aesthetic imagination — enables us to see what it may 
make possible in human thinking towards the nonhuman. 
 
Adorno’s interest in the ways in which thinking can be shifted to better 
understand the objective world are elucidated not only in Aesthetic Theory, but in 
his long masterwork, Negative Dialectics. In this book, Adorno’s focus is on the 
thinking that takes place in philosophy in particular, and how it can better 
apprehend objects through critical self-consciousness and a questioning of 
concepts. Deborah Cook, in her book Adorno on Nature, makes explicit why this 
questioning of thinking practices is of crucial importance when reshaping attitudes 
to the nonhuman, what she describes as ‘nature’: 
 
Once we realize that “[a]bsolute domination of nature is absolute 
submission to nature,” we may be able to “arch beyond” our largely 
sadomasochistic relation to nature by means of self-reflection (P 152) … 
Adorno made this point in Negative Dialectics: “If negative dialectics calls 
for the self-reflection of thinking, the tangible implication is that if thinking 
is to be true – if it is to be true today, in any case – it must also be a thinking 
against itself” (ND 365).  
 
Only critical self-reflection can prevent the subject “from building walls 
between itself and the object, from the supposition that its being-for-itself 
is an in-and-for-itself” (ND 31). Thinking about thought therefore entails 
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thinking about nature as that from which reason emerged but to which it 
cannot be reduced, that from which concepts are formed but with which 
they are not identical and, finally, as that with which thought may 
eventually be reconciled. For reconciliation to occur, human beings and 
non-human things should be regarded neither as an undifferentiated unity, 
nor in their current hostile antithesis.141 
 
As Cook makes clear, for Adorno philosophy can only succeed when it performs 
acts of criticism not only on the world at large, but on itself also—aware that its 
concepts have close relationships with nonhuman reality, but that they do not 
explain or contain the totality of that reality itself. This is an understanding that 
recognises the difference of the nonhuman, without rushing to contain and silence 
it through fixed concepts. This understanding also does not assume that this 
difference must mean a total alienation and polarisation between nonhuman and 
human. Rather, the being-in-itself of the nonhuman, in this ideal, ‘reconciled’ 
cognition, is understood by the human through an accepting of intimacy with 
difference: a difference that is acknowledged, but not subsumed, within a thinking 
always aware of its own limits. Cook suggests that: 
 
Denouncing Western reason because it effectively condemns thought to 
thinking itself, [Adorno] argued that, to escape the sphere of immanence, of 




In the thinking Adorno champions, a concept should “lead to its otherness 
without absorbing that otherness” (ND 157). To paraphrase Robert-Hullot 
Kentor, Adorno wants to plumb the capacity of thought to allow nature to 
break in on the mind that masters it.143 
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The exploration of thought that Cook describes — thought plumbing its own 
nature to expose otherness, challenging concepts to reveal the submerged 
nonidentity of the nonhuman — takes place within the context of philosophy. 
Indeed, philosophy seems the most obvious place in which thinking might be 
expected to confront itself. It is my argument, however, that these explorations of 
the otherness available in thinking also have huge relevance in considering 
aesthetics; particularly in the attempt to try and understand how poetry might 
alter thinking practices to better challenge the oppression of the nonhuman. 
Adorno’s ideas focus on changing philosophy, but can be powerfully turned 
towards to an examination of how poetic thinking might change our thinking 
around the nonhuman world.  
 
Adorno explains the core of Negative Dialectics in this way: 
 
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not 
go into their concepts without remainders, that they come to contradict the 
traditional norm of adequacy… It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact 
that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. Yet the appearance 
of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to 
identify. Conceptual order is content to screen what thinking seeks to 
comprehend. The semblance and the truth of thought entwine. The 
semblance cannot be decreed away, as by avowal of a being-in-itself outside 
the totality of cogitative definitions … Aware that the conceptual totality is 
mere appearance, I have no way but to break immanently, in its own 
measure, through the appearance of total identity.144 
 
‘Conceptual totality,’ is the unavoidable containment of experience and thought 
within the reified conceptual structures of human society. There is no way to 
swerve this containment, despite an awareness that ‘objects do not go into their 
concepts without remainders.’ The awareness is important, but incomplete— 
cognisant of the fact that objects have a ‘remainder’ not captured by concepts, but 
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unable to witness the reality of this ‘remainder’. Yet this mental blockade is not 
hopeless in Adorno’s argument. Thought itself contains the potential to ‘identify,’ 
to genuinely comprehend the reality of a thing. This genuine identification is 
however ‘entwine(d)’ with the ‘semblance’ produced by ‘conceptual order.’ Within 
this paradox the ‘semblance’ of concepts cannot be exited, it can only be broken 
‘immanently, in its own measure.’ The force of concepts is thus used to undo the 
totality of concepts, through and within a mind that is compromised by those very 
structures. This is the challenge of Negative Dialectics: to make use of the 
revolutionary potential within thought, undoing the falsehoods of the reified 
structures that are also inherent parts of that thought— thought made to battle 
against itself and its own limits. 
 
It is this attempt to undo thinking through thinking that I believe animates Wallace 
Stevens’ poetry, in its attempts to come closer to a non-oppressive interaction with 
the reality of the nonhuman.  Stevens’ poetic structures undermine reified thought, 
pointing to forms of thinking that could make space for the nonhuman ‘remainder;’ 
the difference of nonhuman reality that always escapes us, but that flashes up as a 
warning that we are not alone in the embodied world.  
 
Stevens’ poem ‘Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction’, is deeply concerned with the 
relationship between poetry and the world—or, rather, with the ways in which 
poetry can shape our thinking towards the world. In this poem Stevens challenges 
the totality of human concepts through a system of language that inherently works 
against itself: one that rubs linguistic and imagistic concepts against each other to 
create small fractures in thinking. These fractures, occurring within poetry, are 
able to bring to our attention the possibility of a nonhuman reality beyond 
concepts. Thus Stevens makes use of thought’s own resistive potential, and 
imagines what might be possible if our ideas genuinely began from objects, rather 
than from our pre-existing human conceptions of those objects. 
 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno argues that the belief that concepts can be used to 




Though doubtful as ever, a confidence that philosophy can make it after 
all—that the concept can transcend the concept, the preparatory and 
concluding element, and can thus reach the nonconceptual—is one of 
philosophy’s inalienable features…Otherwise it must capitulate, and the 
human mind with it … But whatever truth the concepts cover beyond their 
abstract range can have no other stage than what the concepts suppress, 
disparage and discard. The cognitive utopia would be to use concepts to 
unseal the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it their equal.145 
 
For Adorno, thought must focus on what concepts ‘suppress, disparage and 
discard,’ to have any hope of opening up the potential of nonidentity. Adorno’s 
‘cognitive utopia’ is a place in which the nonconceptual comes forward through an 
awareness of the concepts set around it. In such a ‘utopia,’ the inherent 
nonconceptual nonidentity of the nonhuman would be able to find room, its 
suppressed reality able to make contact with our own. 
 
The attempt to release the potential of the nonconceptual through concepts takes 
place in Stevens’ poem. Here Stevens focuses on the failure of linguistic concepts to 
reveal the genuine reality of the nonhuman; breeding, from this failure, a 
perception of what concepts might hide. This is demonstrated in the first stanza of 
the poem’s first section ‘It Must Be Abstract’:  
 
Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea 
Of this invention, this invented world, 
The inconceivable idea of the sun. 
  
You must become an ignorant man again 
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye 
And see it clearly in the idea of it. 
  
Never suppose an inventing mind as source 
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Of this idea nor for that mind compose 
A voluminous master folded in his fire. 
  
How clean the sun when seen in its idea, 
Washed in the remotest cleanliness of a heaven 
That has expelled us and our images . . .146 
 
To understand how Stevens is challenging concepts in this stanza, one must turn to 
the word that is central to these lines: ‘idea.’ Stevens’ narrator addresses the poem 
to an ‘ephebe,’ the ancient Greek word for a young man in training. This young 
man, as part of his learning process, is asked to begin by ‘perceiving the idea/Of 
this invention…/The inconceivable idea of the sun.’ This ‘idea’ is ‘inconceivable,’ 
because its subject is uncertain—is this the sun’s idea, coming from it, or our idea 
of the sun? The location of meaning is not immediately apparent, and this difficulty 
is made apparent in the multiplicity of meanings available in the word ‘idea.’ The 
etymological richness of the word allows Stevens to question how and if 
nonhuman meaning can become accessible to us. The word comes from the Greek 
root ‘idein,’ to see, which becomes ‘idea,’ meaning the ‘form, the look of a thing, a 
kind.’ By the 1610’s the word is recorded as meaning, in the English language, ‘the 
concept of something to be done; concept of what ought to be, differing from what 
is observed,’ eventually morphing into its contemporary usage: ‘the result of 
thinking.’147 This complicated history of the word ‘idea’ mirrors our modes of 
thinking— from the original potential of simply being able to ‘see,’ our ability to 
witness the reality of the objects of the world has been corrupted by the layers of 
concepts that we place on top of it. From ‘seeing,’ we move to ‘form,’ ‘a kind’— 
seeing things as instances of ‘kinds’ of other things, putting what we observe into 
categories that blur individual difference.  
 
‘Idea,’ which began as a word for the physical act of seeing, ends up meaning ‘the 
results of thinking’: everything that we see, seen through, and created by, the 
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structures of our thinking—our understanding of the world regurgitated to us by 
the concepts that we place around it. It is for this reason that the narrator asks the 
‘ephebe,’ to ‘become an ignorant man again/And see the sun again with an 
ignorant eye/And see it clearly in the idea of it.’ To become ‘ignorant,’ would be to 
reject the layers of human conceptions that separate us from the nonhuman sun, 
seeing it ‘in the idea’ ‘of it.’ An ‘idea’ that is ‘of’ the sun itself: ‘idea’ here returned to 
its original meaning of sight, a genuine witnessing of the complete reality of the 
nonhuman. To be able to achieve such a thing would be the ‘cognitive utopia’ that 
Adorno describes in Negative Dialectics. 
 
The intense difficulty of ever reaching such a utopia is explored in the second part 
of the stanza, where the challenge of achieving ‘ignorance’ is revealed: 
 
Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was 
A name for something that never could be named. 
There was a project for the sun and is. 
  
There is a project for the sun. The sun 
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be 
In the difficulty of what it is to be.148 
 
‘Phoebus,’ the name of the sun god in Greek and Roman mythology, has slipped out 
of contemporary usage, leaving a seemingly more realistic vision of what the sun 
is, without religious myth. But Stevens makes clear that ‘Phoebus was/A name for 
something that never could be named.’ Our current concepts may be more subtly 
pervasive than those of the Greco-Romans, but they are equally as distant from the 
sun’s actual nonhuman reality. Stevens demonstrates this in the poem’s effort to 
undo concepts from a nonhuman object. The narrator states that ‘the sun/Must 
bear no name,’ but then cannot help but follow this immediately with ‘gold 
flourisher’—a new name as imprecise and lofty as those that have gone before. 
There is no way to imagine the nonhuman entirely without name, that is, entirely 
                                                        
148 Stevens, Wallace. Collected Poems. (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), p.332, Lines 24-29. 
105 
 
without concepts. All that we can do is observe the nonhuman in ‘the difficulty of 
what it is to be,’ an object of difference struggling to escape our concepts, but 
registering in our human minds through those very concepts. Stevens makes us 
aware of how our thought wriggles out of concepts only to immediately fall into 
others, managing to build an aesthetic self-awareness of the structures of 
identificatory thinking, even as he is unable to dismantle them.  
 
Adorno argues that: 
 
What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that 
animates the nonconceptual side of art, and whose fulfilment shuns the 
immediate side of art as mere appearance. The concept—the organon of 
thinking, and yet the wall between thinking and the thought—negates that 
yearning. Philosophy can neither circumvent such negation nor submit to it. 
It must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept.149 
 
Concepts are what make thinking possible, and yet they must be transcended in 
the search for a form of thought that could fully respond to the world outside of 
the thinker’s subjectivity. In stanza IV of the same section of the poem, ‘It Must Be 
Abstract’, Stevens builds on the self-conscious awareness of concepts he has 
inculcated in the poem. This awareness allows him to begin to reshape the reader’s 
poetic experience, so as to unseal the potential of the nonconceptual through 
concepts: 
 
The first idea was not our own. Adam 
In Eden was the father of Descartes 
And eve made air the mirror of herself, 
  
Of her sons and of her daughters. They found themselves 
In heaven as in a glass; a second earth; 
And in the earth itself they found a green— 
                                                        




The inhabitants of a very varnished green. 
But the first idea was not to shape the clouds 
In imitation. The clouds preceded us. 
  
There was a muddy centre before we breathed. 
There was a myth before the myth began, 
Venerable and articulate and complete.150 
  
Stevens takes us in this stanza to ‘Eden,’ the imagined start of human life on earth 
(in the Western imagination), the ultimate concept or myth of paradisiacal 
beginnings. Yet at the same time as being placed at this human beginning, we are 
told that ‘The first idea was not our own.’ In this ‘Eden’, Adam and Eve find 
themselves ‘In heaven as in a glass; a second earth.’ The concept of ultimate 
beginning is being reversed—instead of heaven/’Eden’ coming before the more 
imperfect ‘earth,’ here ‘Eden is described’ as ‘a second earth,’ no longer the 
originator of creation. ‘Eden’ is pictured, in this poem, as a beginning that is human 
in every aspect: ‘Adam/In Eden was the father of Descartes/And eve made air the 
mirror of herself,/Of her sons and of her daughters.’ Adam is here directly 
connected to Descartes and his famous statement, ‘I think therefore I am.’ This is a 
mode of understanding in which human thinking is the absolute of what it means 
to exist. In this mode, unless an object thinks as human beings do, it is impossible 
for it to meaningfully exist at all. ‘Eve’ absorbs this oppressively human-centered 
perspective, making the air ‘a mirror of herself’: forcing nonhuman objects to 
reflect her structures of thought, and rejecting any other kinds of being.  
 
However, the traditional myth/concept of Eden is not simply discarded by Stevens. 
Rather it is challenged by another myth: ‘the myth before the myth began.’ This 
‘myth’ is of ‘the muddy centre before we breathed’: a primordial creative space 
that contains a multitude of nonhuman differences. Stevens’ ‘muddy centre’ 
undermines Adam and Eve’s identificatory thinking by creating an alternative, 
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nonhuman, concept of what Eden might be. This form of Eden is ‘Venerable and 
articulate and complete’—an utterly nonhuman ‘centre’ that is ‘articulate,’ able to 
communicate clearly, despite not showing any signs of being able to undertake 
thinking processes. This nonhuman object or being has knowledge, it is ‘venerable’ 
or wise, and it can communicate and interact with other objects. It does these 
things without partaking in anything resembling human cognition. It is ‘complete’ 
in itself, without human input. This form of Eden challenges totally a concept of life 
in which a human thinking mind is needed for meaning to emerge. In this 
alternative concept, meaning began with the nonhuman: muddily fertile and equal 
with the human in its creative ability. ‘Eden’ remains, but its meaning and potential 
has been entirely transformed through the language that brings the concept to life. 
Stevens connects this nonhuman creative potential to poetry itself: 
 
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place 




We are the mimics. Clouds are pedagogues 
The air is not a mirror but bare board151 
 
Having undermined the concept of the human as the original source of generative 
existence, Stevens is now able to reshape thinking about aesthetics, and poetry 
specifically. In these lines Stevens suggests that the poem begins not with human 
genius, thinking or inspiration, but with the extreme alterity of the nonhuman 
world making itself known. In this imagining, the world ‘is not our own,’ and this 
realisation can act as an impetus for poetry, the human seeking reconciliation and 
understanding within its aesthetic acts. Unlike the original ‘Eden’ myth, where 
humanity orders and controls the nonhuman, Stevens’ narrator claims that: ‘We 
are the mimics. Clouds are pedagogues.’ It is human beings who copy the 
nonhuman, learning from its ways of being, rather than the other way around. The 
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air is ‘not a mirror,’ not a nonhuman reflection of our own concepts, but something 
utterly singular and separate from us.  
 
Adorno argues that: ‘Concepts alone can achieve what the concept prevents.’152 In 
these stanzas Stevens has undermined a restrictive concept with an alternative 
version of that concept, making new ways of thinking vitally available for the 
reader. In these refreshed ways of thinking it becomes possible to apprehend the 
total agency and singularity of the nonhuman, even if this individuality’s exact 
details remain oblique. Stevens has not destroyed the concept of ‘Eden,’ but has 
rather refigured it to unseal the revolutionary potential available within. This 
enables a re-thinking of what a creative beginning might be, both in embodied 
human experience, and in aesthetics. This re-thinking briefly suspends the totality 
of human meaning, raising the nonhuman’s forms of being into an equal position 
with the human within cognition. The reader is not ‘told,’ to re-consider the 
nonhuman, instead Stevens breaks into concepts with other kinds of concepts, 
making such a re-consideration an immanent part of full engagement with the 
poem. At least for the moment of reading, nonhuman agency flares up through the 
fragility of concepts, momentarily restored to human cognition. It is my argument 
that such an opportunity gives the reader a chance to transform their thinking 
towards the nonhuman, in ways that are neither dominating nor silencing. 
Steven’s poem is not a manifesto; it is an opportunity. 
 
Stevens not only challenges identificatory thinking in ‘Notes Towards a Supreme 
Fiction’, creating opportunities for new forms of cognition—he also crucially 
explores the challenges of these new forms, investigating what happens in the 
mind as it attempts to process towards a less restrictive mode of understanding. 
Writing in Negative Dialectics, Adorno argues that: 
 
To want substance in cognition is to want a utopia. It is this consciousness 
of possibility that sticks to the concrete, the undisfigured. Utopia is blocked 
off by possibility, never by immediate reality; this is why it seems abstract 
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in the midst of extant things. The inextinguishable color comes from 
nonbeing. Thought is its servant, a piece of existence extending—however 
negatively—to that which is not. The utmost distance alone would be 
proximity…153 
 
The ‘utopia’ of thinking that is imagined in Negative Dialectics, in which the human 
is able to fully comprehend and connect to the reality of the nonhuman, is not 
blocked off by ‘immediate reality,’ the physical qualities of the objects of the world. 
These objects do, in theory, have the capabilities to communicate and connect, but 
they are restrained by what is possible for those things in the current reified 
system. Nonhuman nonidentity has been excised from our lived reality, and so 
exists in what might be, in ‘nonbeing.’ To make contact with nonidentity, thought 
must extend to ‘that which is not.’ This means enacting a process of thought that, 
though inevitably based in the tangible world, reaches out into what does not yet 
exist fully in the human sphere. To further understand such efforts of thinking, I 
look now to stanza III of the section ‘It Must Be Abstract’: 
 
We say: At night an Arabian in my room, 
With his damned hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how, 
Inscribes a primitive astronomy 
  
Across the unscrawled fores the future casts 
And throws his stars around the floor. By day 
The wood-dove used to chant his hoobla-hoo 
  
And still the grossest iridescence of ocean 
Howls hoo and rises and howls hoo and falls. 
Life’s nonsense pierces us with strange relation.154 
 
This stanza seems, on first reading, to be a criticism of irrational modes of being 
and thinking from a rationalist perspective. The narrator describes ‘an Arabian’ 
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‘with his damned hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how’ inscribing a ‘primitive astronomy’ 
that invades the narrator’s own ‘room.’ The ‘Arabian’ is dismissed, his sounds, 
which we must assume to be part of quasi-religious or magical chants, are damned, 
and his astronomy is described as ‘primitive.’ On top of this, the fact that the man 
is ‘Arabian,’ conjures up xenophobic stereotypes of Eastern mystics and fakirs 
using false conjuring to trick and mislead. And yet, looking closer, there is more to 
the seeming nonsense of his ‘hoobla-hoobla’ than might appear. Firstly, though it is 
described as ‘primitive’ the ‘Arabian’’s actions are referred to as ‘astronomy.’ 
Rather than the fuzzy and imprecise ‘astrology’ that we might expect, ‘astronomy’ 
suggests the precise scientific discipline of examining the heavenly bodies. 
Secondly, the ‘Arabian’: ‘Across the unscrawled fores the future casts.’ He does not 
attempt to cast ‘the future,’ he casts it, suggesting a level of skill at odds with the 
way in which he is dismissed by the narrator. At the same time as this figure is 
rejected and sneered at, he is also given agency and power. To understand the 
paradoxical poetic thinking taking place here, it is revealing to look at this 
argument from Negative Dialectics: 
 
We are not to philosophize about concrete things; we are to philosophize, 
rather, out of these things. But if we surrender to the specific object we are 
suspected of lacking an unequivocal position. What differs from the existent 
will strike the existent as witchcraft …155 
 
When thinking is not ‘about concrete things,’ taking its starting point from already 
existent human concepts, but rather thinks ‘out of these things,’ it loses the 
‘unequivocal position,’ of reliably fixed and total conceptions. In thinking ‘out of … 
things’ thought draws on potential nonidentity, rather than what clearly appears. 
In this way it produces ‘What differs from the existent,’ and so strikes the reified 
human mind as ‘witchcraft.’ Stevens’ narrator registers the ‘Arabian’(s) mode of 
thinking as a kind of ‘witchcraft,’ a primitive divination that has nothing to do with 
the empirical world. Yet, submerged deep within this very same reified 
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perspective, is the awareness of its opposite—that alternative structures of 
cognition could reveal the actual nonidentical reality of the nonhuman.  
 
In the lines we have looked at so far, the narrator’s perspective is battling between 
identificatory thinking and moments of hidden awareness. However, in the second 
half of the stanza this awareness bursts to the surface, both in the narrator’s mind, 
and in the language of the poem. The narrator reflects: 
 
… By day 
The wood-dove used to chant his hoobla-hoo 
  
And still the grossest iridescence of ocean 
Howls hoo and rises and howls hoo and falls.156 
 
 
The ‘hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how’ of the ‘Arabian’, which seemed like nonsense at 
the beginning of the poem, is now transformed into the nearly identical ‘hoobla-
hoo’ of the ‘wood-dove.’ What appeared as utterly scrambled meaning suddenly 
comes into view as a perfectly recognisable, rhythmically and aurally 
onomatopoeic description of the call of the ‘wood-dove.’ Similarly, the ‘hoobla-
hoobla-hoobla-how,’ finds a very close echo in the ‘ocean’ that ‘Howls hoo and 
rises and howls hoo and falls’—another recognisably onomatopoeic nonhuman 
description. Here the ‘Howls’ express the sounds of the waves, captured in a poetic 
structure of 5 syllables in each half of the sentence, reproducing the balanced 
rhythm of tidal movement.  
 
The reader’s mind abruptly has to convert what seemed like babble into 
recognisable nonhuman sounds and rhythms rendered in language. What seemed 
like ‘witchcraft’ is actually produced from the real, yet of course utterly different 
and separate, being of the nonhuman—intimately close to us and yet inherently 
alien. In response to this experience the narrator reflects that: ‘Life’s nonsense 
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pierces us with strange relation,’ describing how the not-yet existent nonidentity 
of the nonhuman can, even in its unrevealed state, ‘pierce’ human thinking with a 
potentiality beyond itself. The narrator’s thinking, and the reader’s, has been 
inverted by a realisation that what exists outside of empirical conceptions is as 
real as what exists within it. It becomes clear that just because something is not 
contained by human meaning, this does not make it meaningless, or unworthy of 
consideration. Stevens achieves this effect through and within language, making 
use of the instability of words as they lurch from incomprehensibility into 
comprehensibility, within the flexible space of poetic meaning. Adorno argues that: 
 
The means employed in negative dialectics for the penetration of its 
hardened objects is possibility—the possibility of which their reality has 
cheated the objects and which is nonetheless visible in each one. But no 
matter how hard we try for linguistic expression of such a history 
congealed in things, the words we use will remain concepts. Their precision 
substitutes for the thing itself, without quite bringing its selfhood to mind; 
there is a gap between words and the thing they conjure.157 
 
Stevens deftly plays with ‘the gap between words and the thing they conjure’ in 
this stanza, prising it open through the close proximity of nonsense and sense 
available in the same words: ‘hoobla-hoo’ as ritualistic gibberish, and ‘hoobla-hoo’ 
as the clear description of a bird’s song. In doing so Stevens reveals ‘the possibility’ 
of the nonhuman, ‘of which their reality’ has cheated them, ‘and which nonetheless 
is visible in each one.’ Instead of attempting to fix the instability of language in his 
poetry, Stevens uses this very instability to challenge fixed totalities of thinking, 
totalities that paradoxically take place within thought’s expression in language. As 
Adorno argues:  
 
Dialectics appropriates for the power of thought what historically seemed 
to be a flaw in thinking: its link with language which nothing can wholly 
break.158  
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Stevens uses the potential of poetic instability to bring out the freedom available in 
thought’s unbreakable ‘link’ to language. Stevens acts out, in the body of his poetry, 
a thinking that immanently criticises and breaks concepts at their most vulnerable 
point—their existence in language. In doing this, new ways of thinking about the 
nonhuman are offered to the human, making the openness of poetic language a 
model, and a zone of experimentation, for what thinking is capable of. 
 
The final stanza that I will consider from ‘Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction’, in my 
examination of how Stevens uses poetry to challenge identificatory thinking 
structures, is stanza VII of the section ‘It Must Give Pleasure’. In this stanza Stevens 
not only contrasts more open modes of understanding with identificatory thinking, 
but presses the reader to imagine what it might be like to actually forge a genuine 
experience of the nonhuman: an act of thinking that leads toward the potential of 
thinking itself. In Stanza VII Stevens describes the behaviour and thought of a 
character called ‘Canon Aspirin’:  
 
He imposes orders as he thinks of them, 
As the fox and snake do. It is a brave affair. 
Next he builds capitols and in their corridors, 
  
Whiter than wax, sonorous, fame as it is, 
He establishes statues of reasonable men, 





The ‘Canon,’ imposes orders ‘as he thinks of them,’ responding to the actual 
moment as the nonhuman ‘fox and snake’ might do. What differs in him however is 
that he then turns these structures of immanent thought outward, solidifying them 
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into edifices— ‘he builds capitols.’ As part of this building he ‘establishes statues of 
reasonable men,/Who surpassed the most literate owl.’ Reason has here been 
extracted from the nonhuman world and made into an immovable totality, 
surpassing any connection to ‘the owl;’ to forms of knowledge that touch on the 
nonhuman. This is identitarian thinking in its purest form, and Stevens resists such 
thinking in the following lines of the stanza: 
 
… But to impose is not 
To discover. To discover an order as of  
A season, to discover summer and know it, 
  
To discover winter and know it well, to find 
Not to impose, not to have reasoned at all, 
Out of nothing to have come on major weather …160 
  
In this version of thinking, knowledge comes not from reasoning, but from the 
discovery of ‘an order as of/A season’— the nonhuman’s own structures, its being-
in-itself. As Adorno argues in Negative Dialectics: 
 
This cognition seeks to say what something is, while identitarian thinking 
says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and 
what, accordingly, it is not itself. The more relentlessly our identitarian 
thinking besets its object, the farther it will take us from the identity of the 
object.161 
 
‘Imposing orders’ on the objects of the world may feel like getting closer to them, 
making sense of them, but it actually takes one further and further away ‘from the 
identity of the object.’ The challenge of more open cognition is to think ‘out of 
nothing,’ to genuinely face the nonhuman without imposing any concepts on it at 
all. In such a thinking it would be possible to ‘come on major weather,’ to grasp the 
most important truths of nonhuman existence and difference. However, Stevens is 
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not in any way claiming that his poem or his narrator have achieved this cognition, 
as made clear in the next section of stanza VII: 
 
It is possible, possible, possible. It must 
Be possible. It must be that in time 
The real will from its crude compoundings come, 
  
Seeming at first, a beast disgorged, unlike, 
Warmed by a desperate milk. To find the real, 
To be stripped of every fiction except one, 
  
The fiction of an absolute— Angel, 
Be silent in your luminous cloud and hear 
The luminous melody of proper sound.162 
 
What Stevens does do in these lines is imagine what it might be like if the reality of 
nonhuman difference was able to come forward and be experienced by the human. 
In these lines Stevens imagines that ‘The real,’ would ‘at first’ seem like ‘a beast 
disgorged.’ The experience of reconciled cognition would not simply be a happy 
and balanced one; rather it would involve a shocking confrontation with the 
existence of absolute difference. We can understand why this would take place by 
turning again to Adorno’s arguments: 
 
What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, negative for just as 
long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity: as 
long as its demand for totality will be its measure for whatever is not 
identical with it. This is what dialectics holds up to our consciousness as a 
contradiction … Identity and contradiction of thought are welded 
together.163 
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In human minds in which the identificatory ‘structure of…consciousness’ demands 
‘totality’ and ‘unity,’ the total difference of the nonhuman will appear ‘as a 
contradiction’ that is ‘divergent, dissonant, negative.’ This negativity is what we 
see in Stevens’ lines, where the nonhuman is ‘unlike’ and is therefore ‘dissonant’ 
and terrifying. The unlikeness of the nonhuman is imagined in its total 
contradiction to empirical identity thinking—the pain or shock of these lines 
echoes the pain that we would truly experience if we were able to ‘find the real.’ In 
these lines however Stevens is also expressing poetic hope: ‘It is possible, possible, 
possible. It must/Be possible. It must be that in time/The real will from its crude 
compoundings come…’ The shock of the real is what may be desired and imagined 
in poetry, despite its pain, because it is this shock that would burst through 
concepts, allowing the alterity of the nonhuman to emerge. This shock would be 
able to produce a genuine experience of reality. Adorno argues that: 
 
The power of the status quo puts up the facades into which our 
consciousness crashes. It must seek to crash through them. This alone 
would free the postulate of depth from ideology. Surviving in such 
resistance is the speculative moment: what will not have its law prescribed 
for it by given facts transcends them even in the closest contact with the 
objects, and in repudiating a sacrosanct transcendence. Where the thought 
transcends the bonds it tied in resistance—there is its freedom.164 
 
In Stevens’ poem we are able to imagine crashing through ‘the facades’ erected by 
‘The power of the status quo.’ For a moment the poem, and with it the reader’s 
thought, ‘transcends the bonds it tied in resistance.’ The traditional modes of 
identificatory thinking are rejected, and replaced with an embodied cognition that 
recognises dissonance and contradiction as the markers of the real. In such a 
poetic experience the mind is briefly offered the ‘freedom’ that Adorno describes.  
 
Stevens is not however blithely confident in the ability of poetry to release the 
mind from the prison of reified thought—he is aware that, in our current state, the 
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mind cannot operate wholly outside of concepts. Because of this, in his imagining, 
the appearance of nonhuman difference strips the mind ‘of every fiction except 
one,/The fiction of an absolute…’ This necessary fiction, or concept as it indeed is, 
is different from the concepts of identificatory thinking because it is fruitful rather 
than totalising. This fiction of the absolute — the hope or dream of a joyfully 
‘absolute’ understanding of difference — powers the human mind towards an 
understanding of difference, rather than seeking to close down and suppress it. 
The idea of the ‘absolute’ is a fiction, but the necessary glow of its imaginative 
potential gives vigour to the search for genuine nonhuman agency and 
comprehension. Stevens’ fiction does not place itself in an empirical throne over 
the lower nonhuman, but rather defers to the reality of that nonhuman:  
 
… Angel, 
Be silent in your luminous cloud and hear 
The luminous melody of proper sound.165 
 
In these lines a fictional and humanly created figure/concept, an ‘Angel,’ is asked 
to ‘be silent’ in his ‘luminous cloud,’ to listen to ‘The luminous melody of proper 
sound’ that flows from the reality of the nonhuman. Stevens does not describe this 
melody, because, of course, it has not yet actually been experienced by human 
cognition. But in forcing the reader to imagine it silently, it becomes ‘luminous.’ Its 
nonidentity shines out of nonexistence, a promise of ‘proper sound’ that could be 
found if only our thinking was capable of apprehending it.  
 
As Adorno argues: ‘What would lie in the beyond makes its appearance only in the 
materials and categories within.’166 What is beyond human cognition can only be 
glimpsed ‘in the materials and categories within’: its promise offered in a poetry 
that bends structures of language to make its readers understand that ‘the beyond’ 
does exist, however shrouded in the silence of a reified human system. In Stevens’ 
poems it is possible to work on the very structures of our thinking, to unpick the 
conceptual rigidity that stands between human beings, and a non-dominating, 
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genuinely equal interaction with nonhuman beings. Almost every action on our 
part begins with thinking—thinking is itself a kind of action that reaches out from 
our subjectivity into the world, even as it is coddled and protected from actual 
contact with it by our concepts. In Stevens it is possible to see how the action of 
thinking might be changed, through a dialectic formed from the instability made 
available in poetic language. It is in this change that our imagination and our 





The Enchantment Of Disenchantment. 
 
Adorno’s attention to the gap between the human and nonhuman has allowed me, 
within the critical part of this thesis, to read Stevens in a way that is generative— 
uncovering aesthetic modes that might speak to contemporary poetry as it 
grapples with how best to address nonhuman life and existence, in an era of 
environmental destruction and uncertainty. I have discovered that it is possible to 
write about the nonhuman in a way that is not dominating, if you constantly draw 
attention to the gaps between creative understanding and nonhuman reality. 
Adorno’s work has made it possible to lift the radical potential of Stevens’ poetry 
into the light, and in so doing, imagine how one might turn towards the nonhuman 
within poetics.  
 
In this chapter I will seek to demonstrate how the gaps in understanding between 
human and nonhuman need not create an alienated poetics, but can in fact bring 
forth an enchantment forged from the recognition of vibrant distance. To do this I 
will continue to explore Stevens and Adorno, alongside the work of contemporary 
American theorist Jane Bennett. I will also provide a close reading of Stevens’ 
poem ‘Sunday Morning’, a reading that will illustrate why the mode of 
enchantment might be the affectual state in which the promise of Adorno’s 
theories can be most fully realised. 
 
Throughout this project Adorno’s ideas have re-orientated my attention away 
from any attempt to ‘capture’ the nonhuman thing-itself, and towards an attention 
to the space where that thing should be—revealing the existence of nonhuman 
agency in a failure to comprehend that agency. Adorno’s thinking seeks to break 
down our conceptual assumptions: challenging our subjectivity and disenchanting 
our ideas of human dominance. Adorno shows us, always, what we do not know. 
This is essential in its challenge to our thinking structures, and provides a dialectic 
in which we might be able to glimpse something, however fleetingly, beyond our 
own confines. It may be, however, all too easy to see these ideas as ones that, in 
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upending our usual comfortable assumptions and cosy certainties, leave us in an 
emptier and more joyless world, if a more knowledgeable one. It is crucially 
important, therefore, for me to emphasise in this final chapter the ways in which 
the disenchantment of traditional thinking practices simultaneously enchants— 
breaking through the ruins of damaging ideology to illuminate resistant magic in 
the material world.  
 
For me, although he is at absolutely no pains to emphasise it, Adorno’s version of 
the nonidentical is one in which a glimpse of distant reality can transform a 
suffocatingly lonely human world, into one overflowing with nonhuman 
individuality and vibrant materiality. It is this vibrancy, emerging painfully from 
the unsparing dialectics of Adorno’s theories, that first drew me to his work: a 
perspective in which it is possible to find enchantment, even hope, in a frank 
reckoning with human failure and nonhuman strangeness. The way in which 
Adorno illuminates a world of always-escaping difference shows that it is possible 
to enchant in the very act of disenchantment. Adorno’s theories remove humanity 
from its elevated position, and suggest that there is so much more to the universe 
than an endless feedback loop of the human witnessing the human. It is this 
enchantment, born of negativity, that guides my reading of Stevens, and indeed my 
own creation of poetic work. 
 
In the critical portion of my thesis thus far, I have illustrated how Stevens creates 
an awareness of the distance between the human and the nonhuman in his poetry, 
using the theories of Adorno to clarify my understanding. But I have not, perhaps, 
given enough attention to the enchantment, the joy even, that can emerge from the 
witnessing of this gap in his poetry—and how this enchantment might form a 
central part of the poetic recognition of nonhuman difference. I want to defend the 
central texts of my thesis from inclusion in the pantheon of ‘rationalist 
disenchantment,’ and argue that they not only shake us out of our complacency, 
but also awaken us to the enchanting difference of the nonhuman world.  
 
Adorno’s work opens up the potential for modes of enchantment, but it does not 
elaborate on them in detail in Adorno’s own work. Adorno does not spend time 
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considering why the experience of enchantment might be a crucial element in 
cognising nonhuman difference, and this experience remains a tantalising 
possibility sedimented within his arguments. It is for this reason that I will turn to 
theorist Jane Bennett to reveal the ways in which enchantment might bloom 
alongside an awareness of nonhuman difference, and to consider why 
enchantment might be an important affectual state in considering the nonhuman.  
 
It will be my argument that the ‘enchantment of disenchantment’ might be able to 
not only reveal to us the impossibility of fully understanding the nonhuman, but 
also make us aware of the crucial intimacy that continues between human and 
nonhuman, despite that distance. I will argue that the enchantment born of 
nonhuman ambiguity and mystery is perfectly placed to be revealed within poetry, 
within language that is itself flexible and enchanting. I will demonstrate this 
affinity in an examination of Stevens’ poem ‘Sunday Morning’, showing how poetic 
language might bring the reader towards a fruitful intimacy with alien strangeness 
and unpredictability. In Chapter Three I explored the potentialities of thinking 
made possible by Adorno’s theories and Stevens’ poetry. In this chapter I hope to 
show how the affectual mood of enchantment might not only make these new 
states of thinking desirable, but how it might make them fully possible. 
 
In her book, The Enchantment of Modern Life, theorist Jane Bennett sets out to 
challenge the modern view of life as being ‘disenchanted,’ and to return the ethical 
and aesthetic potentiality of the nonhuman material world to the foreground of 
our thinking. In Bennett’s argument the forces of scientific rationalism, and, 
paradoxically, modern Christianity, have combined to create a Western 
imagination that perceives itself as disenchanted and meaningless. Bennett argues 
that: 
 
The disenchantment of modernity …  goes something like this: 
There was once a time when Nature was purposive, God was active in the 
details of human affairs, human and other creatures were defined by a pre-
existing web of relations, social life was characterized by face-to-face 
relations, and political order took the form of organic community. Then, 
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this premodern world gave way to forces of scientific and instrumental 
rationality, secularism, individualism, and the bureaucratic state—all of 




Disenchantment does not mean that we live in a world that has been 
completely counted up and figured out but rather that the world has 
become calculable in principle … In a disenchanting world the principle of 
calcubility tends to overrule, even if it does not always overpower, 
experience … the calculable world functions as a “regulative ideal.”168 
 
The principle of calcubility that Bennett describes creates meaninglessness out of 
rationality; just as religion creates a meaninglessness that stems from material 
‘worldly life’ being seen as unimportant in a teleology where only life after death 
has true importance. What remains outside the heavenly realm is as calculable and 
limited as the specimens of scientific rationality: 
 
… modern science and “ethically” orientated religion collaborated in 
disenchanting the world; they were sources of, even while they proffered 
solutions for, the problem of meaninglessness that haunts us. Science 
progressively takes the spirit out of things and reduces them to uninspiring 
matter, otherworldly religions desanctify earthly life …169 
 
Bennet’s problem with this worldview is not that she believes it ignores or 
represses an unexpressed spiritual element at work in the living world. Rather it is 
that she believes that: 
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In the cultural narrative of disenchantment, the prospects for loving life—
or saying “yes” to the world, are not good. What’s to love about an alienated 
existence on a dead planet? … This life provokes moments of joy, and that 
joy can propel ethics.170 
 
Bennett’s concern is that the Western world’s narrative of disenchantment, one in 
which the teleological meaning of religion, myth and political certainty has been 
lost, is not only one that is depressing, but one that is paralysing. In an ‘alienated 
existence’ on a ‘dead planet,’ ethical interest in the survival and thriving of 
nonhuman existence is likely to be low, as is, indeed, that towards other human 
beings. Bennett is not arguing that an ‘enchanted’ worldview necessarily causes 
ethical action, or sympathy towards, or interest in, nonhuman life. She is, however, 
arguing that without some sense of enchantment these ethical interests, indeed 
any interests that go beyond the self, are hard to bring about. Bennett argues that: 
 
The experience of enchantment is …  an essential component of an ethical, 
ecologically aware life. In the mood of enchantment, we sense that “we” are 
always mixed up with “it,” and “it” shares in some of the agency we officially 
ascribe only to ourselves.171 
 
For Bennett, to be able to question the relations between the self and the world, 
that world must be seen to not only possess agency, but also to be ‘mixed up’ with 
our own existence. Bennett is not putting forward a holistic view of the human and 
nonhuman, but is rather drawing attention to the fact that, though the nonhuman’s 
difference may be closed and hermetic, that difference still exists intimately with 
our own lives. In Bennett’s argument, the nonhuman can never be rejected as 
nothing to do with us.  
 
At this point it is crucial to ask, what then is enchantment if it is no longer the 
experience of a teleological, religious worldview in which everything is given 
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meaning by divine presence? What is the enchantment that allows for an 
awareness of our profound intimacy with nonhuman difference? Bennett 
describes it in thus: 
 
To be enchanted…is to participate in a momentarily immobilizing 
encounter; it is to be transfixed, spellbound. Phillip Fisher describes this as 
“a moment of pure presence”: 
 
“[T]he moment of pure presence within wonder lies in the object’s 
difference and the uniqueness being so striking to the mind that it 
does not remind us of anything and we find ourselves delaying its 
presence for a time in which the mind does not move on by 
association to something else …”  
 
The mood I’m calling enchantment involves … (1) a pleasurable feeling of 
being charmed by the novel and as yet unprocessed encounter and (2) a 
more unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being disrupted or torn out of one’s 
default sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition.172 
 
For Bennett, enchantment can be experienced in a moment of ‘wonder’ in which 
‘the object’s difference’ comes to the fore and disrupts one’s usual assumptions 
and thinking practices. What is important to my thesis in this is not only that 
enchantment is possible, even in a world without teleological religious or 
ideological meaning—it is that this enchantment comes, in Bennett’s argument, 
from the difference of the nonhuman itself. In this argument, a recognition of 
nonhuman difference does not disenchant — separating and alienating the human 
from the material world around them— it is the ultimate source of enchantment.  
 
Bennett’s argument gives voice to the enchantment that I have always found 
available in Adorno’s theories of disenchantment, but which are not elaborated on 
in detail by the philosopher himself. Namely, that the recognition of a nonhuman 
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agency outside of our understanding is not lowering or depressing, but hugely 
enlivening in its ability to show us that the alien material world exists outside of 
the prison of our subjectivity. Such an awareness brings about, or may bring about, 
the ‘plenitude,’ or ‘fullness,’ that Bennett describes. Such an awareness places the 
human in an unavoidably imperfect world, but one in which there is the profound 
and thrilling hope of something outside of suffocatingly reified existence. In this 
world the mystery of nonhuman strangeness glimmers in the distance, its very 
remoteness from us providing enchanting proof that there is more to reality than 
lonely, suffocating human subjectivity.  
 
The enchantment Bennett describes is not one grounded in mythic or religious 
ideas. These teleological versions of enchantment are as roundly rejected as the 
‘meaninglessness’ of rational disenchantment: 
 
(The) teleological model of enchantment … is also the one at work in the 
story of modernity as disenchanted: proponents of disenchantment share 
with those who lament its loss the assumption that only a teleological 
world is worthy of our enchantment. I contest that assumption. A world 
capable of enchanting need not be designed, or predisposed to human 
happiness, or expressive of intrinsic purpose or meaning.173 
 
The enchantment found in nonhuman difference absolutely does not re-animate a 
teleological view of reality, one in which eco-spirituality replaces traditional 
dogma. For Bennett, any form of teleology robs the material world of the vibrant 
unpredictability that marks its independence from the human. The enchantment of 
nonhuman difference does not fill in the cracks of disenchantment, but replaces 
the entire system with an embodied liveliness born of unknowable strangeness 
and nonhuman singularity. The fact that the nonhuman acts and exists with no 
attention to the ‘destiny’ of human beings is what makes it enchanting—revealing 
that the human exists in a world that contains more than their own stultifying 
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concepts. This world is changeable and active, and is not negated by the assumed 
inevitability of any outcome or system; political, religious, societal or otherwise. 
 
Bennett comes from a background of political philosophy, and her view of 
enchantment is shaped by her interest in its potential to bring about the possibility 
of ethical action: 
 
Enchantment is a state of openness to the disturbing-captivating elements 
in everyday experience … Enchantment, in the model I am defending, as 
operative in a world without telos … enchantment is a mood with ethical 
potential. More specifically, my contention is that enchantment can aid in 
the project of cultivating a stance of presumptive generosity (i.e. of 
rendering oneself more open to the surprise of other selves and bodies and 
more willing and able to enter into productive assemblages with them) …174 
 
As this thesis is directed towards the potentiality of aesthetics, in particular 
poetry, this focus both excites and worries me. It must be made clear that, in my 
argument, enchantment holds no guarantee of causing ethical behaviour, or of 
equalizing the material relations between human and nonhuman. What is crucial, 
however, in Bennett’s text is the way in which she is drawing attention to the 
ethical potential available in affectual experience—the enchantment of a ‘lively and 
mobile’ web of human and nonhuman life allowing, perhaps, a ‘presumptive 
generosity’ towards different bodies and forms. Bennett too is sensitive to the 
frailty of any ethical assumption: 
 
Just how does an enchanted sensibility make it more likely that ethical 
principles will be enacted as ethical practices? Any response to this 
question must be somewhat experimental. The one I am playing out is 
basically this: Enchantment is a feeling of being connected in an affirmative 
way to existence …  This sense of fullness … encourages the finite human 
animal, in turn, to give away some of its own time and effort on behalf of 
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other creatures. A sensibility attuned to moments of enchantment is no 
guarantee that this will happen, but it does make it more possible. Any 
sensibility is an orchestrated arrangement of affections, but affective 
energies are unruly and protean forces and tend to wander from the 
musical score. Thus, the link between them and an ethical sensibility is 
tenuous and unstable and requires repeated acts of discipline and retuning. 
I do not think that there is any way around this fragility or the effort it takes 
to respond to it.175 
 
Bennett’s focus on ‘ethical practices,’ cannot wholly be my own. Its focus on the 
results of thinking is too concrete, for my argument, to make room for the 
potential of poetry’s ‘being-in-itself,’ its freedom from use, however ethically 
successful. Despite this, Bennett’s description of an ethical sensibility that requires 
‘repeated acts of discipline and retuning’ gives me an illuminating way to clarify 
the ability of poetic language to engender new ways of thinking towards the 
nonhuman. Poetic practice necessitates the ‘retuning’ Bennett describes, 
constantly going over and improving upon linguistic potentialities to get closer to a 
form of language, and a form of thought, that can better attend to the difference of 
the nonhuman. This ‘discipline,’ can be a way of understanding how an attention to 
writing practices, and especially reading practices, as seen in this thesis, can reveal 
ways of interacting with language that challenge the usual rigidity of subjective 
thought.  
 
Poetic language can be a space in which the enchanting difference and ambiguity 
of nonhuman agency is revealed through repeated acts of language, both for the 
writer and the reader. As Bennett suggests, no guaranteed outcome can be 
assumed from any practice; ethical or aesthetic. What can perhaps be achieved, 
however, is a repeated attention to perception that allows the usual boundaries of 
thinking to be challenged. In poetics, this means developing a process of 
‘enchanted reading’, a way of entering the language of a poem that attends to the 
opportunities that arise to consider nonhuman difference and enchantment. 
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Reading in such a way does not aim to ‘change’ the narrative of the poem being 
read, but rather attempts to become sensitive to the multiplicity of possibilities the 
poem being read might contain. Such a form of reading is enacted in this thesis’ 
consideration of Stevens, a reading that does not adhere to a set of guidelines, but 
which rather follows Bennett in its attempt to repeatedly retune and reassess its 
position in relation to the nonhuman. 
 
Bennett’s ‘enchanted sensibility’ does not bind together the human and the 
nonhuman in sameness in its attempt to inculcate ethical action, rather it alerts 
human thinking practices to the unique difference that the nonhuman possesses: 
 
… as one becomes practiced in experiencing natural objects in their unique 
specificity, one, in turn, becomes more competent at recognizing other 
selves for their own sake; thus, the characteristic quality of the self under 
the sway of an aesthetic mood is an appreciation of the quality of the 
freedom (i.e. the self-determining potential) of others.176 
 
As Bennett makes clear here, enchantment is ‘an appreciation of … freedom,’ an 
ability to revel in what is not oneself, to enjoy and respect, rather than to fear, the 
alien strangeness of the material world. This appreciation can be ‘practiced,’ and 
this is crucially important to understanding why it might occur most powerfully in 
aesthetics. To read or hear an argument made, such as ‘the nonhuman should have 
rights,’ does not bring about a practice—it asks for a decision to agree or not to 
agree with a statement. It is, in the main, a rational and intellectual consideration 
of an argument. The ‘practice’ of being enchanted by nonhuman difference is, 
however, something that develops through affectual experience, through repeated 
thinking and feeling. Such thinking and feeling, as I will demonstrate in my analysis 
of Stevens, can take place in poetic language in a way that it cannot in political 
tracts. In poetry affectual ‘enchantment’ and joy can merge with intellectual and 
philosophical thinking—producing an embodied experience of nonhuman 
difference, rather than an abstract argument. This does not reject rational 
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thinking, but rather brings it together with felt experience, giving nonhuman 
agency the space to unfold its affectual potential.  
 
The experience of enchantment has much in common with the aesthetic potential 
of poetry. Bennett argues that: 
 
The unknowability and unmanufacturability of … ethical ground find(s) … 
parallels in the way that enchantment hits one as if from out of the blue, 
without warning. You can prepare for it, try to cultivate a receptivity 
towards it, but it is never only or fully the product of will or intention.177 
 
As I have argued earlier on in this thesis, it is poetry’s ‘uselessness,’ its escape from 
fixed structures of meaning, that gives it its unique power. Unlike most narrative 
fiction, for example, poetry is language that can be, if it wishes, language without 
telos—without an endpoint, without a story or the need for a consumable 
‘meaning.’ Poetry is language as momentary aesthetic experience, and as such 
mirrors the ‘unknowability’ of enchantment—its meaning taking place in the space 
between reader and language, connections forged ‘without warning.’ It is for this 
reason that enchantment might be most likely to find a home in poetry, a place in 
which ‘receptivity’ can be cultivated through language, rather than arguments put 
forward and won. The un-fixed nature of an enchantment born out of nonhuman 
difference is as evanescent, and imprecise, as the experience of poetic language 
itself. 
 
Before turning to Stevens’ work, it is important to return again to Adorno, to 
reveal the importance of one particular element of the enchantment made possible 
by the difference of the nonhuman—ambiguity. For Adorno the ‘beauty’ of the 
‘natural world’, what I call the nonhuman, rests in indeterminacy. Adorno argues 
that what fills the nonhuman with beauty, with the potential for enchantment, is 
that its ambiguity gestures to what is beyond reified society; to a reconciliation 
that might be achieved if the world was not profoundly damaged. 
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In his essay ‘Natural Beauty,’ contained in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno argues that: 
 
That the experience of natural beauty, at least according to its subjective 
consciousness, is entirely distinct from the domination of nature, as if the 
experience were at one with the primordial origin, marks out both the 
strength and the weakness of the experience: its strength, because it 
recollects a world without domination, one that probably never existed; its 
weakness, because through this recollection it dissolves back into that 
amorphousness out of which genius once arose and for the first time 
became conscious of the idea of freedom that could be realized in a world 
free from domination.178 
 
For Adorno, the experience of the nonhuman’s ‘beauty’ seems as if it were ‘at one 
with the primordial origin,’ part of a world in which human ‘domination’ and 
control has no part. This echo of a world without the human (one that Adorno 
makes clear may be no more than a fantasy) is intensely powerful and yet weak at 
the same time—weak because it recalls something barely existent, the wisp of a 
past or future free from domination; powerful because, in recollecting the 
potential of such a world, it introduces the potential of that world into reified 
thinking. Nonhuman difference strikes the mind with ‘the idea of freedom,’ a 
possibility as enchanting and enlivening as it is fragile.  
 
Adorno argues that: 
 
The image of nature survives because its complete negation in the 
artifact—negation that rescues this image—is necessarily blind to what 
exists beyond bourgeois society, its labour, its commodities. Natural beauty 
remains the allegory of this beyond in spite of its mediation through social 
immanence. If, however, this allegory were substituted as the achieved 
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state of reconciliation, it would be degraded as an aid for cloaking and 
legitimating the unreconciled world …179 
 
In this description Adorno explains why ‘natural beauty’ is able to remain an 
‘allegory’ of ‘the beyond’: because it appears blind to the painful reality of human 
suffering and oppression. ‘Natural beauty’ appears as world of freedom, an 
existence where destructive human concepts have no power or meaning. 
Paradoxically it is this apparent blindness that allows ‘natural beauty’ to stand-in 
for a world in which oppression and domination might be negated. For this 
dialectic to continue it is absolutely crucial for an actually ‘achieved state of 
reconciliation’ not to be suggested, something we see in the Stevens poem I will 
examine in this chapter. For Adorno the nonhuman does not enchant because it 
becomes part of a holistic system of human-nonhuman unification. Rather, for 
Adorno, it is the suggestion of an as-yet unachieved freedom that provides 
enchantment; containing within it the partial freedom of being able to briefly 
imagine the possibility of a world beyond domination. 
 
Adorno’s focus on ‘natural beauty,’ in his consideration of the nonhuman, is 
founded on the fact that it is in this ‘beauty’ that the crucial ambiguity of 
nonhuman difference is best expressed, an ambiguity with profound import for 
art, and in particular poetry. Adorno argues that: 
 
Only a pedant presumes to distinguish the beautiful from the ugly in nature, 
but without such a distinction the concept of natural beauty would be 
empty ... A qualitative distinction can be sought, if at all, in the degree to 
which something not made by human beings is eloquent: in its expression. 
What is beautiful in nature is what appears to be more than is literally 
there. Without receptivity there would be no such objective expression, but 
it is not reducible to the subject; natural beauty points to the primacy of the 
object in subjective experience. Natural beauty is perceived both as 
authoritatively binding and as something incomprehensible that 
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questioningly awaits its solution. Above all else it is this double character of 
natural beauty that has been conferred on art. Under its optic, art is not the 
imitation of nature but the imitation of natural beauty. It develops in 
tandem with the allegorical intention that manifests it without deciphering 
it; in tandem with meanings that are not objectified as in significative 
language.180 
 
In this paragraph Adorno links the indeterminacy of art with that of ‘natural 
beauty,’ evoking the promissory quality of a medium that can point towards the 
potential of a freedom from reified subjectivity, even if it cannot provide that 
freedom. For Adorno the nonhuman is ‘beautiful’ because it ‘appears to be more 
than is literally there’—its ‘beauty’ enchants because it hints at something beyond 
what we see, an agency and independence belonging to itself, one that is apparent 
and yet invisible. In this way of thinking, the nonhuman disenchants a human 
conceptual system in which only human subjectivity has meaning, then replaces it 
with the enchanting possibilities of a world beyond the human. It is these 
possibilities that we see in Stevens’ poem, ‘Sunday Morning’, a poem that 
simultaneously disenchants teleological systems and beliefs, whilst re-enchanting 
the world through a poetry open to the vibrant potentiality of ambiguous and 
mysterious nonhuman life. 
 
In ‘Sunday Morning’ we see the enchanting possibilities of materiality, possibilities 
which enrich and expand human experience, and the ways in which these 
enchantments are forged through the promissory quality of ‘natural beauty.’ The 
nonhuman world’s ‘beauty’ emanates from the fact that it contains something 
beyond subjectivity, and so figures as a kind of tangible, breathing hope of 
escaping the tight net of reified thought. These possibilities are not expressed by 
poetry as a vehicle for any kind of ‘message;’ rather the possibilities of 
enchantment through ambiguity and change are the very same ones that animate 
the aesthetic acts of poetry itself. Poetry’s power is drawn, in part, from its 
indeterminacy. Poetry can refigure language’s meaning in ways that are 
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expressive, and yet which do not provide consumable, and thus exchangeable, 
messages. Neither poetry, nor the nonhuman and human worlds, are reconciled, 
neither can create paradise. Yet through them, with them, we might be able to 
catch glimpses of the potential for change that exists not in an imagined heaven, 
but in the very voice, meat and mud of material reality; the energetic and alien 
realm of ever-changing bodies and ever-shifting linguistic signs. 
 
In Stevens’ poem we see dramatized the rejection of a teleological religious 
attitude, one that would place Christian salvation in the next world as the true 
theatre of life’s meaning, leaving the material world as a blank waiting place. In 
this rejection Stevens’ not only challenges a worldview that would locate meaning 
only in the afterlife, he also describes attitudes towards, and affects issuing from, 
the ambiguous and changeable nonhuman world.  
 
Stevens’ poem refigures what religion might see as vacuous matter into sites 
where the nonhuman and the human might interact, producing, for the human, an 
awareness of intimacy with alien difference that enchants and enlivens. My 
interest here is less in the detail of what Stevens’ poem is rejecting— a Christian 
theological system with specific beliefs about the afterlife and the meaning of life 
on earth, (interesting as this is) and more in the potentials that the poem opens up 
for ways of being and thinking that reject teleological modes of apprehending 
existence. Stevens mainly focuses on Christianity in the poem, but its strictures are 
not much different to all unyielding, disenchanting conceptual forms, forms that 
figure human experience and human subjectivity as the central points of meaning 
in an inert sea of lesser objects and creatures. Mainstream Christianity reduces the 
nonhuman because it is not capable of spiritual ascension, capitalism and its 
associated reified structures reduce the nonhuman because it/they are seen as 
exchangeable commodities, wholly consumable by humanity’s subjective 
experience. In both systems the potential of nonhuman agency is ignored, as well 
as the possibility this agency might offer to challenge and crack human 




Stevens poem makes possible an ‘enchanted reading:’ acts of existing within 
language that disenchant and enchant simultaneously, converting the instability 
and failures of human conceptual structures, and indeed language itself, into 
luminous sites of generative difference. Though the narrative focus may be on 
religion, the strategies of disenchantment and enchantment in the poem map out 
potential ways of thinking and reading that contain the power to cut through all 
teleological forms of thought. The actions of language in the poem invite a 
multiplicity of readings, not merely the more ‘traditional’ analysis of the poem as a 
simple rejection of organised religion. The devastating power of this poem, its 
affectual impact on me as a non-Christian reader, is testament to its ability to 
transcend this more usual narrative reading. I would argue that this is because the 
poem brings alive the joyful potential of the material nonhuman world, re-figuring 
it as of equal worth to the realm of the solely human. In doing so, the poem makes 
available a profound rejection of exchange-value society — one in which nothing 
has worth beyond what it can be traded for — and returns to the reader the 
possibility contained in their intimacy with the alterity of the nonhuman world. 
The poem’s language maps out a network of resistance to deadening teleological 
thought, a splintering of cognitive control that can be as powerful in its 
disenchantment of capitalist rationalism as it is in its disenchantment of Western 
religion. ‘Sunday Morning’ does not attempt to convince us of an argument, but 
rather makes possible a practice of reading in which one might be able to draw 
enchantment from the nonhuman difference made available through language. 
 
‘Sunday Morning’ follows a woman considering whether meaning is possible in a 
world without god. It begins with a scene of lively and yet relaxing pleasure:  
 
Complacencies of the peignoir, and late  
Coffee and oranges in a sunny chair,  
And the green freedom of a cockatoo 
Upon a rug mingle to dissipate 
The holy hush of ancient sacrifice.181 
                                                        




Despite it being ‘Sunday Morning,’ the brightness and physical vibrancy of this 
scene seems powerful enough to dispel any thought of religion. In these very first 
lines Stevens is drawing on each of the physical senses—touch in the feel of what 
would most likely be a silk peignoir (a wrap or dressing gown), smell in the 
pungent aromas of coffee and oranges, taste in those same objects, sight in the 
bright fruit and the ‘green … cockatoo,’ and sound inevitably issuing from the calls 
and wingbeats of this creature. The fullness of this experience seems bound to 
hold the enchanted attention of the poem’s central figure. Then, however: 
 
She dreams a little, and she feels the dark  
Encroachment of that old catastrophe,  
As a calm darkens among water-lights.  
The pungent oranges and bright, green wings  
Seem things in some procession of the dead,  
Winding across wide water, without sound.  
The day is like wide water, without sound,  
Stilled for the passing of her dreaming feet  
Over the seas, to silent Palestine,  
Dominion of the blood and sepulchre.182 
 
In this part of the stanza we see the woman fall asleep, or at least daydream, and 
this reduction of attention to her material surroundings results in the 
‘Encroachment of that old catastrophe’: death, and the religious associations and 
reactions that come with it. The complacency the woman had in relation to these 
spiritual matters now disappears, transforming her affectual relationship with the 
nonhuman objects and beings around her. The ‘pungent’ material reality of the 
world, its sharp individuality, is dampened by a ‘calm’ that ‘darkens.’ This ‘calm’ is 
peaceful but stultifying, turning the objects into ‘things in some procession of the 
dead.’ This is because vital materiality has been replaced with the conceptual 
strictures of religion, where everything is part of a procession towards the actual 
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meaning that will be revealed to human individuals upon death. Each thing loses 
its individual agency, and so its force— merged into sameness by a system of 
thinking that sees it as ‘mere’ matter. Only human beings will reach heaven, the 
alleged centre of meaning, paradoxically excising the ‘reality’ from real objects. 
The repetition of ‘wide water, without sound,’ emphasises how this sameness will 
remove ‘sound,’ which we must assume will muffle the potential of poetic, (oral 
and aural) forms of communication—anything not focused on ‘silent Palestine,’ a 
vision of reality utterly removed from material and mortal existence. 
 
In Stevens’ second stanza this vision is challenged, and potential ways of being 
presented that reject teleological modes of existence. In this stanza affectual and 
intellectual opportunities emerge from interactions with the nonhuman, 
interactions predicated on the nonhuman being perceived as a real and actual part 
of the meaningful world: 
 
Shall she not find in comforts of the sun,  
In pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else  
In any balm or beauty of the earth,  
Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven?  
Divinity must live within herself:  
Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow;  
Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued  
Elations when the forest blooms; gusty  
Emotions on wet roads on autumn nights;  
All pleasures and all pains, remembering  
The bough of summer and the winter branch.  
These are the measures destined for her soul.183  
 
In this stanza we see how enchantment is drawn not just from witnessing the 
nonhuman, but in the interactions that occur between human affectual experience 
and nonhuman objects. The ‘Divinity’ that ‘must live within herself,’ comes through 
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an openness, a porousness to the other. The woman’s experiences and emotions 
are described in language that folds into and out of the nonhuman without 
consuming it, or negating its difference: ‘comforts of the sun,’ and ‘Passions of 
rain,’ describe feelings that do not take place in those environments, but are of 
them. This blurring of linguistic boundaries makes us aware that human 
experience is not simply projected onto a blank nonhuman screen, but is formed 
partly out of the separate reality of that nonhuman being or object. This is, 
however, always a one sided knowledge of experience: human experience is 
shaped by the nonhuman, we cannot know if the experience goes both ways. The 
affectual wonder and clarity of ‘moods in falling snow’ and ‘Elations when the 
forest blooms,’ recognise the agency of the nonhuman, its ability to shape and 
impact upon intimate experience, without suggesting any full knowledge of the 
alien nonhuman environment or object.  
 
Stevens’ language is highly sensitive to the potential effect of the nonhuman, but it 
is not soggily holistic. He describes ‘gusty/Emotions on wet roads on autumn 
nights,184’ the ‘Emotion’ of the human figure made ‘gusty,’ by their environment, 
porous to nonhuman direction. But there is however no suggestion that the wet 
road or ‘gusty’ wind has any reaction to the human. The nonhuman is figured here 
as still distant, still unreachable in its individual entirety, but this hermetic 
difference does not stop it having a powerful impact on human subjectivity and 
experience. What is a ‘gusty’ emotion after all? It would be hard to explain such a 
thing, being as it is an experience flecked with the impact of hermetic nonhuman 
difference, and yet the poetic language does not render something that is 
unimaginable. We know how it feels to be ‘gusty,’ to have the wind blow through 
our feelings, heightening them, unmooring them from their internal roots and 
cutting them with the presence of uncontrollable strangeness, a sudden vulnerable 
awareness of the genuine reality of the ‘outside.’ This description draws the reader 
into an awareness of their own intimacy with nonhuman difference, an awareness 
of the imaginative potential in the crossing point between mental experience and 
nonhuman interaction. This is not to say that the nonhuman somehow ‘gains 
                                                        
184 Stevens, Wallace. Collected Poems. (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), p.58-59, Lines 26-27. 
138 
 
meaning’ through the fact that its existence might be able to bring about 
enchantment for the human—it is rather that, in becoming briefly aware of the 
agency of the nonhuman, the human is able to find a moment of exhalation in a 
mental and societal system where everything exists for something else, is 
exchangeable. The difference and strangeness of nonhuman distance may bring 
about human enchantment for the very reason that nonhuman difference does not 
exist for our comprehension or benefit. The ‘Divinity’ made available through a 
non-teleological interaction with nonhuman difference is drawn from this 
potential, one that offers ‘All pleasures and all pains,’ a full experience of life that 
might momentarily be able include the various ways of being outside of human 
subjectivity.  
 
Stevens takes the impossibly lofty and distant state of ‘Divinity:’ ‘the state of being 
a god, the state of being divine,’185 and makes it available to a human being, the 
highest possible form of enlightenment, of knowledge, of perfection, appearing 
‘within herself.’ This potential is not, in this case, accessed through religion, but 
through the woman’s interactions with the difference of the nonhuman world. 
Here ‘the measures’ of the soul are ‘The bough of summer and the winter branch,’ 
material, nonhuman objects that change and decay. This ‘soul’ is defined by 
nonhuman objects, and is vulnerable to them—drawing its enchantment from the 
instability and difference of a nonhuman world that, unlike the behaviour expected 
of a Christian god, may pay absolutely no heed to it, that guarantees no future of 
total comprehension. This is a version of experience that is not comfortable, but 
one that is open enough to draw genuine enchantment from the alterity of 
nonhuman existence. In such an experience there are ‘Things to be cherished,’ an 
embodied vibrant world deserving of love, rather than a world of cold matter that 
serves the suffocating circle of human wants. 
 
In stanza VII, Stevens provides the reader with an even clearer vision of what 
might be possible if human subjectivity became truly receptive to the enchantment 
available in nonhuman difference and mystery: 
                                                        





Supple and turbulent, a ring of men  
Shall chant in orgy on a summer morn  
Their boisterous devotion to the sun,  
Not as a god, but as a god might be,  
Naked among them, like a savage source.  
Their chant shall be a chant of paradise,  
Out of their blood, returning to the sky;  
And in their chant shall enter, voice by voice,  
The windy lake wherein their lord delights,  
The trees, like serafin, and echoing hills,  
That choir among themselves long afterward.  
They shall know well the heavenly fellowship  
Of men that perish and of summer morn.  
And whence they came and whither they shall go  
The dew upon their feet shall manifest.186  
 
In these lines we see the promised meaning of religion subverted by the promised 
meaning of nonhuman interaction. The men of this scene are devoted to the sun: 
‘Not as a god, but as a god might be.’ This action is very similar to worship, but it is 
not worship. These men share a ‘heavenly fellowship/Of men that perish and of 
summer morn.’  The fellowship offered in this sun’s ‘devotion,’ is not only between 
the men, but also includes the ‘summer morn.’ Clearly the men are drawing huge 
enchantment and energy from their experience of the nonhuman, but it is not a 
simple interaction where the nonhuman is drained to serve the human. There a 
‘fellowship’ assumed between human and nonhuman actants, even if this 
fellowship is as loose as it is possible to be, forged in the knowledge of human-
nonhuman intimacy, rather than any knowledge of the nonhuman’s own truth.  
Similarly, the sun is described as ‘a savage source,’ (my italics) rather than as their 
‘savage source.’ The sun is a ‘savage source’ in and of itself. It gives light and 
energy to human and nonhuman alike, but this does not denote any telos on its 
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part, or anything else’s. The sun is not a god, because though it makes life possible, 
it does this for no reason other than its own being: it does not exist for humanity.  
 
In the idealised imaginative version of the enchantment available to the central 
figure of the poem, enchantment is created by unpeeling solitary human 
subjectivity, revealing the intense intimacy with difference possible between 
human and nonhuman: 
 
Their chant shall be a chant of paradise,  
Out of their blood, returning to the sky;  
And in their chant shall enter, voice by voice,  
The windy lake wherein their lord delights,  
The trees, like serafin, and echoing hills,  
That choir among themselves long afterward.187  
 
The men’s chant comes ‘Out of their blood,’ but is not only shared between them. 
Their chant returns ‘to the sky,’ and enters ‘voice by voice,/The windy lake 
wherein their lord delights.’ Human expression is imagined here as being able to 
not only react to the nonhuman, but ‘enter’ it, not destroying or controlling it but 
setting up an equalized relationship. In this image, the men’s expressive ‘chant’ 
encourages the ‘trees’ and hills into their own kind of singing, they ‘choir among 
themselves long afterward.’ This is of course partly a description of the men’s 
echoing voices, but it also brings to the fore the possibility of witnessing 
nonhuman agency. The trees are like ‘serafin’: individuals who choose to sing and 
praise, an imagined singing that belongs to the trees rather than the human 
singers. In this version of enchantment, it becomes almost possible to draw the 
nonhuman out into clear response, agency not glimpsed or hinted at but truly 
made available. Importantly, the symbolic, almost pagan nature of these images 
make it clear that this is not Stevens’ depiction of what is, but of what might be if 
the enchanting and vibrant potential of the nonhuman could be fully experienced.  
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Yes, Stevens’ poem refigures paradise as the material world all around us, but it is 
not necessarily suggesting that this paradise is always available to human 
experience. Rather it can be glimpsed in moments of openness when closed 
subjectivity falls away, and in this stanza the poem imagines such experiences at 
full force—the utter difference of the nonhuman ‘naked’ to us, terrifying but also 
enlivening. Even in this version of material paradise there is however no telos, no 
guarantee of destiny or life. Ambiguity and even mystery remain a central part of 
how embodied life will operate. We see this in the final two lines of the stanza: 
 
And whence they came and whither they shall go 
The dew upon their feet shall manifest.188 
 
Where the men come from and where they will end up will be made ‘manifest,’ 
exhibited through and made apparent from, the ‘dew upon their feet.’ This is 
almost a tautology; the dew will show where they will go only as they are going 
there. The revelation of their future only happens at the exact moment that that 
future becomes present, observable in the droplets of water their feet collect as 
they move. Simply, nothing can be predicted about what will happen until it is 
taking place, there is no plan or map of any kind available, only the material reality 
of movement and change. This captures the profound ambiguity of Stevens’ 
paradise, a paradise that becomes so not because of the outcome it will produce, 
but because of its potential to make possible enchanting contact with the genuine 
reality of the nonhuman world. This enchantment has no guarantees, but is rather 
focused on a momentary affectual experience that reveals that something might 
exist beyond reified subjectivity. The promise of freedom buried in this experience 
is what renders it a kind of ‘paradise.’ 
 
It is important to draw attention to the fact that the powerful enchantment Stevens 
locates, and indeed creates, in his poem is drawn paradoxically from an action of 
disenchantment. For Stevens’ poetry to be able to ripple with the enchanting 
brightness of nonhuman vibrancy and difference, he must dismantle, and thus 
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disenchant, previous sites of enchantment. As I have argued earlier on in this 
reading, though this disenchantment takes place in a rejection of Christian 
doctrine, it also serves as a disenchantment of any system which places human 
meaning and conceptual structures as the engendering forces of meaning and 
‘useful’ action in the world. Stevens’ poem is committed to a search for the real, to 
a kind of enchantment that issues not solely from the human, but from human 
experience as an embodied object in a material world. This is made apparent in 
stanza IV of the poem: 
 
She says, “I am content when wakened birds,  
Before they fly, test the reality  
Of misty fields, by their sweet questionings;  
But when the birds are gone, and their warm fields  
Return no more, where, then, is paradise?”  
There is not any haunt of prophecy,  
Nor any old chimera of the grave,  
Neither the golden underground, nor isle  
Melodious, where spirits gat them home,  
Nor visionary south, nor cloudy palm  
Remote on heaven’s hill, that has endured  
As April’s green endures; or will endure  
Like her remembrance of awakened birds,  
Or her desire for June and evening, tipped  
By the consummation of the swallow’s wings.189  
 
In this stanza we see the central figure of the poem’s fear that the joy she finds in 
the ambiguous actions of the nonhuman may be too short-lived to counter a need 
for a more fixed, Christian paradise. She is briefly content ‘when wakened birds … 
test the reality/Of misty fields, by their sweet questionings.’ In this image we see 
that ‘reality’ itself is being questioned through nonhuman action. The ‘wakened 
birds’ test the ‘fields’ through their song, a preparation for embodied movement 
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that suddenly draws the mind into an awareness that there is an entirely separate 
agency existing right next to its own. The birds are not mechanistic, but self-
directed, giving flight to a sense of the world that is full—a world that contains 
human subjectivity, alongside a nonhuman difference that points beyond that 
subjectivity. In this ambiguous space of ‘misty fields,’ the woman is able to be 
‘content,’ comforted by a world in which, in a very real sense, she is not alone. By 
this I mean that as a human being she is not alone on the earth, but intimate with 
real and vibrant beings whose experience escapes her, and yet which she can 
know exists. However, the mortality of this living world, its inevitably short life 
span, creates concern. The poem responds by listing a series of religious and quasi-
religious concepts:  
 
There is not any haunt of prophecy,  
Nor any old chimera of the grave,  
Neither the golden underground, nor isle  
Melodious, where spirits gat them home,  
Nor visionary south, nor cloudy palm  
Remote on heaven’s hill190 
 
and then contrasting these expired concepts with the endurance of ‘April’s 
green.’191 Stevens is disenchanting any possible form of religious, spiritual or 
generally teleological belief by making us aware that it is they that are short-lived, 
rather than the endlessly renewing life of the nonhuman. What seems fragile and 
mortal has power in its ability to change and grow, existing far beyond the 
invented conceptual solutions that humans tack on to existence to try and make it 
fully comprehensible. The paradoxical endurance of spring’s delicate greenery 
refigures our ideas of what is lasting, and makes the conceptual systems of the 
‘visionary south’ and ‘heaven’s hill’ seem as insubstantial and flimsy as a 
daydream. As a result, the enchanting power of these systems leaches away, 
placing such enchantment into the space of an embodied experience of difference: 
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Like her remembrance of awakened birds,  
Or her desire for June and evening, tipped  
By the consummation of the swallow’s wings.192  
 
The woman's 'remembrance’ of birds will not endure in the way an edifice might, 
rather it endures in her own understanding, the experience of nonhuman 
difference creating more affectual resonance than any rigid conceptual system. 
The woman’s ‘desire for June and evening,’ expresses a longing to connect with the 
embodied human world. What is crucial however here is that this desire is not 
consummated by the gaining of a full, holistic comprehension of that nonhuman 
world. It is consummated by ‘swallow’s wings,’ an inherently ambiguous and 
changeable nonhuman object. Not only can those wings fly anywhere, and fly away 
from her, they are specifically of the ‘swallow’ a bird famous for its long distance 
travel and its movement from place to place. Consummation of desire is found at 
the painful point of distance; a desire, even a love, for a nonhuman actant that has 
no interest in, or responsibility to, the human individual. Such a consummation 
continues and deepens desire rather than finishing it, satisfaction found in the 
enchantment of what is able to be wholly free from human subjectivity.  
 
The language of these lines impresses the enchanting ambiguity of this experience 
into the reader’s mind. The woman’s ‘desire for June and evening,’ is ‘tipped’ by 
‘the swallow’s wings.’ How can desire be tipped? We are able to understand this 
image as that of wings that are tipped with colour—an image that ingeniously 
relocates the edges of the woman’s human experience to the physical edges of a 
nonhuman body. This makes apparent that the consummation of her desire is not 
in having it consumed and negated by nonhuman experience. It is rather ‘tipped,’ 
touched and at the same time thrown off balance by a nonhuman difference that 
offers no holistic inclusion. This is an enchantment that manages to consummate 
desire in the unfinished, unpredictable extension of that desire—change and 
potential replacing diktat and holy commandment.  
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In stanza VIII, the final stanza of the poem, the enchanting opportunities of 
ambiguity and difference found in stanza IV find their own consummation: 
 
She hears, upon that water without sound,  
A voice that cries, “The tomb in Palestine  
Is not the porch of spirits lingering.  
It is the grave of Jesus, where he lay.”  
We live in an old chaos of the sun,  
Or old dependency of day and night,  
Or island solitude, unsponsored, free,  
Of that wide water, inescapable.  
Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quail  
Whistle about us their spontaneous cries;  
Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness;  
And, in the isolation of the sky,  
At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make  
Ambiguous undulations as they sink,  
Downward to darkness, on extended wings.193 
 
In this stanza the ‘water without sound,’ the space of religiously defined death that 
turns everything towards the afterlife, is pierced by a ‘voice’ that challenges 
Christ’s rebirth—the central concept of Christian belief. The voice brings the 
spiritual concept wholly back to earth, describing Christ’s tomb as ‘the grave of 
Jesus, where he lay.’ Rather than god becoming flesh, and then being resurrected 
and becoming immortal god again, here Jesus becomes flesh for good. His body 
becomes a corpse with no ‘lingering’ spirits to turn the material world into 
background objects for the ‘real’ action of heaven. This poetic disenchantment, 
coming as it does after Steven’s series of disenchantments throughout the poem, 
leaves again a space in which different aspects of being are able to have their 
enchantment recognised. Into the grave space left by Christ’s now long-gone 
corpse, new potentials emanate. Stevens lists differing descriptions of the 
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ambiguous, enchanting and changeable material world as imagined without such 
teleological, religious concerns:  
 
We live in an old chaos of the sun,  
Or old dependency of day and night,  
Or island solitude, unsponsored, free,  
Of that wide water, inescapable.194  
 
Firstly, Stevens does not offer one description that can accurately sum up and 
contain the potential of experience. Rather he offers three options, punctuated by 
two uses of ‘Or’ that suggest both the infinite variety of experience, and the 
impossibility of this experience ever being accurately and perfectly captured in 
language. Stevens is not trying to overcome the instability of language, but is using 
it to better illuminate the instability at the heart of experience and being itself. The 
descriptions themselves repeatedly de-centre humanity from any role in directing 
the contours of existence—humanity lives ‘in an old chaos of the sun,’ our life only 
a by-product of the energy created by a nonhuman object that knows nothing of us 
and does not seek to serve us. Or we are simply directed by the ‘old dependency of 
day and night,’ our daily structures and forms engendered by the earth’s 
movement around the sun, rather than any original plan of our own. Or we are in 
an ‘island solitude, unsponsored, free,’ separate from any spiritual guidance, but 
also made potentially free by this lack of guidance. Despite the inevitability of ‘that 
wide water,’ death, freedom in life might be possible if we transform our attention 
and direct it towards the embodied living difference of the nonhuman world. In the 
final part of the stanza Stevens describes this world, drawing lyric attention to the 
enchanting mystery of its difference: 
 
Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quail  
Whistle about us their spontaneous cries;  
Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness;  
And, in the isolation of the sky,  
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At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make  
Ambiguous undulations as they sink,  
Downward to darkness, on extended wings.195 
 
These lines are beautiful, but the beauty that they capture is not of friendly 
sameness, but independent and unknowable difference. The quail’s ‘cries’ are 
‘spontaneous,’ and ‘Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness,’ bringing themselves 
forth for themselves, presumably far away from any human being who might eat 
them. Similarly, in the ‘isolation of the sky,’ ‘casual flocks of pigeons 
make/Ambiguous undulations.’ The sky is empty of heavenly meaning, and the 
pigeons are ‘casual,’ unperturbed by any human conception or meaning placed on 
to them. The pigeons are expressive in their undulations, but these movements are 
‘Ambiguous,’ their meaning to the pigeons themselves cannot be decoded by a 
human observer. So we have a world stuffed with vibrant material actions, ‘Deer’ 
moving on mountains, ‘quail’ calling, ‘berries’ ripening and birds flying, and yet 
none of these actions can be fully understood, fully mastered by the human. We 
are not distant from the physical world, but its meaning, its agency and hermetic 
existence is, in our current state, hidden from us. This intense intimacy with 
difference does not however alienate as one might expect. The very alienness of 
the nonhuman enchants and beguiles, a thrilling, endlessly deep environment of 
the more than human, of what goes beyond human subjectivity.  
 
Stevens embodies the experience of this enchantment in the rhyme scheme of the 
poem itself. We have the satisfying rhyme of ‘cries’ and ‘sky,’ on alternating lines. 
We would then expect another two rhymes separated by a non-rhyming line, to 
continue the formal structure. Instead however there are only three following lines 
rather than four, invalidating the potential for that rhyme scheme. When the 
rhyme does come it is in two lines together, and it is a half rhyme: ‘sink’ and 
‘wings.’ On top of this, the syllable count of the poem, ten syllables per line, is 
interrupted by ‘Ambiguous undulations as they sink,’ which is eleven syllables. 
This extra syllable sounds out in the reader’s mind an extra note of difference, of 
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unexpected action overstretching the boundaries of structure. This means that in a 
very small space we move between the aural satisfaction and pleasure of balanced 
full rhyme, to the unexpected syllable count and incomplete rhyme of the final 
lines—intense beauty and surprising ambiguity embedded in the poetic 
configuration itself. The ‘Ambiguous undulations’ of the pigeons go ‘Downwards to 
darkness, on extended wings’—both disappearing from us into the darkness of 
unknowing, of mystery, and opening up ‘extended wings’: creating space and 
movement. This final image is not a closing down but an opening up, potential 
emerging from the realisation that we cannot follow where the nonhuman goes 
entirely. It is when we catch our breath at this line, its beguiling and yet 
maddening instability, that we as readers are able to become enchanted by an 
awareness of what we do not know.  
 
In this poem Stevens manages to access the hope that can be found in paying 
attention to that which we cannot enter into— a nonhuman realm whose existence 
reminds us that we are not at the centre of a totally subjective, suffocatingly one-
note cosmos. Rather, agency and independence do exist beyond us, hermetically 
sealed by our inability, as yet, to overcome conceptual structures. Despite this, an 
awareness that this independence is really out there is profoundly enchanting, a 
brightness threading through what we know, illuminating the possibility of 
freedom. In bringing disenchantment to bear in this way, Stevens enlivens rather 
than making cynical. Stevens picks apart our expectations and beliefs not to make 
us bereft, but to ignite our sensitivity to the vibrancy of the alien material world. 
 
This critical portion of my thesis has explored what might become possible when 
the difference of the nonhuman is allowed space within the structures of language, 
and has questioned how thinking might shift if able to come into contact with such 
language within an ecological poetics. Ecological poetics, as I have shown, cannot 
be a rule-book for change, offering language to be used as a tool for action. What it 
may be able to do, however, is challenge the entrenched thinking practices that 
raise human values and structures over the modes of existence of every other 
being and thing—thus forcing air into the cracks of closed reified thought.  
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By examining Stevens and Adorno I have become aware of how such ecological 
poetry might be brought about through the constant bringing forward of aesthetic 
failure and guilt, the impossibility of poetry capturing nonhuman difference 
revealing the very existence of that difference, glinting just beyond human 
comprehension. Whether contemporary poetry might respond to the systematic 
destruction, degradation and suppression of the nonhuman world through writing 
of this kind cannot yet be know. What I do know, however, is that it is in the brief 
glimpses of nonhuman individuality made available to me by the processes of this 
thesis, that I have found my own muted creative hope. Not the hope of ‘changing 
the world,’ (though that is worthy and necessary) but the hope that poetry need 
not merely be a handmaiden to oppressive relations between human and 
nonhuman; the hope that poetry’s instability, unpredictability and liminality might 
make it the perfect space in which oppressive relations and thinking practices can 
be shifted, unpicked.  
 
Poetry will not jump off the page or out of the mouth and save the rainforest, cool 
the climate or clean the microbeads from the stomachs of fish, much as I might 
want it to. But it need not serve the rigid, life-defying human concepts that make 
nonhuman beings and things mere exchangeable commodities for fuel or pleasure. 
Every human action takes place in a web of intense intimacy with the nonhuman 
world, despite its difference and distance from our comprehension. Every human 
action in this web, including those that impact upon the nonhuman world, begins, 
consciously or unconsciously, in thought. It is my belief, drawn from the lessons of 
this critical portion of my thesis, that it is in poetry that this thought might, for a 
brief moment, have the potential to change—that a glimpse of nonhuman 
difference, rising up through the layers of human failure, might challenge the 
suffocating sameness of human subjectivity.  
 
Poetry is where thought goes for the possibility of dissolving itself and being 
remade, and, as I have proved throughout this critical study, where it may hope to 
become ecological. It is in poetry that I will continue my efforts to make nonhuman 
difference come alive for the human, and where I hope to continue being 
surprised, amazed, and thrown out of my assumptions by the feral independence, 
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difference, autonomy and beauty of a world that is not, and will never will be, ours. 
In a contemporary moment in which the nonhuman is often treated as little more 
than a statistic, a wealth resource or an entertainment, this seems to me to be 
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A woman like that is not a woman, quite. 


















































the hex for a penis isn’t really all about 
a penis 
the penis is not an issue all fine doing its own thing 
ink blot semen     sweet white plaster  
pale peach tartlet 
but when it goes you see    you see a lot of things 
 
to hex a penis off means taking a laugh out for a walk 
long and blue 
cold as Russia 
laughing and laughing your mouth is open 
let your girlfriend see your tongue 
 
to hex a penis off wrap yourself up 
in a warm bed and no one is there 
intellectual persuasion 
hand in the unowned air 
peeling strips of dull bleached sky 
 
hex like artemisia 
holofernes head back   the fucking sucker 
head back and tirades full of blood 
he goes down way way down 
judith’s painted hand is a snare 
she is catching your penis and taking it home 
 
hex with a plate of grilled pears 
against cream 
a glass of just-pink wine 
teacups porcelain thrush egg blue 
your soft under the breath singing 
 
hex it off with a little journey 
islands of any kind ideally somewhere cold 
green things butting out into a black/grey sea 
no one is on the island to tell you the kind of 
things you should be touching 
 
hex at a child-wedding 
don’t worry it’s cool 
at the ceremony just wait until the 
drinks are being served and then set fire 
to the whole place 
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the drapes that are azure blue 
holiday destination blue  pope innocent blue 
the child-bride comes with you 
her big gobstopper eyes and hello kitty backpack 
full of dicks 
 
hex in a philosophy seminar 
see them start to detach and waver 
a few centimetres apart from their owners 
 
maybe i’m not actually bothered by the logical 
summation of things 
their soft and sweet calculation and steadfast rationale  
maybe i like it out here in the dark cold wood 
with all my bits hanging down and fiery creatures 
perching on every surface shaking their claws 
maybe i like it with god holding my sweaty wavering hand 
 
hex it by saying nothing 
this navy zip-up and scarf says that i understand comfort 
and solidarity 
don’t talk to me   don’t tell me about your day 
or ask me where the good places are  
is there a problem is this sector 
no  
off it goes 
 
turn back and unpave the roads 
hex an epic poem  some kind of discharge 
a throne that you forged from  
gold and diamonds and plastic bangles  
and crow feathers and infinity rings 
 
hex it through glory 
total and utter glory 
your huge red/black hair reaching and touching the upper echelons 
pagan understanding and all types of weird singing 
some woman in a mint silk pantsuit so happy with 
a penis between her legs and the next shucking it off 
able to do exactly as is necessary 
 
wind batters the tall insane skyscrapers 
glowering hungry sky    very unusual 
that metallic taste in your mouth 

















Have you had relations with the devil and what took place? 
 
I kissed him under the tail, it was a bit like soil, a bit like road tar  
when it heats up, he was flickering in pleasure, the field would  
be just the same when I tongue that, the bird’s feathers parting. 
 
 
What knowledge did the devil give you? 
 
I built a house next to the sea, the roof is red/orange, the sky 
is a shaking plate of light peeling you back, there is grass 
out the front, some metal bins, you can see a lighthouse. I began 
to sleep with the windows open, I began to creep along the bed 
to my own globe face in the mirror. Sitting rubbed up in myself 
is this fierce fire, it does not come from me, even the stones in 
the drive are crackling with it. 
 
 
What did the devil make you do under his control? 
 
His mother had just died. We ate mint ice 
cream by the coffin, he was missing her, my 
sock was loose, we kept laughing. 
 
 
What is magic? 
 
Picture an egg yolk, that huge yellow throw up sun. 




What is magic? 
 
Little cracks coming in, small flaws in the glass, 
and the air slapping itself, you stand on a hill, 
things are mainly green and breakable, 
you think ok I’m not alone, but mainly, 
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ok I was never alone, on a far off hill the 
earth is breaking up against the gas pressure 
of the sun, if there was ever anything to miss 
this is what you miss, how it’s beginning. 
 
 
What crimes have you enacted? 
 
Love makes me forget myself sometimes.  
I am horribly angry, I am sick with it, 
my vomit turns black, but this love. 
I can’t explain it, beyond that it is exactly. 
 
 
What other witches/sorcerers have you conjured with? 
 
S couldn’t eat. The food was poor and cheap but not that. 
She had these amazing dark eyes.  
 
 
Have you taken black mass? 
 
I’ve wondered why things turn. Rustling and fluttering cells,  
the nib of the chest where what you might call soul slides out 
and enters a hyena fucking happily amongst the fruit rinds. 
 
 
What did the devil make you do under his control? 
 
What you should do is go out and get really drunk. 
 
 
What did the devil make you do under his control? 
 
What you should do is get a sleeper train. 
 
 
What did the devil make you do under his control? 
 
I can pack everything and I can carry the suitcases up 
staircases and along roads. I can go, even though 
I am not importantly myself. Some of the things  
that are me can go. 
 
 
Have you profaned holy scripture? 
 
The biggest fear is that reality itself starts to curdle, 









Who have you used spells against in this parish? 
 
I can’t say that I’ve met god face to face, but I 
can tell you how I imagine it. God holding my heart 
in a palm as it flexes from blue to green to white. 
God being really tired, haar of sea fog. 
I’ve had to decide what it looks like, what it is.  
Shiver of the long world, cold feet,  





































WITCH AND THE DEVIL 
 
when the witch first met the devil the devil was 
a beautiful man and a beautiful woman 
the devil had long eyelashes and a body that was hard and soft 
at the same time so that you wanted to hold him  
and also be held by her and run your hands through the curly 
sticky liquorice hair which smelt of the salt churned up by the prow of a boat 
the devil wanted to know the witch he wanted to ask about the spells she did 
when she pulled roots out of the living air and controlled jackdaws with the ease 
of directing first year undergraduates in a department play 
he wanted to see the things she could do when she pushed her fingers into the mud 
and listened as best she could to what the mud was saying until sometimes the mud 
found its way up her throat and out of her mouth 
the devil was very different the witch could see he was different by the way he talked 
to her and actually listened to the answers  
the witch liked his sloping gait and the way he looked at her with oilslick eyes 
that kept changing colour sky and sea shifting direction 
the witch had been waiting for a long time because even though  
she lived in a pre-industrial society she dreamt of motorways and nightclubs  
though she didn’t know they were called motorways and nightclubs 
she dreamt of huge chunks of the sky falling down and covering all the spires 
drowning all the bells and towns and ploughs and churches in blue  
 
 
the devil liked getting up early which is what the witch liked so they would go out 
before anyone else was around and they would act out satanic rituals in the woods 
the witch was surprised by this because she thought the devil would prefer the night-time 
but she was also pleased because you could see what you were doing a lot better at dawn 
and also the light had the green tint of rusted copper and took part in the celebrations 
which the devil said were the best he had probably ever done because the witch was so 
good at doing them and such a natural 
the witch kept having sex with the devil and the devil had all the sexual organs you could 
want so the witch could have him inside her at the same time as putting his breast in her mouth  
and even though the witch had always assumed that she probably did like sex in general  
though not usually in practice this time the witch liked it in practice because she didn’t have  
to put her hand over her mouth or anything like that she just had to do what she was doing  
and the devil loved putting his tongue between her and also turning into other animals whilst he 
was down there so the witch didn’t just feel like she was getting what she wanted she felt like 
everyone everywhere was getting what they wanted 
 
 
the devil made the witch a salad which had lettuce and cucumber in it but which also had 
watermelon in it the pink flesh and the black seeds 
the witch began crying at this though she wasn’t exactly clear why 
something about the wet pinkness and hard blackness and the cold fruit of it in her mouth 
against the slightly dirty vegetables reminded her of the descriptions of christ’s resurrection 
when after all that time behind a boulder being dead he comes out and he is still dead but 




the sun doesn’t set and he’s smiling in his whole but also destroyed flesh 
which is staying on his bones with the pink new blood that someone put in there 
 
 
the witch showed the devil how to talk through eye blinks so that no-one else 
knew what was going on and the devil tried to show the witch how to become  
invisible but that was a really hard one that was going to take her a while to get right 
the devil had a lot of books with him which he kept stuffed in his underwear drawer 
a mix of things like the bible told backwards and general works of contemporary literature 
so the witch could read all of that when she wasn’t practising how to change the weather 
by sucking on a spoon of honey and dog hair or how to use parsley to stop the 
pastor speaking on sundays so that he would just have to wave his hands around and try 
and impersonate the terrible fires of hell and the scalding water that would greet each sinner 
when they finally gave up their hard life and went onto the next hard life for another go 
 
 
the witch had never thought about what other people thought about exactly 
she had thought about those motorways and nightclubs and had imagined getting run 
over or dying of a drug overdose she had also imagined turning to chalk and dissipating 
she had imagined giving birth to a huge squadron of frogs and eels 
and she had told people about it which meant that she didn’t have to worry about getting 
married as much as other girls or women or young men had to worry about getting married 
but now she was thinking about different different things like unrolling clouds of blue tits 
from the cavities between her muscles and a huge ornate building filled with beds so that you 
couldn’t see the floor only lovely silk topped mattresses where women climbed from bunk to 
bunk whispering to each other and lighting candles and never having to have their feet touch the 
sawdust under a roof made of clear glass so that they could all see out but no-one could see in 
 
 
the devil didn’t like to talk about god that much because of their falling out 
the witch wasn’t even sure sometimes if the devil 100% believed in him 
still the witch wanted to know what god was like from a being with first-hand experience 
she wanted to unplug the gap that she had thought about at night when she was small 
thinking of nothing praying to nothing watching the curtain slap and slap against the window 
so the devil described a landscape of ice with icy crags and peaks rising up into an ice pale sky 
vast expanses of snow tunnelling along wind channels in twisted curls and icebergs wide and 
huge as continents bleeding water down onto the frozen sheets of ice which were too thick 
to be tested with scientific instruments air that is so cold that birds that fly into it are knocked 
down dead straight away whales are left cubed and shattered as they meet the immobile sea 
miles and miles of whiteness so that looking at it is also not looking at it the witch asked how can 
god be an environment made of ice and the devil said no god isn’t the ice he’s under the ice  
but you have to be very very very hot to burn your way through to him 
 
 
one thing the witch didn’t ask the devil about was badness even though she knew a lot 
of people would say that the devil was full of badness if not defined by badness 
but by this point the witch was as sick of goodness as much as she was sick of badness 
in fact she was really sick of them her spine ached with all of it collecting 
like pink nauseous liquid in the links between her vertebrae 
the witch wanted some sort of power though she knew it would get her into trouble 
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the witch wanted to be allowed to do her own thing without disturbance 
she wanted to throw the broom into the grate and instead 
buy an airplane rising across a tin can silver sky higher and higher 
30,000 feet and rising so high that no-one can grab onto your ankles 
no-one can cover you or take a shot get you on your back pull something 
a blue void of cloud cold planets shoals of birds 
she had always been looking up so had been practising for a long time 
standing on ledges craning her neck and picturing a space outside the ground 
a walk into the air that looks like the future because it is 
 
 
the devil said that he was accused of murder wherever he went even though 
he never murdered anybody not because of morality but for other reasons 
to do with essential life force and the energy capture of the seasons 
he said he wasn’t a man and wouldn’t drink milk because it didn’t belong to him and that 
even if someone was with him for 1000 years they weren’t going to get him 
there was nothing to get or at least getting doesn’t work like that 
the devil did say he believed in a personal kind of sacrifice that didn’t involve 
an altar or necessarily have a particular cause though he had a soft spot for martyrs 
he rather said that you had to make a decision are you prepared to destroy yourself 
for freedom even though it will be really awful and maybe worse than not freedom 
even though it will involve some true horror examples of which include lungs full of swamp tar 
the smallest bit of daylight refracting through permanently shut blinds 
and a large selection of types of silence each and every one of which are unobserved 
the devil always looked at the witch with an expression of compassion which was 
the same expression she had on her face when she looked at him 
but when he talked about freedom he looked painfully quiet like the kind of 
person who casts no shadow and the witch wondered if actually that was because 
her face looked like that 
 
 
when the witch said goodbye to the devil  
they didn’t get that overtly emotional but they held onto each other 
for a long time until there was a flow of breath back and forth that 
was entirely equal in the air passing through their mouths  
it is terrible how we can never guarantee anything we really want is 
what the witch thought but still she took a bit of her hair and tied it round 
the devil’s wrist and the devil said something in her ear but it wasn’t words 
so I can’t transcribe it but it looked like a body floating on a sea 
of grass with the moon pulling that grass backwards and forwards 
in tides and with each tug of the moonlight more blue flowers burst up 
out of the soil and stretch their capped mouths and the body passes over them 










WITCH AND THE SUFFRAGETTES  
 
again somehow the witch finds it is about eating and not eating 
they don’t eat and so they are made to eat 
she asks a policeman ‘what is with this eating thing?’ 
but he doesn’t know why just that when a woman eats 
she is eating for the state 
when she watches her friend forced to lie back and be fed 
she retches  
the feeding is the same as being sick it is the same as not 
being fed because it leaves you hungry  
ghost meal fattened with air 
the witch tries to listen to the feeding because it is saying something 
she knows it looks like a penis being forced down her throat 
and she knows that they know it 
the feeding wants to make things happen without desire 
weakness is too close to permeability 
see through bones which are an obvious lack 
calling out EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY body only  
small because the mind is small there is no room for it inside 
the feeding is the tippex and it says that fullness is the cover up 
when the witch is fed she thinks how interesting it is that 
fullness can be so blank 
groping around in the sick dark not allowed to pour out only 
allowed to take in 
 
witch is sad when she thinks about the suffragettes 
their pale green and pink their soft bodies and hard placards 
the witch wonders what happiness could possibly look like 
at some point it went wrong and even though she’s very old she 
doesn’t know exactly when that point was 
but she’s thinking that the most likely is probably Orpheus 
when Orpheus was singing it was so marvellous and Eurydice sang too 
obviously they were a really good couple 
back then it was early you could still smell the cinders coming off the big bang 
nothing had really fixed yet nothing looked lasting 
trees were improvising their places   
Orpheus went back to get Eurydice from death as we know  
but he wouldn’t let her make her own way out of the rubble seek into the scratch of 
each step that is not knowing always not knowing  
he looked at her eyes which were dry and dark 
her song is still down there somewhere 
 
 
the smell of freedom is the smell of vomit the witch can see that now 
it isn’t lots of clear light pouring in gold fantastic gold 
it is vomiting all over yourself and it getting hard in the folds 
it is getting your time and they don’t give you anything so 
you bleed down your legs thighs sticky  
so they smack when you move them wet gloss 
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smell of slaughtered animals the unclean things 
is the smell of where you’re going into the sweat  
of piss and cold  
into the rawness where the inside comes outside 
which is exactly what they hate 




the rush of death is a stunt 
it vibrates its own meaning 
which garbles and surpasses you 
all of the explosions are coming 
out of your head eating the words 
when the houses burn are you meant  
to feel sorry for it the witch thinks probably 
yes but obviously no 
all the fires coursing up the townhouses  
and golf courses and morning rooms and 
nurseries and halls of commerce and residences 
were all already there cracking and flailing 
and spitting 
the pleasure of seeing everyone see it 
their white eyes fat with flames 































goes down the shaded path 
to where all her old babies are 
crisped up now 
little touches under the ground 
angels feel bad about it angels 
have tin foil wings and are apologetic 
angels are sad and cry their faces never going red 
but they can’t hump on the bodies 
each body that was a little sperm and a shaking 
globular egg that was a green pustule 
a bacterium full of something (potential) or 
one inch to the right and could have been an oak tree 
angels imagine the jobs the babies could have done as good citizens 
beautiful and whole with satisfying marriages and smallholdings 
witch thinks no a fuck-ton of small waiting christs 
who had to die because if they lived she’d die and then they’d die anyway 
capture and restraint the hot desire to have one but also be left alone 
angels don’t like christ that dirty guy 
his eyes were brown like silt that won’t do he sweated and drank juice 
christ born to die well it makes sense a christ for the funeral pyre 
death wet in his mouth 
these small ones also their little burning faces and snapped necks 
shivering in the body where it happens 
someone has to live over the very end 



























she looked at the hard bridle 
saw it running with its own capture 
red and  
blue  and 
black 
stop 
witch attempted to be separate from her own body 
witch attempted to unwoman 
witch was not a wife but they could hear her going on 
and on and on and wow and on 
he held her arms and she kicked and someone else did 
it went over her head the metal bar over her tongue  
caged latches she stopped struggling when she could 
not get away she made her eyes black holes dragging gravity 
the tongue’s flesh was spongy and wet it was raining 
so in the marketplace of course she waited one arm 
tied to a post and all of that metal on her head her brain 
people did their early capitalist accumulation 
people said things and there was no saying back 
now there were no words that words should break 
and if a kind of silence was home what vocabulary 
could be eaten back could be swallowed new names 
in the damp thought spaces where no noise comes 
a loud cry that isn’t the name of a cry but is a cry 
there was a small group of people left in a forest 
she had heard their language was a collection 
of bird sounds in the sounds time did not exist 
there were no names no one pushed themselves on 
themselves the canopy opened like a huge mouth 
running speaking through itself with a burning fork 
words until they burn and scald insufficient 
from far away witch could see a ship moving 
it was taking voices in soot boxes 
the sails were white so she knew pain 
because of course standing there the tongue 
death was white and not black death had always 
been white waving its blank lock into the air 















the witch thinks about what it would be like to fuck the government 
the government would be an octopus would it or no a giant squid 
that huge cobalt industrial complex eye 
how can anything be that big  
how can basically a prawn swell and swell to these Cousteau proportions 
you can’t see where its sex parts are you can only see the eye the huge 
impossible eye much more sophisticated than an x-ray 
which only sees bones this sees soul this sees sin this sees your GPS location 
the fucking happens without visibility there are things touching the insides of you 
perhaps its huge phallus has entered you and is moving around but then again 
it could be one of the tentacles and you don’t have any way of knowing 
there must be pornos a lot like this but with slightly less rare animals 
unsurprisingly witch thinks it would not be nice in the traditional sense of nice 
the pulsating tentacles or phallus or phalluses breaking into different sections of 
your body as if you are an unpicked thread material meeting material slowly 
taking the speech bits and the feelings bits and uncoring them like slit avocados 
discarding and melting down and widening into a colossal shouting 
on the other hand there are some elements that want absolutely no resistance at all 
that want to slick and shuddering the parts that hurt gone and vomited 
it is horrifying but easy it doesn’t take effort forcing yourself to watch a bad film 
but just happens the brine flow and the thick parts soldering into your vagina 
your own eye is closed your own breath is making sympathies saying let’s stay healthy 
or somewhere out in the sea I found myself and melted into this everything 
even though the fucking is deeply impersonal and separate each breast a round cushion 
of disconnected pleasure still it has worked out something intimate about your weak dark inside 
region still as you separate and click off there is a growing national pride in not being your actual 
self but something whole and gigantic and full of salt and progress and power and clean covered  






















the witch thinks about what it would be like to 
fuck woods and not the government 
the stretch of land is green but has redness in the soil 
the trees gather around a path from Roman times which 
has sunk into the ground an opening flashing and brightening 
fucking the trees is giving back the means of production to the trees 
xylem and blood vessel outreach tell me how it is when there’s a storm 
not that different because we all shake but some don’t 
have a shelter it can’t be made romantic branches are entering different 
parts of your body is that right different parts of your body are entering 
branches you are shouting loudly and thistles racketing about in here inside 
your radical opening and singular throat sounds for this to work you can’t 
spend more than four hours on the ground clearing bracken or cutting 
because it ruins so easily when it is not a choice the tree is taking 
water from you drenching and it has an archive of season and this is what it is like to 
feel snow pushing hard in between your legs cold and magisterial and probably not in any 
widely available porno when the summer gets in there inside the pockets of your arms  
open sweaty mouth space is being made that widens and separates more and more and 
you look the same but really green hair you forget the words for assessment criteria  
for investigation for intersection for fence for phallus for trunk for the thing the thing the thing 
one solar panel opening eat it up and eat it up stacked cream layers of light 




























the witch has romantic leanings that are expended on no-one 
apart from the petrol station boy 
he gets given flowers and a few kisses because he is too small 
to hunt the witch 
the rest of them however would hunt the witch  
the witch would like to get some of them under her and cradle 
their heads on her breasts or fuck them against the arm of the sofa 
the witch would like to have conversations about her favourite  
literary genres  
the witch would like to roll a cigarette and put it in their mouths 
watch the smoke curl up past grey eyes  
but she isn’t totally stupid  
the petrol station boy looks at her tattoo and says ‘cool!’ 
 
 
the witch knows all about Europe 
in Europe people are sad a lot 
in Europe there are excellent things 
like fiestas and shaded cupolas 
and places that used to be abbeys 
but are now sort of team ups between  
stone walls and grass and sky 
to make full bodied installations 
about the impermanence  
and yet eternal recombination  
of things 
in Europe there are all these bullet holes 
from burning the last lot of witches  
and there are military parades 
where the hats distract you 
to a certain extent from the killing element 
but European rivers smell of death anyway 
so you can never really forget about it  
 
 
the witch records her body as local 
because she’s extremely old underneath 
the witch understands that just because you stay very still 
it doesn’t mean you aren’t listening  
it doesn’t mean that you don’t exist  
she understands that people like fast 
so she impersonates a rock and doesn’t want to be liked 
she impersonates a tree and fuck 
she’s thinking like a tree 
her mind gets green and grows and grows 
 
when the witch was captured they instigated a strip search 
they were looking for the place the devil had marked her 
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with his teeth 
or with his penis 
or with his own devil instruments 
there wasn’t anything very obvious apart from a mole 
and a suntan mark 
so they also had a look inside her 
and they did find a smudge there 
which the witch said was a birth mark 
but no matter 
they asked a witch a lot of questions about what she got up to 
all the fun she had with the devil tricking people 
stealing people’s livestock 
encouraging women to leave their husbands 
turning into a panther and a brown lizard 
and having sex with the devil in those forms 
they asked her why she hated goodness and life 
at which she couldn’t help closing her eyes 
and thinking of a blue wide light coming off the sea 
so they pulled her eyes open 
and asked her whether she knew how to make men’s cocks shrivel up 
and fall off 
 
 
the witch tells the petrol station boy about it  
on his break whilst they both eat coconut-pecan muffins 
which aren’t that nice but which are going off today 
the boy has a somewhat flat and unresponsive face 
which makes him easy to talk to 
the witch tells him about the trial 
how there were always lots of journalists there 
trying to take photos of the witch outside 
and that inside it was quiet and sombre 
with everyone in black apart from the witch 
who hadn’t been given anything else apart from 
her slip which meant her skin prickled 
at the trial a lot of people made claims about the witch 
such as that she poisoned their dogs 
that she brought lightning  
that she made all the girls in the town go mad  
and start foaming at the mouth and downing vodka 
that she stole babies and ate them raw on battlefields 
that she said war and it was war 
 
 
the witch tells the boy 
that she used to dream about a hill 
covered in lumps of earth 
the lumps stuck up and so you couldn’t walk 
properly over the hill or sit or look at the view 
under each of the lumps someone was buried 
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and the earth wasn’t thick at all over the dead people 
so the witch got on her knees and pulled some of 
the corpses up to the surface which were at different  
stages of putrefaction 
because she really wanted to see their faces 
and to remember as much as she could about their hair colour 
their bone structure or clothes  
or to fish out personal artefacts from the graves 
and work out their names 
but the hill didn’t end and every time she pulled out a body 
more stretched out in front of her 
so that even those she had looked at were starting to blur together  
in her mind 
the witch decided that the only thing to do was to eat 
some dirt from every grave so that even if she couldn’t remember 
who was who then at least some of their bacteria might get inside her 
and mix up and absorb into her own bacteria 
and so she went along and stuffed handfuls of soil into her mouth 
without stopping on and on even though she felt sick and knew that she’d never  
get to everyone before night came and made it impossible 
 
 
the witch is an excellent dancer which is good 
because as far as she knows it’s hard to pin down dance 
as a criminal act depending upon where you do it 
as its reason for occurring usually has ambiguous elements 
also the witch doesn’t trust the words which come out of her 
which is why she has stopped writing things down  
instead there is the dancing which she is good at without 
having had specific training and also people expect women 
to dance and they expect witches to dance so it doesn’t confirm 
or deny she could be doing it to get sexual attention 
which she isn’t but they don’t know that do they 
she dances keenly and quietly with added humming to keep time 
you can’t belong in there and you can’t dance with her 
which is the point 
it’s like that poem except that she isn’t the dancer she really is 
in this case the dance 
 
 
the witch doesn’t have a party membership  
maybe because she travels so much 
and finds herself interested in things  
like a string of red beads hanging off a fence post 
in very hot dusty sunlight 
peeling paint on a car that has been left to fall apart 
with weeds creeping themselves through the windshield  
and the engine 
rows of skulls in glass cases  
two men holding each other or fighting in a lit window 
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waking up in a boat and throwing up the sweet potato fritters 
from the night before all over someone’s thick dark hair 
 
 
the boy at the petrol station didn’t have a lot of time left 
on his break so the witch told him about the burning 
the witch said if you could see inside those flames 
then you would know that it wasn’t just you burning 
with your skin peeling back in red open mouths 
or your eyelids crackling away in ashy slick folds 
meaning you couldn’t not look 
you’d also know that everything else was burning too 
that the sky was melting its blue fat down to black 
cold needling stars 
that christ’s lungs were splitting under the pressure of 
hot blood his words losing their oxygen 
and flattening out 
that women’s bellies were popping open ripe melons  
of meat onto the cobbles and high rise balconies 
you’d see the small dark core at the centre of the  
planet contracting into blank steel 
absorbing all the matter and all the light that you had 






























spell for logic 
 
you will sit on your hands 
the sea has a fat logic if you look at it right 
operating sneakily by the moon 
 
you will menstruate exactly when the packet 
tells you to 
 
cut off all the dead parts in your chest 
a cheap Andromeda 
BE ORGANISED 
 
lie on a ring binder and hold your breath 
look at the flood of water running up the sand 
the snow that hovers 
bitchy and quiet 
 
in this rest you are rested 
this whole and perfect sleep 
 
 
































goes the mountain 
 
BLOOD   BLOOD   BLOOD 
 
are you scared yet? 
 
little fissures are putting their black hands onto 
the earth 
 
       an opening 
 
 
SMASH SMASH SMASH 
 





hot and wet and tired and pain 
 
a bird grows nasty feathers 
 

























spell for friendship 
 
utter night with 
bras on the floor 
and a container ship full 
 
I CAN’T WAIT FOR THE MEMORIAL 
TO DO US JUSTICE 
 
the point is she’s talking and you don’t get it 
 
 
when the moment comes 
when everything pulls back from its sheath of flesh 
and the staggering weirdness flows and pulses like 
a lash 
 
send her a text 
 
you thought it’d be your mum 
but like christ you renounce 
those false and precious things 
 
for a pasty agony 
 
the end of the world (or something) 

























spell for a siege 
 
 




if you take your tongue to it you may be able to unlock something 
 
       damp squares 
 
 
   put on all the clothing you own and climb a tree 
 





it seems that being human is not enough        or 
 
        it’s not relevant  
 
 
you are a shining hungry bone like the rest of them 
      (my catkin) 
   
the stray dogs scratching their teeth on ice 
 
         the oval birds 
 
 
bend down and kiss the dirty soil 
 
        gnash yr brown and heathen teeth 
 
 
    focus on black holes 
    on immensities 
 
 












spell for animals 
 
 
         their heads of different shapes 
         are on the floor  




       there are a lot of  things you could say like: 
 
 
             sweet 
             but didn’t have a lot of language 
 
             sweet 
             but is this thing 
               
             sweet   





           when the bits all rustle up and burn and spread 
           and catch and rush and fall and slip and wet and move 
           and finalise 
 
 
     where         will      my thought 
 
 
              the pools of words    crowning in      distant      space 
 
 

















spell for online porn 
 
 
ok get the camera out 
 
   the reason I want you in this cavity is 




      all of the sperm becomes pearl 
 
 
  these        fat       fingers 
 
 
      the hole gets tighter and tighter and tighter and tighter 
 




       but that’s my actual penis 
 
 
           that’s the actual sun coming up whilst we’re in it 
 
 
              
 





















spell for bad relationships 
 
 
hang your mouth 
 
   the blue and sappy teeth there 
 
it is so tiring 
 
unwrap little fingers from their gloves 
 
  now you will be bad 
 






no crying is allowed 
 
   as you throw the corpse from windows 
 
 




























spell for reptiles 
 
come into the ice! 
 
behind a black eye 
the comfort of venom 
 




you are inside the lithe pouch of self 
 
 
  tell me 
 



































spell for women’s books 
 
 
the cat shit vellum 
 
     the bad storm coming in over the flatlands vellum 
 
 




the poet moves their hips like someone on a tram about to vomit 
 
        
 
       Athena still and glacial in her blue ice-bath 
 

































spell for dramatics 
 
 
   when the wind is in 
 
 












her plastic impossible tears 
 
 
    tiny screwed up pastel heart 
 
I CAN STILL TELL 
 
 the way opens 
 
    a mountain in the side of air 
 























spell for sex 
 
 
one damp steak 
 
   hung outside from the porch 
 















































          sad in Romania 
 
 
       that black sky 
 
 
   friendly  incomprehensible     language 
 
 and his own curdled quiet tongue 
 
 
     COME            BACK TO ME 
 
 
           
 
 




       witness 
 
 
       a furled wrap of your old hair 
 
 
       lying in the drain 
 
 
      one       fog      at a window 
 
 
           everyone saying                            go home please! 
 
 
       and the sea playing porous 
 
 








spell for Nietzsche’s horse 
 
 




we are all becoming feminine 
who can say what    man  is 
   on this nano level 
 
your ears are terrible furred lips 
 
 
‘successor of the dead god’ 
 
 

































spell for mysticism 
 
 
I cannot say it is good when it is so bad 
I cannot say    hug this guy over here 
or    this recording             this nice bowl of walnuts 
 
where you       are 
 






the light tells me something 
         




I don’t know what yet 
  my eyes are still red and cracked 




     look— 
 
 






















spell for reality 
 
what do you do when the answer to  
too much is absolutely nothing? 
honey sits on the table 
fat and glowing 
winter light gives you a pass 
nine minutes of feeling nearly 
completely alive 
 
sometimes the ashy body in the ground seems 
to have all the answers 
ultimate realness       nasty truth as the final only truth 
why then       this  stupid relentless yearning  for snow  
      why the   honey  and talking 
 
 
the burning bush is another form of ultimate realness    
but what is it telling us 
certainly it’s nasty 
however also       gold 
also  the entire pocket cosmos shifting and flapping 
gentle limbs       holding each other        in the depth of the fire 
 
 
then               somehow 
 
 
as    much snow as you could ask   for 
 






















in the little dark 
the witch sits 
green men on the walls flailing their tongues 
who am I but a collapsing galaxy? 
 
when Iphigenia died all her friends were outside 
sniffling and rubbing their faces 
the slugs inking a black message in the grass 
the impossible religion is always to forgive 
it is also sitting up to the chest in mud and learning nothing 
mud songs sky mud mud harrier 
the complete terror of how it hurts 
the owls watching you and meaning nothing 
the crows speaking and suffering 
curling out of the wind with a spit of blood in their mouths 
you must forgive that they are not bad and not good 
you must not know them and not try  
white hot ember sending out movement 
 
the difference is    a space of sky  
 



























the fire the ash 
something like Byzantium  
all the incredible gardens going away 
all the incredible sunsets of history  
dancing a polka     a shuffly waltz 
 
in a café you can talk to someone and think 
this is the end of fascism    right here 
in the way that we are knowing things together 
climbing the alpine slope of the mind in little jumps 
 
in the café you are aware of Cleopatra   her good headdresses 
her  astute understanding of economics  her carpet rolls 
her sense of humour       she is my best girl 
she is full of such excellent knowledge 
hello….? 
is anyone there?       
 
history is so old and gross 
wake me up when 
wake me up when it really gets started       
 
the city is a cauldron set it off 
everything is really dusty 
witch’s hands are covered in dirt  something sticky 
 
under the streets the sewers is the oily singing sea 
in the plain trees  there are  watchful bird creatures  interested parties 
imagine being so new                 not one whole century      in your smudgy face 
 
a lot of traffic noise 
these hurtful insinuations   that witch is all better 
 
















witch is on mars 
her own occult space program 
runes of hovering peace 
red blood folds 
alien silver trickling down her legs 
 
mars is just    lovely 
holograms of your face endlessly repeated 
witch says to  herself that no-one has ever been hurt here 
impossible! a planetary surface free of bruise 
no-one has died    wet then heavy unappealing flesh 
no-one has corrupted            mystics still pure and flashing 
like neon signs 
empty red dust           empress of a flat land    cold boulders 
sweet tender   terrain of     never -  been  -  slit 
 
from mars 
the earth is a small green eye 
well          every woman needs a rest 






























the saddest year of my life is every single year 
the kirk with its little whitewashed windows 
the small towns and the seedy pyres 
 
three girls play in the silty garden 
heads on fire with light 
their dresses pink and violet 
suntrap angels small beasts 
always the same beginning 
smoke hovering and smarting in the distance 
 
what the earth deserves 
so much 
so much more 
than dead bodies—bits flailing about 
 
when the evenings go dark and no one is about 
how do you bear it 
how do you bear the small stench 
the black water rising and rising 
 
history is hands cupped for some warm urine 
girls or people or things in their torn outfits 
history is a joke compared to earth 
its huge painful promises 
 
witch watches the girls and their lit hair 
their sharp teeth 
the earth likes wolves at least 
you can give it wolves 

















WITCH TRIALS  
 
what happens at a witches’ sabbat is 
a bunch of women sit together 
lock fingers and say things 
sometimes they sing 
sometimes they tell each other secrets or 
make plans 
the wind rubs away their voices 
they sneak them back 
stars cough 
this is what it’s like to turn over to the devil 
so much smoke 
so much strange movement 
 
the witch has familiars  
she has a wolf a dog a sparrow a grey cat 
a horse a delicate toad a shivering goat 
why on earth would you not kiss those slim 
blue tongues 
why would you not slip into the night with them 
 
when the devil came back the witch started asking him 
about god again even if it was a somewhat awkward subject 
she wanted to know why she occasionally turned up at church 
and sat alone on the end stall feeling bored and sick and all the stone 
seemed to say you are not alive you are not alive you are not alive 
the devil pushed his hair up into a butterfly clip 
sighed and said it’s buried there’s just this space 
and the witch said tell me about the space tell me what would happen 
if I could touch god and lick his marble face tell me what would 
occur if I was let down there to find him it’s been so long 
and the devil said you don’t want it but would be something like 
black black black black black black black black black black 




the witch tries to think about how it started 
maybe it was when a girl came home late at 
night with half her clothes missing  
maybe it was when the witch made beds in the cellar 
for everyone coming to abort their unwanted babies 
and she burned herbs to get rid of the smell of shit 
and blood and women went home dazed and elated 
by themselves by their strange lightness 
maybe it was when she saw a woman spend every day  
walking from her house to the top of the hill and back again 
over and over never actually stopping 
her face was sooty and her mac had rips in it 
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she kept walking and walking at top speed 
and the witch wanted to say please stop 
or where are you going but of course  
she knew exactly where she was going 
 
 
maybe it was when she put on that scratchy halter 
maybe it was when someone knocked a fence up 
and her and the cow just looked at each other blindly 
maybe it was when corpses went into the river 
maybe it was when the books peeled off 
maybe it was when everyone started to look down at 
the floor rather than catching each other’s eyes 
maybe it was when the town board took a financial  
stake in sexual services 
maybe it was when they kept saying walk don’t run 
and her legs ached with green splintered clashing 
maybe it was when bats fled the church at weddings 
maybe it was when there was this punishment 
maybe it was when her friend started to say hit me 
please hit me please hit me hit me hit me hit me hit me 
 
 
the witch wanted to run away 
but where is away 
they were using her name like a flag 
hands were grey with smoke 
when they touched you it was a 
touch that pulls internal organs 
dirty shapes amongst the viscera 
 
 
night can start at daybreak 
that was clear 
night when you pray and pray 
for morning and listen out for a bird’s 
minute watery cry 
and it doesn’t come 
 
 
the witch could only think of it in squares 
one small image at a time a sip of it 




foot twisting like a shot hare 





the witch wanted to organise dances 
that would heat the room to such an extent  
that all of it would be sweated out 
all the humanness would bleed 
into furry salt and slick pouring 
the witch wanted to cut throats 
break and break and break and break 
and break and break 
see what her hand would look like 
ripped from its mooring 
hate is this spit 
it is pushing open a chapped mouth 
and spitting into it 
 
 
the witch thought 
once in this square there were 
dinosaurs and before that there were these 
fish who began rubbing their fins on the sand 
they wanted to come up and breathe 
and walk around 
there were fish-people come out of the sea 
gasping and coughing building small shelters 
out of pines  
at some point one of them will have put an arm 
around another one 
at some point one will have started singing 
the witch begged to the air when did this 
what is this 
 
 
the ash stuck to everything 
it became everything and ran down 
the houses down people’s faces 
down windowpanes and chicken 
coops and sheds and workshops and 
front steps and bed sheets and cardboard boxes 
tight sticky little collar around every cell  
the ash got into the atmosphere and changed  
the weather systems 
rain didn’t dig out light but brought a choked distance 
dogs were eating their young and leaving the half  
chewed bits on the pavement 
they know something 
thought the witch 
 
 
the witch didn’t record how many people 
were called witches or who died 
who condemned them or who reported them 
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who tried to hide who went quite bravely 
to the flames who screamed up to the edge of sound 
when they were dying who was quiet or 
how many children wandered around the mess 
what level of society the average victim came 
from or what happened to bone marrow in the heat 
which people were sent mad by events and started 
to beg for themselves to be killed too 
who remained seemingly unaffected 
what happened to the excess of blood that someone 
had to collect 
to the individual teeth the gold jewellery the ornate rings 
the balled up sanitary pads the false eyes rolling fondly 
the slick waste from intestinal breakdown 
the song that she was singing that then ended up in heads 
corpse words ‘the road the road was narrow but my lover 
he fought on’ in live heads worming and writhing 
the lack of crying at funerals  
the boy dragging his filthy dog into the square because 
he knew that it was the devil incarnate that it had killed 
his mother his sister that it made him touch his own cock 
and moan for something that if he could push it up into 
the fire too then probably all of this would end 
someone licking at a dark patch on the ground 
like it was the most tender spot of something beloved 
instead the witch spent the whole time forcing her eyes to 
stay open 
even when the air was very thick she was going 
keep having a look 
even if it took every piece of eye meat 
she would develop night vision 























the witch lay in immense thick darkness 
around her were the bones of the body 
she burned 
let be burned and slipped off snakelike 
being witch the witch still breathed 
under the pile of logs and ash 
at the corner of what should be known 
adjunct to her bones are the other bones 
adjunct to her skin are the other skins 
and other hair and other eyes hard globules 
what dead thoughts can live down here 
someone didn’t like her husband 
someone loved hers and screamed to be separated 
someone kept their own shed of goats which they 
tended like children someone read philosophy 
someone had a tic where they kept scratching  
their face someone had had a recurring dream 
that they were a medieval knight with clean 
gilt armour who had their own horse and castle 
and who rode out on adventures and would 
drive through the thicket branches slapping their 
face find a damsel tied up against a tree with  
long wavy brown hair and when they got close 
would see that they are the damsel they are the horse 
they are riding themselves they are saving themselves 
 
 
the witch is tired and at war 
she hates the past and she hates the present 
she hates how easy it is how innocuous how boring 
hates England and wants to stop at that but finds 
herself hating them all she hates the landmasses of 
Europe their fat seas their pin tip hills she hates 
their verdant grasses and their polite architecture 
their binaries their sinewy rivers their flatlands and mud and windmills 
and factories and press organisations and colonial bureaucracy and prisons 
and fellowships and barnyards and pump rooms and lochs and silage plants 
there is light and she loves it coming in from space 
clean and sharp as an equation light slipping under chapped eyelids 
sometimes warm sometimes cold hint of blue roughness 
of spectral red twist of lilac blue rim spot of green 
the witch can love light unexpected the witch can feel it 
gathering up in itself the light is not stupid or clever 















not quite  
 




is it big? 
 




if I  
 
















if the books are all saying? 
 




make it up very cleverly 
 
why do you why do you? 
 
this is a difficult one for a whistling 




but I don’t I just wait unfortunately 
 
I curl as close as I possibly can 
 








I am inside that  
 




they don’t run 
 








never tell me to go sweetheart 
 
it was already 
 
the loudness can be let out in an instant 
 






it gets faster 
 
you and a large mud-brown eye 
 
in every place it happens 
 






















































spell for midsummer’s day 
 




under all this is a centre of human jam 
red and pulsing 
 
 
what you feel touch your face 
       in a wavering immense cut 
 
the sun    is hovering at her absolute mid-point 
 
     do you feel that fucked and desperate gilding stir in you? 
 
 
     your stinking  consecrated jam? 
 
      throw yourself down on the floor like a bad dog 
 
get on your knees        and lick the boards 
 
      get up again 
 
 
the fire is doing things to   you 
 




this earth    is so  
 
                
 















spell for emotions 
 
 
make a cake that looks like a picture of your mother making a cake 
set up an industrial skyline with more and more tender phalluses hitting the air 
 
 
don’t       you   realise      how little                                      time there is? 
 
you can’t set up a portfolio  
 
or reason about the amount of passengers through the border 
 
 
      YOU HAVE TO START CRYING OR WHATEVER! 
 
 
      you have to cup a breast just there in the suggestive lamplight 
      or put yr mouth on a fox’s mouth though it hurts and hurts 
      or carry a person on your back over a revered mountain 
 
you have to 
 
           
 
 
hurry hurry hurry hurry 
 
 























spell for January 
 
the two-head calls to you 
 
 
       he is resting over a door and motioning you in and sending you out 
 
 
who will be on your list of the most ambitious fucks? 
 
who will be on your list of the persons leaning towards disaster? 
 
 
    I won’t say DON’T BUY  
 
 
      just tip your head back like an eel is going in 
 
 
     the cold has something to say       in its weak syllables:  
 
 
     we will have achieved something when you get up and make coffee naked and 
you are not naked 
 
 
we will have achieved something when            everyone leans into the ugly gale 
 
 























spell for UN resolutions 
 
 
       the sun comes 
 
they are lying there on the frayed grass 
 
 
   some warm arms and legs 
 
       
 
 
there is only a particular smell in them 
 
 
      small occult fire 
 
when the libraries were burning down everyone was running back 





  a      touch   
 down to the genome  
 
           SAVE THE 
 
 
    ah because suddenly you care 
 
language and its vulgar rotations 
 
      
 
 
grass thinks too 
         
is thinking: 
        
        ‘my only’ 










spell for translation 
 
 
beat the drum 
 
 





     oh                   god 
 
 
how good it feels 
 
 

































spell for joy 
 
THESUN THESUN THESUN 
 
nothing can be trusted! 
raise up your rinsed hands! 
terrible fury and becoming! 
take off your clothes! 
 
one colossal owner of the void 
brightness folding into itself 
again and again vulval or filo 
 
I see a shaking which is total and absolute fear 
 
one day yr gonna die!  
 
the hot impossible apple of 
your perfection 
 
you freckled you covered in something 
you utter 
 
just open up your face 
light’s ice cream cone coming 
on the inside of yr eyelids 
 
























spell for political change 
 
a zeitgeist request here 
 BE SO IN ACCORD WITH YOURSELF 
 THAT YOU GO AWAY 
 
 
nothing is like you 
that picture online  
she has a human body bits of it 
her eyes and mouth are clammy that’s 
 weird 
there might sort of be breasts under the sheet 
 
anyway you’re crying and crying 
 
spit gummy mouth 
trailing 
 
she is nothing like you and yeah 





take that dead ugly body into your bed 
it hates you 
 
let it crack and swell 
 
when things get really bad 
lick it 
the shaking of pink awful mulch 
             the scrabbly leaves in the slowly rotting mouth 
river water 
 




adoring what it is 
adoring with everything you have and are 
her damp alien mess 
then you have reached the first stage of what we decide 








spell for agency 
 
  there is such a thing as a cold and 
terrible night 
 
          a lot of murdered sex workers 
 
 
in a drama-documentary about 
 murdered sex workers 
 
 
 the cold night gathers round 
 
locusts talking about you 
 
    things in the air 
 
that are not of this world 
 
 
   STICK YOUR HAND INTO THE GREEN/BLACK SLIME 
 
 
 she wore tight leggings with the band showing 
 
      she didn’t mind burying the shit back into the friendly earth 
 
    a mourner of patchy neon 
 
 




what do you         think          
 














spell for maths 
 
 
  this is hard 
 
    can you see that      rubbing around      the huge cold wind 
    numbers making faces in ash 
 
 
Hypatia  had her skin taken off with tiles 
 
   she made equations    zero on her long tongue 
 
 
Hypatia     saw the stars 
 
     but you never will 
 
she saw   blazing signs      codes           the   future 
 
 
    you’ll never see that though 
    standing in the mulchy forest 
    straining your poor eyes 
 
 
Hypatia got in on a constellation        an adorable moon crater 
the messages        the   decimals   reaching    her skinny desiring hands 
 
      but you’ll never see it 
      you’ll die and you’ll never see 
 

















spell for Lilith 
 
 
Lilith you look so nice  with that snake 
 
 
   your hair curled the way a serpent might 
 
 
   Lilith    you are such a bad girl 
 
 
       i heard you like reproductive justice 
       i heard you like staying up all night   with your lips pressed against the cracks 
        
 
Lilith can you make an owl demon? 
a huge one? 
flapping through the night with copper eyes 
shrieking for our salvation 
dripping internal blood all over used cars and buildings of state 
 
 
   Lilith 
you have a really great body 
you are a taunt 
an un-fucked thing    in a realm of little bits 
 
 
   Lilith 
please sleep in my bed at night 
smelling of lavender and coal 
rub my back    and look at me   with an impossible  black gaze 
 
      the things you have seen 
      a whole universe of your own making 




  Lilith  
take us back with you 
 
sliding all over the floor 
raving & screaming 




spell for the witch’s hammer 
 
  a two pronged sword 
  to put them down 
 
 
out there a lot of things happen 
 
witches  
undo   each other       a candle in each opening 
 
 
      witches wake at night and cry 
      beasts with curly horns comfort them 
      /suck gently 
 
 
witches go astray 
carnality       swooping and fluttering    like a ragged flag 
 
they          laugh    so much 
covered in purple bruises 




the witch’s hammer  sinks into flesh 




             the witches eat your book 
             then you 



















Witch lies on the volcano 
amongst creeping language  
red spaces/ash snowflakes 
lava says something huge 
the way it shudders down the mountain 
a song without melody 
clouds of dust hold the forest 
lava still coming in slow sweet insistence 
the sun coming in and out of black  
waving and smiling with bright teeth 
 
a retinue of ghosts follow the lava 
their singing a slow boom 
ghosts are not sad which is why they are here  
the volcano could never be a sad object 
it could never weep only resist 
pink lava making heartfelt in a green forest 
 
ghosts have seen things 
ghosts have watched aliens making love in silt from silt 
meteor love a moon on moon 
terrible cell creation whooping breath long dead 
but alive alive and crawling with beetle certainty  
through the humming fire 
 
the witch has too many reasons to part from the earth but she won’t part 
inside a crater the skin of the earth bursts 
she cannot go home from the world  
she sees herself warm covered in soot and definitely not cute 
a new set of scary words crawling       
a new set of tongues that look unborn and haggard 
 
down below things shudder 
the volcano is ready at all times  
it happily gorges on being itself 
as the ghosts rub their hands in glee 
as they procreate violently smoke hissing from 
gashes in the rock  
 
ghosts are pink and blue and gold   agile birds 
they are safe when they can change 
safe when they can mourn and have voice to mourn 
safe when they can hurt    safe and entirely shattering 
all of them crowding up into each other’s skinny arms 
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transparent clever yearning bodies and eyes 
transparent tears and happy gnashing lovely teeth 
transparent organs pulsing and held out like gifts 
 
the witch watches the charged belonging air  
rubs her foot in the salt lava 













































a sort of woman’s face 
all gods in it 
dearest sister 
dearest beloved 
marriage comes as knife between us— 
we don’t need it 
 
witch sister 
passionate head and arms 
excellent culottes 
on the outside can’t tell if you’d see it 
the way to breed magic is to put our heads together 
for now the new epoch appears 
passionate cheek and foot 
what of 2000 years for us? 
giant churches and pyramids glittering 
in a weird unholy air 
what of the many 
rubbing our stomachs and laughing   like dogs 
 
witch has many sisters 
callous hot mouths 
sneaky breaths 
 
yes explosions are good 
mountains coming down like pebbles 
but also 
 
you put a hand in her hand 
witch’s hair turns to snakes 
terrible terrible 


















under the strange light 
witch watches something strange 
moving about 
wet dark shape in the snow 
hurrier 
sentient or un-sentient?  
animal or mineral? 
 
witch is scared of ghosts on their own 
what exhausting thing might they want? 
what annoying   painful demands? 
what yellow    milk will  they force  through her 
sentimental     and lukewarm  wetness 
 
but wet dark shape is not a ghost 
is not a thing 
is not     in-fact         dark 




witch shouts out an    O 
 
into the hush 
 
wet shape in the sleet  shivers 
the very white   day 
the  bright mountains 
   the       long tepid grasses 
 
wet shape is not witch’s soul 
it hovers 
is not a soul 





wet    shape   speaks runes 
draws in the sky 
an inter-spacial worshipper 
of       changed positions  
 
 
wet shape does not call back 
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but       it does 
 
its  huge    call       shakes the witch’s ribcage            wide               open 
 
blue and honey 
 
shimmering index       of inside knowledge 
 
 
wet shape’s voice is not a voice 
 
it is a stranger with no body 









































the witch is under neon glow 
the petrol station boy is rubbing her 
hand he would wear her makeup  
he would wear her perfume 
he doesn’t have a problem with things like that 
the witch is sucking a sparkling lemon drink out of a 
long straw her hands are cold 
time is incredibly heavy but loose holding itself 
up like one of those long distance albatrosses 
with huge ungainly wings crossing immense 
distances not stopping to eat or shit or cry or think 
the petrol station boy shares a cigarette with her 
under the no smoking sign which is his way of saying 
I don’t know what of all to be sorry for but I am sorry 
the witch permits a half smile and explains the system 
of land enclosure to him while she takes little menthol puffs 
she hasn’t looked in the mirror for three days and can feel 
her face growing into itself 
in the car park the devil is waiting for the witch he has 
on a green dress his hair is in a slick ponytail his boots 
are shiny and dotted with diamante studs 
he is thinking about the flammable nature of everything 
and how it could still be burned up at any time 
even the concrete the plastic files the nanotechnology 
and a little part of him is thinking about god as it always is 
thinking about the word liberation and its sound 
the witch has loam on her cold hands she has soot 
on them and bird’s feathers 
she tells the petrol station boy about what happens 
when you agree to go and live in a foxes’ den 
how your face gets smaller how you do these shivered 
scratchy screams how you bite into raw chicken 
how you don’t do it what you do you do something else 
how crows talk to you and come off kind of bitchy 
the petrol station boy laughs he is so young that he looks insane 
to have only just turned up to the party and nonchalantly 
drink an orange juice in that manner while summer is developing 
because anything bad can happen and anything can 
teeth snapping and cawing blood making little pathways 
the devil is shouting over to the witch 
the witch is shouting back and she is just shouting like she 
will always be just shouting and shouting and singing quietly 











How do you do your magic? 
 
How is so balletic, how is like a dance spectacular, getting up 
from your seat at the back of the stage and rushing into the  
spotlight, rushing into movement, a body doing not exactly 
what is ‘natural’ to it (is dance natural) but what its potential 
is, the shapes that flesh didn’t command only opened. 
 
How do you do your magic? 
 
If there is a worst word it is nostalgia, the choirs 
twisting a larch into a tea towel, if you make it 
warm and curling, and so the twitching knowledge 
sinks a little, my instinct to stuff leaves into my mouth 
recedes, smaller and smaller the incantations and the 
freshness. 
 






Where did you learn your knowledge of witchcraft? 
 
I could pick any woman. i.e. Iphigenia i.e. Jane Grey 
Buy a wife, have a nice and symbolic wedding, take her home,  
put your penis in there, make some humans. Sometimes you buy a dress.  
Sometimes you are sort of kind and have a blond face, sometimes 
you are shit, or drown her with one hand pocketed. Inside that, never. 
Inside, a slick web. A field of tubers processed under electric lights. 
Please record a million, million, million, million, million ghosts.  
Please record a system of language never heard before on the surface of the earth. 
 
 
What are your plans for treasonous action against the King and state? 
 
If I say the witch knows things, you won’t enjoy. I could smash every 
dousing crystal, apparition, rune, astrological symbol, bassinet, globe 
of silver, dagger, pleated skirt and we would still. Dogs come  









How many times have you used your craft for material gain? 
 
There was once a person I led to be killed. In the ballad it  
was four roses on a pale cheek, it was wet long hair like 
trailing oil. I found myself radicalised. I found the state I was 
in unbearable. I found that violence looked pure, all the clean 
edges. When the call came. He was quite small for what he’d 
done. I never felt less bad. I was. It was freezing, totally freezing. 
Everything was a new country, the way you notice things when 
you first visit a city, the half open windows, the smell of orange 
blossom, the bottle green trams and full skirted waitresses. 
Something after all this time had occurred or was occurring. 
Not good, existent. Afterwards my lover put a small 
kiss on my mouth and said, do you really hate us all?  
And I said, obviously.  
 
Have you attempted to draw others into your dark arts? 
 
The best time though wasn’t then, all that dry, agonised 
scratching. The best time was a Tuesday, we didn’t go 
into college. We cut up magazines into strange art forms 
and listened to the radio. The sun had the touching innocence 
of the early 90’s, hair bleached a pale lilac at the edges. 
There was a little world and it didn’t say anything, nor 
did it have to perform. No one self-consciously did a 
pillow fight in their training bra. Instead, our legs got 
warm. Instead we made mothers into a word as easy as 
drinks in a bowl of ice. We found all the thoughts 
there had not been time for in the previous, saw tremendous 
fleets of new work flood into the hallway. The Odyssey had 
a bit about periods. One new love poem for each asteroid 
in the outer atmosphere. Some thawing. All the time I was 























all the attention & cold love 
waiting at the finland station for the trains to rush in 
oh 
this cunt is a commie red until the very end 
this cunt is a commie with its heat set onto surplus value 
be as afraid as you can be afraid 
be afraid until you tremble the cunt wavering through concrete 
so hardly and so softly 
 
cunt hex is the very end of men 
it sees you in the small eye 
your badly written messages and stink of nerve gas 
what is this portable transmission   what are these borders 
wet and sticky to the touch 
blackened tongue parts hanging off porches 
 
the cunt eats ice cream from the clean bowl of your skull 
laughing 
bands together all of the hamlets w/ needlepoint accuracy 
cries in the shower cries onto newspapers cries during sex cries at passport control 
cries in the sky down in the pit covered in swivelling happy tar 
 
the cunt has face turned out has lobes switched onto rental practices refuge with a huge heart in it 
please tell me again to my face that emotion has no place in the body of language 
please tell me again why police try and crawl up in this mouth how it spits them out crisping 
nicely 
 
a cunt hex is a terrible thing 
you are a wet bone in a pool of other bones 
you can feel this in your bowels your sunken boy-womb where snow breeds 
it comes in at the root of your spine it is a temple to your beautiful self pity 
it is a temple where everything burns where the body burns and all the deserving angels  
go into the pyre 
 
hex ends your accretion of capital 
hex hears you at night the way you fuck— pathetic and nasty 
it’s both weak and sort of aiming towards violent 
we’ll stop all that your mouth choke with dousing rods 
you thought there was a conspiracy of women didn’t you you thought that 
yes you’re right of course  
we are laughing at your dick just like you assumed 




hex from a cunt is a blue skill 
essential as seabirds 
meaningful aspect 
good work that must be done at the level of dirt 
work that must draw all the people together all the workers 
all the cunt workers taut and loosening 
all the cunt workers cuntless or heavy 
all the cunt workers rising up  
they will put their program of songs onto the curriculum 
they will be herbivore but really nasty really awful 
cunt hex is matter of fact  
it is excising the bad matter cutting away at what has gone off 
your little standards your medley of avant-garde hits  
where the world is your emotionless brunch party where the world is what you do to it one great 
battlefield heaving with unsuitably attired corpses with all your small type books so ugly in the 
way of actual plants  
 
we are all so damaged and imperfect we are all so hurt know that as I hex you I hug you know 
that as you are hexed and the blood is pouring from your head and groin that it is only because I 
love everything that is alive it is only because after the source of the infection being sliced and 
opened up to the parched grass it is only then that our work truly begins only then that the dour 
singers get murdered and you get allowed to breathe   
 
a kind of tender petalled forgiveness comes in my hate for you  
a forgiveness that knows how it is to hurt and hurt on when inside you turn off  
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